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for	 global	 and	 European	 cooperation	 based	 on	 certain	 values	 and	
obligations	 rising	 from	 then	 was	 the	 other.	 The	 year	 1991	 saw	 the	
culmination	 of	 both	 front	 in	 this	 transformational	 period	 of	 Russian	
history.	









regional	 and	 local	 level.	 All	 levels	 have	 a	 representative	 (elected)	 and	
executive	(administrative)	side	of	government	and	the	judiciary.	The	federal	
administration	 includes	 the	 sectoral	 ministries,	 central	 agencies	 and	
services.	These	federal	bodies	have	their	branches	in	the	regional	and	local	
(municipal,	city)	level.	The	regional	administration	includes	the	executive	








republics	 in	 the	 former	 Soviet	Union	which	 in	 actuality	 fell	 somewhere	





received	 less	 attention	as	 a	 separate	 entity	 in	 research.	 Studies	 about	 the	
transition	 period	 usually	 concentrate	 either	 on	 changes	 in	 the	 state´s	
political	 system	 or	 case	 studies	 which	 are	 problem	 specific.	 Along	 with	
macro-economic	 studies,	 a	 major	 interest	 has	 been	 the	 development	 of	
state-regional	relations	in	the	1990´s.	Information	about	the	development	
of	 local	 administration	 in	 Russia	 is	 scattered	 among	 different	 types	 of	
literature.	 It	 is	 therefore	 difficult	 to	 collect	 because	 of	 the	 very	 different	
levels	of	analysis	and	formulation	of	questions	involved.	Yet	the	effect	which	
territorial	 arrangements	 have	 had	 on	 administrative	 networks,	 policy	
implementation	 and	 the	 position	 of	 civil	 servants	 has	 been	 huge	within	
Russian	 history.	 The	 meaning	 of	 territoriality	 for	 the	 development	 of	
administrative	culture	therefore	needs	more	attention.	




jurisdiction	 of	 the	 state	 and	 municipalities	 and	 the	 territorial	 state	
functions	in	municipalities.	This	definition	includes	the	implementation	
of	 both	 locally	 made	 decisions	 and	 state	 imposed	 (legally	 sanctioned)	
obligations.	
Before	 the	collapse	of	 the	Soviet	Union,	 studies	of	Russian	and	Soviet	
administrative	 systems	 could	 broadly	 speaking	 be	 categorized	 into	 two	
groups:	 totalitarian	 theory	 which	 stressed	 the	 political	 and	 economic	
unitarian	links	and	controlled	practices;	and	socialist	theory	of	the	state	in	
which	political	ideology	was	understood	to	translate	directly	into	structures.	
Since	1991	a	more	varied	view	on	 the	Soviet/Russian	 state	has	begun	 to	
emerge.	This	includes	elements	from	both	orthodox	approaches	as	well	as	





alternating	 cultural	 identities.	The	municipal	 administration	 at	 the	 local	




been	 two	 major	 waves	 of	 cultural	 influence.	 The	 first	 has	 seen	 the	
municipalities	as	a	direct	functional	part	of	state	governmental	organs	and	
state	 ideology.	The	 second	has	 seen	 them	more	 a	 representative	 of	 local	












organizational	 studies	 in	 the	 context	 of	 administrative	 science	 and	
administrative	history.	Combining	organizational	and	cultural	studies	is	a	
well	 established	 and	much	used	 theoretical	 approach,	particularly	 in	 the	
research	of	organizational	learning.	Conceptual	tools	have	been	borrowed	
from	 these	 organizational	 studies.	 In	 the	 historical	 part	 of	 the	work	 the	
starting	point	is	a	theory	of	public	administration.	Here,	I	have	wanted	to	





of	 structural	 arrangements	 would	 not	 suffice.	 Instead	 of	 choosing	 one	
“macro-theory	 of	 Russian	 studies”,	 the	 culture	 of	 administration	 is	




thus	 a	human	product	which	 eludes	 any	 rigid	 theoretical	 categorization.	






it	 the	 structures	 (economic,	 political,	 legal	 and	 administrative)	 which	
organize	institutional	work?	Or	is	it	the	human	interaction	in	bureaucratic	
social	groups	or	some	type	of	a	combination	of	these?	




these	 effects	 to	 the	 structures,	 either	 as	 desired	 development	 or	 as	
dysfunctions.	 Culture	 is	 the	 social	 system	 of	 a	 structurally	 governed	
administration.	In	this	sense,	culture	cannot	be	looked	at	separately	from	
structure.	
The	 research	 therefore	 asks:	 how	 do	 structural	 reforms	 and	 the	 old	
culture	of	institutions	meet	in	transitions?	To	help	answer	this,	two	historical	
periods	have	been	chosen	as	objects	of	study:	
1.	 The	 administrative	 reforms	 before	 the	 revolution	 leading	 to	 the	
October	 revolution	 (19–1916)	 and	 the	 subsequent	 cultural	
radicalization	 of	 the	 socialist	 government	 during	 Stalin	 (191–
193).
2.	 The	 perestroika	 years	 as	 a	 reform	 period	 of	 the	mature	 planning	
system	 (196–1991)	 and	 the	 consequent	 change	 to	 capitalist	
government	system	since	the	beginning	of	the	90´s	(1991	onwards).
3.	 Because	 the	 intention	 has	 been	 to	 draw	 a	 general	 picture	 of	 the	
Russian	 administration	 from	 historical	 perspective,	 the	 empirical	
work	forms	just	one	part	of	the	whole.	
I	 have	 chosen	 a	 group	 of	 dominant	 cultural	 elements	 in	 these	 historical	
transition	periods	to	see	what	meaning	they	held.	The	aim	has	been	to	form	




central	 elements	 which	 can	 be	 found	 in	 different	 types	 of	 bureaucratic	
organizations	and	which	are	also	central	to	the	idea	of	the	rule	of	law.	These	
elements	 are	 studied	 at	 two	 levels	 of	 change:	 the	 political	 ideologies	 of	
administrative	change	and	actual	state	buildings.	
Political	ideologies	of	administrative	change	are	useful	and	meaningful	
because	 they	 show	 the	manifest	 goals	 of	 organizations	 and	 thus	 help	 to	
reveal	unintended	side-effects	which	materialize	in	the	formation	of	a	new	
administrative	culture.	The	state	building	stage	of	 transition	 includes	 the	
description	 of	 the	 administrative	 ecology	 for	 each	 time	 period.	 Here,	
authority	 relations	 and	 legislative	 changes	 dominate.	 The	 lengthy	 time	




authority	 and	 political	 power	 have	 existed	 and	 in	what	 proportion.	The	
relationship	with	 law	and	higher	supervising	bodies	 is	 thus	 incorporated	
closely	into	the	analysis.	
Methodologically,	a	case	study	has	been	used.	I	treat	the	four	time	periods	
as	 separate	 cases.	 In	 the	 last	 part	 (the	 present	 day	 transition)	 analysis	 is	




in	 relation	 to	 the	previous	 system.	The	aim	 in	each	historical	period	has	
been	to	create	an	ideal	type	of	administrative	culture	which	has	developed	
during	the	transition.	The	ideal	types	are	answers	to	both	the	question	of	
what	 and	why.	The	description	of	 administrative	 elements	 of	 ideal	 types	
helps	to	understand	the	central	question	of	transition:	why	is	changing	the	
structures	 and	 law	 not	 enough	 to	 change	 the	 culture	 of	 administration?	
Conversely,	what	have	been	the	elements	of	administrative	culture	and	the	




1 Theoretical Framework 
1.1 How to Define “Administrative Culture”
1.1.1 Defining Concepts in the Study of Administrative Cultures
The	 definitions	 given	 to	 key	 concepts	 deserve	 concentrated	 attention,	
because	 they	 touch	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 how	 we	 perceive	 meanings	 in	
cultures.	When	 the	 subject	 of	 study	 is	 an	 alien	 culture,	 this	 task	 is	 even	
more	acute.	Surprisingly,	the	present	day	transition	literature	has	not	paid	
much	 attention	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 concepts	 in	 political	 and	 economic	
studies.	 In	my	view,	 this	has	contributed	to	the	 lack	of	dialogue	between	




has	 carried	 very	 different	 connotations	 in	 all	 these	 cultures,	 which	 are	
bound	to	the	historical	roots	and	social	dynamics	of	each	time	period.	The	
discourse	 between	 political	 and	 scientific	 spheres	 heavily	 influences	 the	
official	 meanings	 of	 words.	 I	 support	 Ilmari	 Susiluoto´s	 view	 that	 “the	
grammar	 of	 politics	 has	 a	 wide	 task	 in	 examining,	 for	 instance,	 the	
“grammar”	of	planning	discussion,	the	latent	and	manifest	meanings	of	the	
term	planning,	or	the	rational	and	emotional	aspects	of	Finnish	planning”	




















an	everyday	 term	has	been	used	 in	a	very	 liberal	manner,	much	 like	 the	
concept	of	culture,	to	include	anything	from	a	written	document	to	what	
ever	is	“in	the	air”	in	a	society	at	a	certain	historical	moment.	Often	it	 is	
used	 as	 a	 synonym	 for	 doctrine.	 For	 instance	 Darrell	 P.	 Hammer	 has	
described	doctrine	as	“the	authoritative	and	usually	well-publicized	ideas	
that	make	up	the	official	philosophy	(…)”.	 In	his	view	“ideology	 is	 those	
political	 values	 that	 are	 parts	 of	 the	 belief	 system	 of	 the	 individual.	 In	
contrast	 to	 doctrine,	 ideology	 tends	 to	 be	 ambiguous,	 inconsistent,	 and	
even	irrational.”	(Hammer	196:	5.)
I	use	the	concept	of	political	ideology	of	administrative	change	which	is	






means	 the	 core	 values	 of	 a	 particular	 political	 ideology.	 For	 instance	 in	
liberal	democracy	such	core	values	include	freedom	of	individual	liberties,	
such	 as	 free	 speech,	 or	 the	 right	 to	 private	 property.	 From	 these	 follow	
principles	of	free	information	flow	and	property	rights	protection.
In	 this	 study,	however,	 the	hierarchies	 of	 definitions	do	not	matter	 as	
much	as	the	relevance	of	concepts	for	administration.	I	have	concentrated	
on	the	ideological	thoughts	of	the	decision	making	elite	to	find	out	what	
types	 of	 official	 purposes	 of	 action	 have	 existed	 for	 administrative	
organizations.	 What	 is	 good	 administration	 in	 general?	 How	 are	 basic	
political	 relations	 organized	 in	 administrative	 decision	making?	What	 is	
the	relationship	with	law	and	economy,	and	so	on.	







“control”,	 “power”	 and	 “guidance”.	 These	 are	 words	 without	 which	 the	






It	 is	often	quite	 important	 to	make	a	clear	distinction	between	 formal	
organizations	and	the	social	system	in	which	the	daily	culture	is	formed.	
Susiluoto	points	out	 that	 in	 the	 study	of	 the	 Soviet	 administration,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	understand	the	difference	between	terms	relating	to	action,	in	
separation	to	words	used	in	the	description	of	structures.	Translating	terms	
from	 Russian	 to	 English	 and	 Finnish,	 for	 instance,	 requires	 theoretical	
work	 based	 on	 understanding.	 For	 instance,	 the	 word	 “upravlenie”	
(administration,	government,	in	Finnish	hallinto)	has	been	translated	with	
the	use	of	several	words.	On	one	hand	there	are	“administration”,	“leadership”	





In	 the	Western	 discourse	 guidance,	 supervision	 and	management	 are	
often	used	as	synonyms	for	administrative	work	in	a	very	general	manner.	
In	this	work,	these	words	have	their	specific	meanings	which	correspond	




procedural	 principles.	 Power	means	 an	 ability	 to	 affect	 wanted	 changes.	
Control	means	an	ability	to	secure	the	work	process	for	the	advantage	of	the	














which	 structures	 advance,	 and	 power	 which	 different	 groups	 in	 these	




importance	 of	 their	 work,	 has	 significant	 meaning	 for	 the	 creation	 of	
cultures.	 Different	 professions	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 have	 influenced	 the	
interpretation	 of	words.	 Susiluoto	 pointed	 out	 the	meaning	 of	 the	word	
“steering”	which	as	a	term	of	cybernetics	has	belonged	to	the	language	of	
engineers,	mathematicians	and	planners.	As	the	planning	and	steering	tasks	







studies,	 it	 is	 therefore	 important	to	remember	that	 the	same	persons	can	
mean	 different	 things	 with	 the	 same	 words	 when	 speaking	 of	 different	
times.	For	a	researcher	then,	this	represents	a	challenge	in	understanding	
the	cultural	context	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	studied	organizations.




constitutes	 culture	 and	 how	 it	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 administrative	




often	 treat	 “culture”	 as	 something	 which	 inhibits	 progress.	 Transitional	
studies	made	from	an	economic	perspective,	concentrate	on	building	new	
models	and	seek	to	explain	the	errors	of	old	ones	in	(macro)	economically	
rational	 terms.	As	with	 purely	 legal	 studies,	 culture	 is	 often	 viewed	 as	 a	
group	of	unsolved	problems.	
Social	sciences,	on	the	other	hand,	have	developed	a	multitude	of	different	













There	are	 several	ways	of	 looking	at	an	administration:	 structural	and	









he	 represents	 one	more	 classification:	 elite	 –	 democratic	 administration,	
which	has	been	used	in	different	forms	within	administrative	literature	(for	










The	 study´s	 perspective	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 Heady	 (1996)	 who	 has	
examined	several	ways	to	categorize	the	elements	of	administration.	He	
sees	that	administration	can	be	defined	primarily	in	two	ways:	by	its	basic	





control),	 2.	 differentiation	 and	 specialization	 (division	 of	 labor,	 goals,	
roles),	and	3.	qualification	or	competence	(professionalism).	(Heady	1996:	
4,	9.)	
Heady	 detected	 three	 variants	 for	 looking	 at	 bureaucratic	 behavioral	
characteristic.	The	 first	 could	 be	 called	 “	 the	Weberian	 ideal”	 in	 which	
functional,	 desirable	 behavior	 is	 expected	 and	 accepted	 as	 natural	 in	
bureaucratic	 operations.	 Another	 stresses	 dysfunctional	 behavior	 which	
develops	 from	the	 rationalistic	orientation	of	bureaucracy	and	structural	








is	 purely	 structural	 and	 the	 other	 social.	The	 elements	 of	 administrative	
culture	are	most	of	all	derived	from	the	theoretical	formulation	of	transition	
in	 which	 transitional	 purposes	 are	 overriding.	 Yet,	 to	 have	 a	 common	
measurement	“model”	for	each	historical	case,	the	elements	also	have	to	be	
the	 same	 in	 each	 case.	The	 elements	 can	 be	 found,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	
modification	of	Markku	Kiviniemi´s	model	(1994)	in	which	rules,	resources	
and	 external	 relations	 presuppose	 certain	 elements	 to	 be	 present	 in	
















I	 look	 at	 the	 changes	 in	 administrative	 elements	 in	 the	 transitional	
process	 through	 three	 themes:	 the	 political	 ideology	 of	 administrative	
change,	state	building	(organization,	laws	and	economy)	and	the	transformed	





these	 definitions	 adds	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 possible	 side	 effects	 and	
risks,	 if	 not	 of	 direct	 causes.	 Cultural	 transition	 changes	 the	 self-under-
standing	of	both	citizens	and	administrators.
Ideologies	 of	 administrative	 change	 include	 three	notable	 aspects:	 the	
use	of	metaphors,	stories	and	myths.	Both	in	the	191	and	1991	ruptures,	
metaphors	have	been	used	to	create	powerful	images.	These	have	been	used	





which	 influence	 how	 actors	 understand	 meanings	 and	 react	 in	 social	
situations.	 Andrew	 Brown	 has	 separated	 four	 functions	 of	myths	which	
influence	 the	 development	 of	 culture.	 First,	 myths	 create,	 maintain	 and	
legitimize	past,	present	or	future	actions	and	consequences.	Second,	they	
maintain	 and	 conceal	 political	 interests	 and	 value	 systems	 which	 affect	
whole	 organizations.	 Third,	 they	 explain	 and	 create	 cause	 and	 effect	


















the	 official	 ideology	 at	 the	 structural	 (institutional)	 level	 (comp.	 for	










Political	 scientists	 have	 attempted	 to	 categorize	 political	 regimes	with	







values.	 New	 administrative	 ethics	 and	 procedural	 principles	 are	 created	
which	show	the	basic	assumptions	of	the	organization.
In	transition,	 the	old	culture	mediates	 the	range	and	differentiation	of	
public	 resources	 and	 rules,	 and	 of	 external	 relationships	 as	 a	 result	 of	
changes	of	ideological	purposes.	The	transformed	administrative	culture	is	
in	fact	a	transformed	version	from	the	ideal	administrative	type	described	




1.	The	basis	of	cultural	changes	 is	a political ideology of administrative 









•	 external	 relations	 (i.e.	 types	 of	 clients,	 elites,	 relationship	 with	
them).
	






















•	 authority:	 type	 and	 ownership,	 market	 of	 authority,	 territorial	
hierarchies	






•	 leadership:	 roles	 in	 the	 organization	 and	 in	 the	 administrative	
market
•	 personnel:	 working	 style,	 specialization	 and	 professionalization,	
hiring	and	promotion	practices




each	 time	 period	 and	 their	 changes	 within	 the	 theoretical	 framework.	
Concepts	relating	to	an	ideal	type	(the	liberal-democratic	one	in	this	case)	
can	be	used	in	two	ways.	They	can	show	the	relevant	similar	features	which	
correspond	 with	 the	 ideal	 type	 or	 qualities	 which	 differ	 in	 other	
administrative	 cultures.	 More	 interesting,	 however,	 is	 to	 discover	 the	






of	 my	 outline,	 and	 are	 not	 universal	 by	 nature.	 The	 descriptions	 of	
















1.1.3 Administrative Ethics, Procedural Principles and 
Citizenship in the Liberal-Democratic Ideal Type
The	present	day	(European)	liberal-democratic	administration	ideal	type	is	
used	 as	 a	 reference	 point	 in	 this	 work.	 I	 claim	 that	 this	 framework	 is	







help	 enable	 the	birth	of	 a	 certain	 type	of	 behavior,	while	 others	make	 it	
more	difficult.	For	instance,	the	structures	which	build	upon	the	ethical	and	
procedural	 choices	 of	 a	 liberal-democratic	 rule	 of	 law	 administration,	
should	not	in	principle	lead	to	undemocratic,	dictatorial	or	highly	corrupt	
administrations.	Alternatively,	one-party	systems	of	authoritarian	govern-
ment,	 without	 the	 separation	 of	 powers,	 make	 organizational	 learning	





and	 legitimacy	 to	government	will	mean	a	return	 to	an	emphasis	on	 the	
public	aspects	of	its	work	and	to	the	basic	issues	of	democracy	(Stivers	1994:	
443).	 Different	 definitions	 of	 ethics	 are	 connected	 to	 different	 types	 of	
government.	For	instance,	in	the	case	of	the	liberal-democratic	ideal	type,	














of	Russian	administration,	because	 law	has	 twice	been	a	political	 tool	of	
major	system	change.	Law	has	also	been	the	key	instrument	of	state	building	
aimed	at	altering	the	most	basic	assumptions	of	public	institutions,	i.e.	the	
social	 contract	 (Grosenick	1994:19)	of	 the	 administrators.	Furthermore	
law	is	closely	connected	to	many	of	the	cultural	elements	under	study	here.	













by	 those	 who	 take	 part	 in	 the	 decision	 making.	 At	 the	 actor	 level,	 the	
resolution	 of	 interest	 conflicts	 between	 individuals	 must	 at	 least	 be	
compatible	with	the	non-negotiable	values	of	rights.	(Clark	&	Dear	194:	
155,162.)	These	same	non-negotiable	values	of	rights	form	the	basis	of	the	
relationship	 between	 administration	 and	 its	 citizens.	 Discretion	 is	 used	
with	 the	 intent	 of	 protecting	 individual	 citizens	 from	 arbitrary	 decision	
making:	the	administration	has	horizontal	authority	(i.e.	the	delegation	of	
decision	making	to	interested	parties,	as	an	opportunity	to	take	part	in	the	
preparation	 of	 decisions);	 concepts	 of	 public	 interest	 (i.e.	 broadened	
definition	of	expertise);	and	local	community	which	strengthens	the	link	in	
a	non-coercive	way.	(Comp.Stivers	1991:	444–446.)	









administrator	 accept.	 The	 ideal	 is	 minimal	 use	 of	 personal	 discretion.	
(Peters	194:	41.)
The	 second	 group	 uses	 generalities	which	 are	 drawn	 from	 a	 series	 of	
individual	decisions.	This	way,	each	case	is	to	an	extent	a	new	one	which	
can	 be	 modified	 according	 to	 situational	 reasons.	 The	 ideal	 is	 a	 well-





making	 is	 generally	 assumed	 to	 be	 a	 result	 of	 personal	 bargaining	 and	
negotiation.	 Rules	 which	 the	 administration	 itself	 has	 promulgated	
constitute	a	place	from	which	to	begin	bargaining.	(Peters	194:	43.)	This	
type	 of	 personal	 “flexibility”	 is	 often	 characterized	 as	 being	 typical	 for	
societies	 in	 transition.	The	 political	 instability	 of	 the	 country	 intensifies	
what	can	be	considered	a	permanent	dysfunction	from	the	view	of	a	stable	
rule	of	law	ideal.	Trust	is	personal	and	not	institutional.	
The	 liberal	 tradition	 has	 been	 ambivalent	 about	 the	 role	 government	
should	 have	 in	 society.	 The	 traditional	 liberal	 view	 is	 that	 government	
should	only	have	authority	when	it	is	necessary	for	the	protection	of	life,	
liberty	and	property	of	citizens,	and	legitimacy	to	do	so	only	when	it	has	
popular	 consent	 (Hollis	 &	 Plokker	 1995:	 51).	 The	 welfare	 state	 in	 the	
Scandinavian	 model	 has	 meant	 an	 active	 state	 which	 regulates	 the	
development	 of	 the	 whole	 society.	This	 type	 of	 government	 needs	 large	
popular	support.	The	present	neutral	liberal	democratic	ideal	type	tries	to	




The	public organization aspect	 requires	 legality.	 Legal	 practices	 in	 the	











are	 guided	 through	basic	 legal	 principles	 and	procedural	 principles.	The	
first	 include	the	 legality-principle	(decision	making	based	on	 laws,	norm	
hierarchy)	 and	 equality-principle	 (equal	 treatment	 of	 citizens	 in	 similar	
cases).	The	other	principles	include	that	of	proportionality	(administrative	
actions	 are	 in	 reasonable	 proportion	 to	 the	 issue),	 the	 goal-directness	
principle	(discretion	can	not	advance	inappropriate	goals)	and	the	protection	
of	 legitimate	 interests	 -principle	 (including	 prohibition	 of	 retrograded	
decisions).	(Ryynänen	1991:	11,	Sigma	Papers:	no.	2:	9–14,	Mäenpää	1996:	
13–202.)	 In	 transitional	 periods,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 not	 all	 principles	 are	
institutionalized	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Similarly,	 some	principle	may	never	be	
institutionalized	 and	 a	 legal	 legitimation	 is	 created	 for	 this	 situation.	The	
discretionary	rights	of	a	single	administrator	are	important	because	discretion	
is	a	part	of	real	power.	It	can	be	called	“the	area	of	free	consideration”	in	which	
legality	 and	 expediency	 are	 used	 as	measurements.	 (Ryynänen	 1991:	 12.)	
Political	environment	influences	the	way	administrators	use	discretion.
Discretion	 is	 also	 connected	 to	 relationships	 in	 hierarchies,	 guidance	




trative	 guidance	 should	 not	 exceed	 the	 limits	 given	 for	 administrative	
regulation	and	higher	administrative	organs	should	not	be	able	to	command,	














The	 professional	 ethics,	 the	 ethics	 of	 the	 organization	 and	 the	 personal	
beliefs	of	an	administrator	play	a	role	in	the	process	(Moilanen	1999:	12.).	
In	the	work	organization,	rule	of	law	and	private	rights	either	materialize	or	
face	 obstacles.	The	 concept	 of	 professional	 ethics	 has	 been	 particularly	
important	 in	many	public	organizations	 in	which	legal	 training	has	been	
valued.	In	the	Soviet	Union,	engineers	were	considered	to	be	qualified	as	
all-round	 managers	 of	 different	 types	 of	 organizations.	 The	 definitions	






of	 thought	 that	 people	 have.	 Yet	 within	 the	 relationship	 between	 legal	
protection	and	administration	there	exists	an	interesting	duality	of	state	
and	 society.	 It	 is	 from	 this	 duality,	 that	 rights	 appear	 within	 the	 real	
world.
	“Rights”,	as	such	originate	from	extralegal	ideas,	which	were	turned	into	
practical	principles	 and	 institutionalized	 as	 a	 result	 of	political,	 religious	









status.	Especially	 since	 the	diffusion	of	 the	human	 rights	 concept,	 it	 has	
been	thought	that	rights	exist	even	without	the	approval	of	the	state,	which	












level)	 a	 reciprocal	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society.	 Rights	
appear	in	the	real	world	context	when	this	relationship	extends	beyond	






When	 considering	 the	 amount	 or	 depth	 of	 legal	 consciousness	 in	 a	
particular	 society,	 it	 is	good	 to	remember	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	same	as	 legal	
culture.	 Jane	 Burbank	 has	 suggested	 that	 “legal	 culture	 rests	 upon	 the	
citizenry´s	recognition	of	the	legal	system	as	a	preferred	means	of	solving	
























1.2 How to Define “Transition”
1.2.1 What Does Transition Mean for Administrative Culture?




ideology	and	practice	 it	 in	 their	actions.	There	 is	a	reliance	on	rules	and	
procedural	 rationality	 in	 which	 decisions	 follow	 from	 programs	 and	
standards.	 Stability	 exists	 and	 goals	 are	 reasonably	 consistent.	When	 the	






making.	 In	 transitional	 situations,	 administrative	 questions	 of	 structural	
arrangements	become	highly	political.	In	fact,	political	power	“slides”into	







transition,	 culture	 (as	 a	 definition	 of	 something	 unconnected	 with	 the	
structures)	easily	becomes	a	wavering	description	for	everything	“qualitative”	
from	high	culture	to	“national	character”.	It	is	then	usually	a	waste	basket	















maybe	 a	 strong	 component	 of	 transitional	 risks	which	may	 create	more	
permanent	 dysfunctions	 in	 organizations	when	 central	myths	 are	 under	
attack.	
In	 revolutionary	 changes,	 new	myths	 may	 be	 created	 in	 the	 form	 of	
transitional	purposes	which	rise	from	the	political	ideology	of	administrative	
change.	An	example	is	Communist	utopia.	Even	in	less	dramatic	situations,	
transitional	 purposes	 connote	 “mythical”	 qualities	 such	 as	 “democratic”,	
“civil	rights”,	“liberal”	and	so	on.	These	have	different	meanings	for	different	
people	who	may	be	disappointed	in	each	other´s	definitions.	Again,	myths	
are	an	element	which	has	significance	 in	 the	 transition	of	culture	and	 in	
preservation	of	established	culture.	But	perceptions	and	mystified	meanings	
are	not	cultures.	
In	 this	 work	 culture	 specifically	 refers	 to	 the	 rules	 of	 organizational	
behavior	 which	 are	 governed	 by	 institutionalized	 norms.	 Cultures	 are	
concrete	entities.	Structural	factors	are	present	in	cultures	both	as	objective	
frames	for	action	and	practices	which	reveal	values	behind	the	rules	(i.e.	
laws)	 of	 society.	Culture means	 institutionalized practices and patterns of 








which	 coexist	 and	 sustain	 each	 other.	 Both	 exist	 in	 all	 societies	 but	 in	
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changing.	 Individuals	have	 fragmented,	fluctuating	 self-concepts	because	












given	 by	 this	 study,	 the	 institutionalized	 forms	 of	 old	 structures	 hinder	
transition.	 Old	 forms	 have	 left	 a	 mark	 in	 the	 patterns	 of	 thought	 and	
practices	 of	 organizations.	 Theoretically	 then,	 a	 connection	 between	
structures	and	cultures	needs	to	be	found.	




certain	 official	 goals	 around	 which	 the	 daily	 work	 has	 to	 be	 arranged.	




of	administrative	ethical	principles,	 for	 instance,	requires	 looking	at	how	
structures	support	or	hinder	the	realization	of	these	principles.	In	this	study,	
this	 normative	 character	 is	 mirrored	 against	 a	 definition	 based	 on	 the	
previously	examined	ideal	type	of	liberal-democratic	administration.
In	 Anthony	 Giddens´	 theory,	 which	 I	 borrow	 in	 an	 altered	 form,	
structures	 (rules,	 resources,	 transformation	 relations	 and	 properties	 of	
social	systems)	and	social	systems	(regular	social	practices	of	reproduced	
relations	between	actors)	meet	 in	 the	 structuration	process	 in	which	 the	
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rules,	 resources	 and	 official	 transformation	 relations	 (Giddens	 194,	
Kiviniemi	 has	 used	 organizational	 action	 in	 place	 of	 transformation	
relations	19:	).	They	include	legislation	which	defines	authority	and	its	
proper	 use,	 and	 sets	 official	 tasks	 for	 different	 levels	 of	 administration.	
Resources	 include	 money,	 concrete	 material	 objects	 (buildings	 and	
equipment)	and	personnel	which	brings	along	its	education	and	professio-
nalism.	Official	transformation	relations	mean	formal	internal	and	external	
relations	 in	 which	 authoritative	 decisions	 are	 made.	 Transition	 means	






At	 the	 same	 time,	 as	 the	 environment	 is	 going	 through	 a	 major	 social	
change,	 it	 affects	 the	administrative	organization	more	directly	 than	 in	a	
stable	 situation.	The	 ecology	 of	 transitional	 administration	 is	 looked	 at	
from	the	point	of	view	of	it	producing	new	risks	for	the	ethical	basis	of	an	
organization.	 Transitions	 include	 great	 decision	 making	 uncertainties.	
Legislation	and	its	implementation	usually	cause	unintended	side-effects	as	
well.	Transitions	produce	administrative	risk	cultures	(see	following	chapter	
1.2.3).	 Learning	 requires	 understanding	 the	 logic	 of	 new	 demands	 and	




to	be	connected	 to	each	other	 in	 the	actions	of	people	 sharing	 the	 same	
meanings.	Problems	arise	when	these	connections	serve	different	purposes	
for	different	actors	and	actor	groups.	Goal	attainment	is	disrupted	by	side	
effects	of	 the	 social	 system	which	 return	 them	as	dysfunctions.	 In	many	
cases	the	dysfunctions	become	institutionalized	and	it	is	difficult	to	separate	




mutual	 assistance,	 was	 used	 as	 an	 informal	 daily	 practice	 in	 the	 official	
administrative	market	(Kordonskii	2001)	of	the	state.	






(comp.	 for	 instance	Griseri	 199:121).	Thus, a transition is a process in 
which a new administrative culture is born inside the old culture. It	 has	
transitional purposes	which	means	an	ideology	of	administrative	change.	
The	implementation	of	purposes	first	has	effects	on	the	old	structures in	
the	 form	of	 state building	which	 is	done	 through	new	 rules	 and	public	
resources,	 and	 in	 changes	 of	 external	 relationships.	 During	 periods	 of	




building	 which	 is	 based	 on	 the	 transitional	 purposes	 can	 be	 in	
conflict	with	the	old	culture	which	produces	new	dysfunctions	and	
risks,	or	intensifies	existing	dysfunctions.
2. Mediation of	 the	 transitional	 purposes	 is	 done	 in	 organizational	
learning	in	which	unintended	results	are	typical.














power	 balance	 of	 the	 changing	 administrative	 market	 effect	 the	 way	
mediation	takes	place.	
1.2.2 Transitional Purposes and Structures
Transitional	purposes	are	intended	solutions	to	question	as	to	how	people	
should	 live.	 These	 questions	 are	 answered	 in	 the	 political	 ideology	 of	
administrative	 change.	 The	 political	 ideology	 of	 administrative	 change	
deals	with	fundamental	questions	as	to	why	the	administration	exists.	For	
instance	 in	 the	 latest	 changes	 of	 Russian	 state,	 this	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	
introduction	 of	 new	 concepts	 of	 democracy	 and	 public	 organization. 
Essentially	all	political	ideologies	of	administration	build	legitimation	for	
authority.
In	 administrations,	 the	 objective	 of	 the	 state,	 is	 reflected	 in	 structure:	
new	 legislation,	 policies	 supporting	 it	 and	 resources	 given	 to	 the	
administration	to	fulfill	its	duties.	The	objective	may	be	in	practice	badly	
formulated,	 idealistic	or	under	 constant	political	 re-examination.	All	 the	
same,	 major	 systemic	 changes	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 state	 are	 not	 possible	
without	it.	





criteria	 by	 which	 performance	 can	 be	 judged.	 Guidance	 about	 the	
appropriate	 level	of	 resources	becomes	difficult. All	of	 this	 can	 lead	 to	 a	
lower	level	of	achievement	than	is	realistically	and	cost-effectively	possible.	
(Hogwood	&	Peters	195:	2.)
The	 formulation	 of	 purposes	 effects	 implementation.	 Hogwood	 and	
Peters	 (195)	have	separated	 two	 types	of	purposes.	 In	 the	first	case,	 the	
smooth	operation	of	the	political	system	is	the	overriding	criterion,	which	
means	that	vague	objectives	maybe	desirable.	In	the	second	case,	substantive	
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While	 answers	 to	 these	 questions	 are	 being	 sought,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
remember,	 as	 Hogwood	 and	 Peters	 have	 pointed	 out,	 that	 there	maybe	




are	 important	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 administrative	 cultures	 at	 all	 levels	 of	
bureaucratic	 hierarchies.	 Purposes	 which	 are	 vague,	 may	 cause	 many	
tensions,	inter-organizational	conflicts	and	contests,	as	well	as	opportunities.	
Interpretations	 of	 purposes	 are	 connected	 with	 the	 formerly	 discussed	





principles	 need	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 the	 organization´s	 “social	 contract”	 for	
implementation	as	daily	procedures.	The	leadership	is	most	effective	when	
it	can	employ	ethical	changes	 strategically.	Behavior	changes	are	difficult	




because	 learning	 new	 behaviors	 means	 changing	 organizational	 conse-






As	 the	 administration	 grows,	 the	 need	 for	 new	 control	 organizations	
increases	 and	 it	 becomes	more	 difficult	 to	 pinpoint	 actual	 responsibility	
relations	 from	outside.	Weakened	control	 and	 responsibilities	 add	 to	 the	
ethical	choices	a	single	administrator	has	to	make.	At	the	same	time	work	
tasks	 require	 large	 units	 which	 leads	 to	 divisions.	 These	 work	 against	
intergroup	 cooperation,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 many	 administrative	
decisions	 (such	 as	 welfare)	 build	 human	 relations	 and	 require	 ethical	











In	 the	 assessment	 of	 transitions,	 the	 attempt	 is	 normally	 to	 somehow	
separate	that	which	is	generally	administrative	from	the	transition	process.	
Larjavaara	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 looking	 at	 transitional	 processes	 is	 not	
identical	 to	 mapping	 general	 dysfunctions	 of	 administration,	 which	 are	




culture	 which	 will	 be	 looked	 at.	 But	 because	 I	 see	 culture	 as	 a	 process,	





This	 is	 why	 clear	 understanding	 of	 both	 the	 new	 purposes	 and	 the	
characteristics	 of	 the	 old	 culture	 is	 so	 important.	The	 basic	 problem	 in	






make	 successful	 goal	 attainment	 in	 them	difficult.	A transitional cycle of 
administrative culture	 is	 thus	created.	In	this	process,	 the	dysfunctions	of	
the	old	culture	are	easily	recycled	into	the	new	administrative	culture.	This	
often	signifies	failure	of	the	original	purposes	in	the	eyes	of	citizens.	
The	meaning	of	 trust	 is	paramount	 in	transitions	because	the	political	
system	 is	 weakened	 by	 changes.	 As	 Guy	 Peters	 has	 pointed	 out,	 it	 is	
fragmented,	full	of	ideological	argumentation	and	“blockage”.	Bureaucracy	
then	steps	in	to	fill	the	power	vacuum	in	the	system.	As	more	power	passes	
on	 to	 it,	 the	 image	 of	 government	 as	 authoritarian	 and	 impersonal	 is	
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they	 do,	 because	 often	 people	 change	 their	 behavior	 from	 the	 intended	
when	the	side-effects	become	large	and	meaningful	enough.	In	the	end	of	
this	development,	side-effects	can	assume	the	directive	role	of	the	execution	
of	 law.	Actual	 culture	 can	deviate	 from	 law	and	official	 policy	 goals	 and	
form	 a	 different	 type	 of	 organization	 from	 the	 one	 intended	 by	 the	
leadership.
Transition	of	culture	involves	fast	changes	which	often	leads	to	ineffective	
organizational	 learning.	New	 risk	 positions	 appear	 rapidly	which	makes	
planning	 very	 difficult.	 In	 major	 structural	 changes,	 the	 shared	 climate	
breaks	and	people	often	need	to	find	quick	individual	survival	solutions.	In	






internal	 binds	 (authority	 relations,	 promotion	 and	 status	 guarding	
pressures,	 traditional	ways	of	assessing	different	 types	of	matters	and	so	
on)	may	cause	administrators	to	act	in	a	way	which	conflicts	with	formal	
stated	purposes.	Mutual	 favoritism,	nepotism	and	 corruption	 are	 typical	
examples	of	conflicts.	The	actual	weight	different	actors	in	an	organization	
have	 is	 further	more	 not	 bound	 by	 organizational	 limits.	 Group	 goals	
inside	an	organization	can	be	protected	and	advanced	by	outside	pressures	









a	 risk	 organization.	 Its	 ethical	 base	 is	 at	 risk	 because	 of	 the	 economic,	
political	and	social	pressures	of	the	surrounding	society.	There	can	be	two	
types	of	risks:	outside	structural	changes	which	threaten	the	organization,	
and	 cultural	 opposition	 inside	 the	 organization	 which	 hinders	 (ethical)	
change	imposed	upon	it	by	outside	structures	and	leadership.	
On	the	basis	of	existing	 literature	 it	 is	possible	 to	say	that	 the	Russian	
federation	has	twice	been	a	risk	society	where	many	permanent	dysfunctions	
of	 the	 old	 administrative	 culture	have	 been	 reproduced	 in	 altered	 forms	
during	the	transition.	Risks	and	side-effects	are	often	the	same	thing	and	
their	 analytical	 definition	 is	 at	 best	 relative.	 In	 his	 framework	 for	 the	




take	place	 in	 spite	of	planning	 and	are	often	unwanted.	Risks	 are	 effects	
which	 have	 significance	 for	 the	 administration	 and	 its	 environment	 and	
may	create	difficulties	for	purpose	attainment	in	the	future.	
	 I	 have	 looked	 at	 the	 Russian	 administrative	 cultures	 as	 “markets”	
(Kordonskii	 2000)	 in	 which	 different	 actors	 influence	 (mediate)	 the	
formation	of	a	new	culture.	These	markets	could	also	be	named	as	bargaining	
networks	which	would	stress	the	fact	the	there	were	negotiation	rules	and	
an	 attempt	 at	 reaching	 satisfactory	 compromises	 for	 all	 administrative	
parties.	 The	 concept	 of	 market	 puts	 the	 stress	 slightly	 more	 on	 the	
competition	of	different	groups	inside	the	administrative	structures.	
For	 understanding	 the	 environment	 of	 transitional	 administrations,	






many	ways,	 separate	directions.	One	 is	 the	political	 state	or	government	
level	and	 the	other	 the	socially	adapting	citizen.	Hectic	change	produces	









not	 just)	environment	becomes	a	 risk	producer	and	 transmitter	of	 latent	









created	 to	make	 structures	more	 coherent	 become	 rigid.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	
structures	themselves	can	become	norms.	
4)	 Law,	 rules	 and	 norms	 are	 often	 formalistic.	They	may	 be	 formally	
adopted	when	they	don´t	reflect	the	social	traditions	of	the	environment	
and	 thus	 the	 climate	 of	 the	 surrounding	 society	 makes	 enforcing	 laws	
difficult.	For	the	administrator	the	dilemma	then	is	how	much	can	he	try	to	
enforce	 the	 law?	Should	he	 try	 to	enforce	 it	on	a	 limited	 segment	of	 the	










norms	 is	 tested.	 If	 they	 conflict	 with	 new	 norms,	 there	 is	 a	 clash	 of	
expectations.
6)	Power	and	control	change	their	nature.	There	is	a	lack	of	consensus,	










in	 choice	 making	 and	 calculation)	 is	 created	 as	 a	 result	 of	 mounting	
knowledge.	 Outside	 models	 can	 be	 accepted	 uncritically	 or	 through	
revolution,	and	the	dichotomous	thinking	(good-bad)	continues.
)	Politics	are	inside	the	administration	which	means	that	administrators	
need	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 left	 by	 politicians	 who	 cannot	 formulate	 clear	 and	
enforceable	policies.	“Best-intentions”	guide	decision	making.	Often	quick	
solutions	 are	 sought.	 In	 the	 long	 run	 there	 is	 an	attempt	 to	 colonize	 the	
future	which	brings	 surprises.	When	 administration	 fails,	 politicians	 see	
that	laws	and	rules	which	have	been	adopted	as	“policies”,	are	not	carried	





a	result	of	 the	resistance	by	the	population	to	 law,	 the	public	view	of	 the	
administration	becomes	cynical.	In	the	worst	case,	bureaucracies	can	appear	
as	forms	of	organized	irresponsibility.	
10)	 Class	 structure	 of	 the	 elite	 fluctuates.	 Cliques	 are	 important	 and	
nepotism	 gains	 even	more	meaning	 as	 a	 way	 to	 secure	 positions	 in	 an	








11)	 The	 position	 of	 the	 personnel	 varies.	 Cliques,	 nepotism	 and	
corruption	 gain	 importance	 in	 the	 hectic	 changes	 as	means	 of	 survival,	
social	advancement	and	relations	with	citizens.	Education	opens	possibilities	
for	survival	and	handling	uncertainty	becomes	a	cultural	qualification	as	a	














the	 most	 evident.	 Relying	 on	 the	 formal	 structures	 alone	 can	 bring	
unintended	results	depending	on	the	level	of	formalism	in	which	there	is	an	
incongruence	between	formally	described	institutions	and	real	life	informal	





least	 because	 its	 own	 position	 is	 now	 more	 easily	 changed	 by	 internal	










administration.	 In	 the	 international	 cooperation	 of	 the	 1990´s,	 this	 has	









1.	 To	 find	 out	what	 kind	 of	 a	 culture	 has	 developed,	 new	dominant	
institutionalized	patterns	of	thought	and	practices	have	to	be	found	
both	at	an	organizational	and	system	level.




to	 both	 the	 possibilities	 and	 limitations	 of	 structures,	 and	 an	 attempt	 to	
influence	 the	 conditions	 defining	 these	 structures.	 Routines	 reveal	 the	





occurs	when	 the	other	party	willingly	 adopts	 the	 identity	 and	 culture	of	













of	 the	 change	 and	 see	 imminent	 threat	 to	 their	 position.	They	 see	 that	
previously	 excluded	 groups	 gain	 importance	 and	 new	 types	 of	 values	
emerge	which	require	new	skills,	work	habits	and	contacts	in	the	society.	
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Instead	 of	 open	 separation	 they	might	 use	 different	 types	 of	 retardation	
tactics.	
In	 the	 administration´s	 wider	 environment,	 there	 is	 overlapping	 of	
competing	 and	 often	 incompatible	 types	 of	 social	 systems	 which	 often	
causes	a	deep	feeling	of	guilt	over	not	being	able	to	meet	one´s	own	norms	
in	 the	 surrounding	 society.	 It	 is	 natural	 to	 swing	 extravagantly	 between	




see	 the	 usefulness	 of	 organizational	 purposes	 for	 themselves	 in	 daily	





members	 create	 new	 requirements,	 their	 own	 sources,	 conditions	 and	
consequences.	This	kind	of	change	rarely	happens	without	larger	changes	in	
the	 structural	 conditions	 and	 thus	 it	 can	 be	 described	 as	 happening	
successfully	 when	 the	 (often	 more	 or	 less	 forced)	 structural	 and	 social	
changes	 work	 towards	 the	 same	 direction	 (Argyris	 19:	 20–24,	 comp.	
Giddens	194).	
Gagliardi	(196)	has	pointed	out	that	policies	can	only	be	adopted	if	they	
are	 produced	 by	 the	 structures	 “naturally”	 or	 –	 in	 his	 opinion	 –	 by	 a	




















increases	 possibilities	 of	 conflicts	 among	 professionals	 when	 a	 policy	
succession	is	undertaken.	When	different	professions	need	to	interact,	they	
will	 tend	 to	 conflict	 over	 the	 control	 of	 clients	 (citizens).	 Professional	
rigidities	are	concentrated	in	law,	where	policy	successions	can	encounter	
institutional	and	behavioral	problems.	In	addition,	recruitment	is	typically	








managers	were	 revealed	 during	 the	 freeing	 up	 of	 the	 initiative	 and	 self-
direction	of	subordinates	in	the	transition	process.	The	resentment	over	the	
decline	 of	 status	 was	 “expressed	 in	 delay,	 avoidance,	 disinterest,	 back-
pedaling,	 talking	 for	 the	 record	but	finding	endless	 excuses	 for	 inaction,	










The	 socialization	 of	 long-term	 employees	 of	 any	 organization	 often	
results	 in	 isomorphic	 relationships	 of	 the	 character	 and	 the	 structure.	
(Fitzgerald	 19.)	 In	 transitional	 societies	 the	 connection	 is	 broken	 and	
people´s	self-images	require	drastic	sudden	changes.	Because	the	trust	and	
motivation	 to	 enforce	 the	new	values	 is	 lacking,	 changing	 laws	does	not	
really	change	the	way	people	prioritize	things.	This	creates	a	psychological	
problem	for	anyone	attempting	to	push	forward	changes.	When	negative	






of	 the	 elite	 but	 negative	 for	 building	 the	 commitment	 of	 the	 population	
(and	 line	administration)	which	 is	needed	 for	deeper	cultural	 transition.	
Stalling	the	process	on	the	other	hand	can	intensify	dysfunctional	features	
of	systems	and	thus	erode	trust	between	state	and	society.	This	is	one	of	the	




2.1 Research Material and Its Use in the Work
The	materials	which	have	been	used	can	be	put	into	three	groups.	All	groups	
have	 been	 approached	 with	 the	 same	 style	 of	 content	 analysis	 (see	 for	
instance	Tuomi	and	Sarajärvi	2002).	The	material	has	been	used	to	obtain	













document	 is	 undisputable,	 first	 hand	 material.	 I	 have	 concentrated	 on	
political	writings	and	official	programs	as	a	 starting	point	 in	all	periods,	
with	the	exception	of	the	last	one	where	the	ideological	purposes	have	been	
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–	 factual	 material	 of	 structures	 such	 as	 normative	 material	









see	 how	 major	 laws	 regulate	 public	 decision	 making.	 Descriptions	 of	
structural	 arrangements	 have	 also	 been	 searched	 in	 general	 historical	
studies	about	the	four	time	periods.	







–	 Historical	background	material:	historical	 studies	of	 time	periods,	
administrative	and	political	archive	material	(original	but	collected	
in	ready	volumes),	instructions	of	administrative	organizations.
–	 In	 the	 Murmansk	 city	 district	 administration	 in	 1993	 and	 2000,	
interviews	 were	 conducted	 (all	 together	 31)	 by	 the	 author.	These	
interviews	 dealt	 with	 the	 present	 day	 work	 of	 the	 case	 study	
organization.	The	intention	has	been	to	look	at	the	development	of	
practices	 and	 ways	 of	 thought	 in	 one	 sample	 organization	 in	 the	
studied		year	period.	The	interviews	have	been	recorded,	transcribed	




–	 The	persons	 interviewed	 all	worked	 in	 the	 same	October	District	










produced	 through	 the	 use	 of	 different	 types	 of	 materials	 within	 social	


















important,	 as	 well	 as	 elite	 studies	 connected	 with	 Russian	 and	 Soviet	
government	 (Russian	 administrative	 positions	 and	 nomenklatura	 in	 the	





From	each	 interview,	 excerpts	have	been	chosen	by	way	of	 looking	at	
what	types	of	answers	(general	style	of	describing	one´s	work	and	attitude	
toward	changes)	dominate	the	interview	and	thus	can	support	the	general	
picture	which	 is	 built.	The	 generous	 use	 of	 this	 type	 of	 direct	 quotation	
material	is,	in	my	view,	appropriate	in	a	cultural	study,	particularly	when	a	






formed	 the	 core	 of	 the	material,	 where	 as	 other	 material	 has	 served	 to	
corroborate	 the	 analysis.	 In	 the	 case	 study,	 interviews	 have	 been	 given	
considerable	space	as	source	material.	
2.2 Evaluating Changes in the Past
This	study	builds	a	picture	of	Russian	local	administration	culture	in	four	
epochs	by	using	a	present	day	ideal	type	as	a	model	for	understanding	each	
case.	 I	 search	 similarities	 and	 differences	 in	 several	 cases	 with	 the	





own	 conditions	 which	 have	 been	 produced	 by	 earlier	 generations	 in	
previous	structures.
The	 justification	 for	 the	 study	 of	 history	 in	 organizational	 research	 is	
obvious:	 understanding	 the	 work	 of	 administration	 any	 further	 from	 a	
formal	 structural	 level	 is	 impossible	without	 some	 consideration	 for	 the	





and	 legal	matters	 of	 each	 time	 period	 needed	 to	 be	 included	 in	 such	 a	







(1995),	 for	 instance,	 sees	 the	 value	 of	 historical	 research	 in	 its	 ability	 to	
meThodology
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answer	 such	 questions	 as	what	 lies	 behind	 the	 surface	 of	 administrative	
















for	 it	 adds	 valid	 information	 into	 the	 description	 and	 analysis	 of	 a	
phenomenon.	But	 in	 transitional	studies	which	aim	to	compare	different	








of	 action?	 Transition	 would	 almost	 naturally	 be	 connected	 with	 causal	
analysis	and	quantitative	material	where	changes	appear	to	be	unambiguous.	
It	could	be	equally	argued,	though,	that	teleological	methods	which	explain	





and	 the	general	 theoretical	 view	of	 administrative	 culture	 in	 transitional	
time	periods.	It	seeks	to	explain	the	meaning	of	action	without	a	specific	
intention	of	finding	causal	relations.	At	the	same	time,	 these	two	are	not	
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seen	 as	mutually	 exclusive.	 It	 can	 be	 argued,	 that	 in	 understanding	 the	
meaning	 of	 action,	 we	 produce	 information	 about	 its	 causes	 and	 the	























2.3 Searching for Culture in Case Studies





for	 our	 understanding	 of	 administration.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	










case	 study	 is	 appropriate	 when	 the	 investigator	 has	 an	 opportunity	 to	
observe	 and	 analyze	 a	 phenomenon	 previously	 inaccessible	 to	 scientific	
investigation.	(Yin	194.)	The	aim	of	such	research	is	to	make	observations	






phenomenon.	 (Eneroth	 194.)	 Eneroth´s	 ideas	 are	 in	 parallel	 with	 a	
Weberian	model´s	way	of	looking	at	organizations.	This	approach	tries	to	




Typically,	 qualitative	 research	 is	 interested	 in	 the	 competence	 of	 the	
concept	 which	 is	 drawn	 from	 observations.	 A	 low	 reliability	 is	 actually	
positive	because	the	meaning	is	to	find	as	many	qualities	(data)	as	possible	




similarly	 to	 the	 concept	of	public	 administration	which	was	done	 in	 the	
beginning	 of	 this	 work.	 The	 transitional	 process	 refers	 to	 the	 way	 the	
administrator	 in	 his	 every	 day	work	 adapts	 to	 and	 effects	 the	 structures	
within	 the	 social	 system	of	 the	organization.	 “Transitional”	on	 the	other	
hand	refers	to	something	extraordinary	and	non-stable.	
The	aim	of	the	case	study	part	of	this	work	is	to	describe	the	effects	of	




material	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 sources.	 Other	 than	 interviewing,	 the	 study	
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included	 observation	 of	 work	 routine	 in	 a	 customer	 service	 situation,	
acquainting	myself	with	the	staff	and	collecting	written	material	about	the	
regulations	 and	 procedures	 used	 in	 the	 administrative	 work.	 Getting	 to	
















politics,	 personal	 ambitions,	 internal	 conflicts	 of	 the	 administration,	
personal	ambiguity	and	so	on,	which	form	the	background	of	the	world	as	
it	 is	 seen	by	 those	 interviewed.	The	most	 a	 thematic	 interview	can	do	 is	




2.4 Finding Meanings in Interviews













Self-evaluation	 has	 both	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 from	 a	
methodological	perspective.	The	greatest	hazard	connected	with	my	study	
is	that	as	an	outsider	I	have	entered	an	organization	with	a	de-ontological	
view	of	what	 administration	 should	be	 like.	 I	have	an	 idea	 that	 certain	









situation.	 A	 result	 is	 that	 they	 seem	 hypocritical.	 In	 addition	 to	 this	






is	 also	 the	problem	of	 connecting	 the	findings	 to	 the	organizational	 and	
general	 administration	 level.	 Important	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	
interviewing	 process	 is	 what	 Michael	 Brenner	 (195)	 calls	 “a	 view	 of	
something	between	(inter)	people”.	The	accounts	which	people	give	are	a	
result	 of	 interpretational	 work,	 selected	 aspects	 of	 the	 past	 which	 seem	
important	 within	 the	 frame	 of	 reference	 provided	 by	 the	 interviewer.	
Whether	the	interviewed	persons	stick	to	the	particular	frame	of	reference	






the	 interviews	 that	 is	not	visibly	 there.	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	do	not	 follow	 the	












as	people,	 their	 roles,	values	and	 life	 styles	 in	order	 to	 interpret	 the	data	

















of	 reality	 is	 so	 fine	 and	delicate,	 that	 it	 takes	 a	 lot	 of	 time	 and	personal	






(comp.	 Mira	 Bergelson	 2005).	 In	 my	 case,	 I	 had	 to	 first	 penetrate	 the	








interview	 is	 a	 process	 during	which	 the	 interviewer	 has	 to	 be	 open	 to	






2.4.2 The Interview Process and Themes
A	thematic	interview	was	used	in	this	work.The	same	set	of	questions	was	
asked	from	all	participants	in	both	rounds	and	in	most	cases	in	the	same	
order.	 I	 did	 not	 try	 to	 interfere	with	 the	 interpretations	 the	 interviewed	
persons	gave	to	each	question.	Additional	questions	were	used	when	it	was	
approapriate.	Informants	were	chosen	by	the	organization	itself,	via	those	






informants	were	chosen	according	 to	 their	 seniority	position,	and	 in	 the	
latter	 case	 of	 summer	 2000,	 those	 with	 enough	 work	 experience	 from	
different	levels	of	the	hierarchy	were	chosen.
The	 interview	 topics	 gave	 the	 interviewees	 chance	 to	 describe	 their	
orientation	in	the	workplace	and	to	describe	decision	making	dynamics	if	
they	wished	to	do	so.	The	formal	work	routines	 in	the	organization	have	
played	 a	 secondary	 –	 although	 important	 supportive	 role.	 The	 basic	
assumption	 in	the	field	work	was	that	people	will	 themselves	 tell	what	 is	








1.	 The	 undesirable	 factors	 which	 operated	 in	 the	 interviewer-	
interviewee	interaction.
2.	 Problems	of	understanding	for	different	respondents.
3.	 No	 verification	 data	 for	 attitudes,	 value	 statements	 and	 cognitive	














female	 interviewer	 was	 an	 advantage	 because	most	 of	 the	 interviewees	




be	 said	 to	have	been	an	obstacle	 in	obtaining	meaningful	 results.	People	
were	surprisingly	open	even	in	the	1993	group	and	in	the	latter	group	of	




been	 proof-read	 by	 native	 Russian	 speakers,	 did	 not	 work	 during	 the	
interview.	A	 typical	 example	was	 the	word	 “challenge”	which	 seemed	 to	
involve	 different	meanings.	The	 different	 cognitive	 styles	 of	 respondents	
also	shows	in	the	answers.	In	the	1993	group	the	difference	between	personal	
































•	 Personnel	 policy,	 family	 and	 work	 (specialization,	 new	 roles	 of	
personnel,	women	at	work)
•	 Work	 with	 higher	 organs	 of	 administration	 (central	 government,	
legislation)
•	 Information,	 quality	 and	 circulation	 (legislation,	 work	 organi-
zation)
•	 Leadership	(authority,	delegation)

















Officials	 often	 have	 to	 consider	what	 is	 “politically	 possible”,	 in	 other	
words	what	can	be	realistically	done	now	and	in	the	future.	In	times	of	deep	
political	crisis	the	civil	servants	may	be	forced	to	live	in	a	officially	“non-
political”	 environment	 to	 avoid	 any	 future	 confrontations.	This	 may,	 of	
course,	cause	many	practical	and	personal	complications.
The	 idea	 of	 citizenship	 is	 at	 the	 center	 of	 the	 questions	 concerning	
citizens.	How	much	can	the	“receivers”	of	the	services	influence	the	planning	
stage	 through	 civil	 servants?	 What	 is	 the	 civil	 servants´	 margin	 for	
discretion?	Whether	 the	 administrator	 sees	his	 position	 as	 a	mechanical	
provider	of	 legally	bound	 services	 to	 a	passive	 client	or	 as	 a	participant,	
assistant	 in	 the	process	of	 coordination	of	 the	 (hopefully	 active)	 client´s	
individual	 situation,	 is	 an	 interesting	 issue.	So,	 too,	 is	 the	 relationship	of	












as	of	more	 interest:	 the	position	of	 single	 administrators,	 the	 changes	of	
official	authority	for	the	work	and	the	idea	of	effectiveness	as	manifest	in	
the	 description	 of	 organizational	 form	 and	 rules	 of	 work.	 In	 the	 Soviet	
Union,	“effectiveness”	held	its	own	specific	meaning	which	included	such	











new	 administrative	 culture	 after	 1906.	 The	 analysis	 will	 show	 how	 the	
qualities	of	the	old	culture	affected	the	creation	of	local	administration	both	
in	town	and	rural	forms	of	local	government.	
3.1 The Political Ideologies of Administrative 
Change: Community Government vs. State Functions




of	 statehood,	and	 the	connection	between	 law	and	administration	 in	 the	
Russian	empire.	This	synthesis	produced	many	of	the	structural	and	policy	
changes	 which	 enabled	 the	 transformation	 of	 legal	 thinking	 in	 general,	
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concept)	 was	 embedded	 in	 the	 person	 of	 the	 emperor.	 Before	 1906	 the	






principle	of	compulsory	 service	by	 tying	 the	new	nobility	 to	 the	head	of	
state	through	military	and	civil	service,	making	it	totally	dependant	upon	
the	personality	of	the	ruler.	Similarly,	the	creation	of	new	types	of	estates	




move	 to	 centralize	 ownership,	 decision	 making	 and	 political	 control.	
(Tiihonen	1994,	Berman	1963.)	
The	aristocracy	which	 formed	 the	first	 civil	 service	was	an	 interesting	
dichotomy:	at	once	landowners	mastering	the	fate	of	people	given	to	them	
by	the	ruler,	were	simultaneously	servants	of	the	state	themselves.	This	type	
of	 bondage	 to	 the	 ruler´s	 decision	 making	 considerably	 affected	 their	
cultural	role	as	political	and	legal	dependants	of	supreme	power.	As	Fred	






Besides	 the	 strong	 personal	 power	 of	 the	 ruler,	 the	 autocracy	 of	 the	
Russian	 empire	 had	 a	 religious	 nature	which	made	 it	 different	 from	 the	
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Russia	as	a	land.	This	special	relationship	needed	to	be	passed	on	to	the	next	
generation.	The	 autocratic	 power	 of	 the	 Tsar	 was	 a	 central	myth	 which	
sustained	social	relations	and	in	which	it	was	simply	unthinkable	that	an	









town	 culture	 which	 affected	 its	 role	 in	 the	 Russian	 state.	 According	 to	
Makarenko	(199),	the	destruction	of	Novgorod	and	the	strengthening	of	
Moscow	as	the	center	of	the	land	can	be	viewed	as	the	historical	background	
for	 the	 weak	 development	 of	 town	 culture.	 (Makarenko	 199:	 31.)	The	
merchant	class	for	 instance	was	too	weak	to	develop	within	and	from	its	
own	 ranks	 a	more	 emancipated	 circle	 of	 intellectuals	 capable	 of	 being	 a	
meaningful	political	 and	social	power.	Political	 factors	had	also	played	a	
role	in	the	development.
Instead	 of	 a	 strong	 town	 culture,	 the	 development	 of	 administrative	
authority	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 Peter	 the	 Great	











The	 strong	 personification	 of	 institutional	 power	 at	 the	 top	 effected	
administrative	 culture	 through	 the	 personnel	 system	 which	 included	
characteristics	of	both	legitimate	authority	and	rules,	and	social	relations	of	
the	 court.	 In	 the	 100´s	 the	 state	 administration	 culture	 of	 Russia	 had	
developed	a	“mature”	social	system	to	which	social	climbing	was	central.	
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Tiihonen	 has	 described	 how	 elite	 recruitment	 happened	 through	 three	
different	channels:	1)	by	origin	of	birth	in	which	the	best	patron	was	one	
who	 belonged	 to	 the	 same	 family.	 2)	 through	marriage	 to	 an	 influential	
family,	and	3)	by	finding	a	patron	who	was	situated	near	the	court	 in	St.	
Petersburg.	 A	 patron	 was	 needed	 throughout	 one´s	 career.	 Loyalty	 was	





that	 the	 elevation	 of	 the	 educational	 level	 of	 civil	 servants	 and	 official	






preserve	 it.	 Furthermore,	 the	 institution	 of	 autocracy	 did	 not	 have	 clear	
outlines.	 It	 overlapped	with	 the	 regular	 administration	by	 controlling	 its	
activities	 with	 the	 help	 of	 personal	 agents,	 and	 by	 way	 of	 trusted	 state	















system.	 Besides	 state	 officials,	 ranks	 were	 given	 to	 municipal	 officials	
holding	 relatively	 high	 administrative	 posts.	 More	 people	 could	 hold	 a	
specific	rank	than	were	office	posts	which	required	it	by	law.	The	main	basis	





protection	 for	 civil	 servants	 against	 their	 immediate	 supervisors.	 The	
municipal	administrators	were	an	exception	to	the	general	rule	in	that	their	
ranks	were,	 in	many	cases,	bound	to	 the	 length	of	 the	service.	 (Shepelev	
1999:	166–16,	1.)
During	 reform	 discussions,	 the	 proponents	 of	 the	 prevailing	 situation	
viewed	 it	 by	 comparison	with	 the	 general	European	 system	of	 hiring	 and	
promoting	civil	servants	based	on	the	evaluation	of	their	origin,	property	and	




could	 be	 given	 to	 him	 by	 a	 socially	 lower	 level	 person.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
appointment	 system	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 guarantee	 of	 political	 control	 for	 the	
autocracy	combined	with	the	dignity	of	equality.	(Shepelev	1995:	13.)







servants	 going	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 where	 the	material	 conditions	 were	
better.	(Shepelev	1999:	1,10,	13.)
In	 the	 (dominantly)	 state	 administrative	 culture	 the	 quest	 for	 rising	
status,	decorations	and	additions	to	personal	finances	were	central	matters	
of	guidance.	A	side-effect	was	the	misuse	of	official	posts	in	order	to	better	
one´s	 positions	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 artificially.	This	 was	 done	 by	 changing	
positions	 to	 a	 higher	 rank	 in	 the	 system	 within	 administrative	 organs	




actual	 devotion	 to	 affairs	 themselves.	 Instead	 there	 was	 an	 underlined	
insistence	on	pleasing	supervisors	upon	whom	an	official´s	career	depended.	
(Shepelev	1999:	11–12.)
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3.1.2 Legal Reforms in the Old Administrative Culture
In	 the	 development	 of	 local	 administration	 law	 became	 an	 important	
instrument	 in	 connecting	 society	with	 the	 state.	 In	Russian	history,	 the	
state	administration	became	powerful	 in	partly	by	filling	the	void	in	the	
written	 legal	 authority	 of	 the	 ultimate	 decision	maker.	The	 state,	 as	 an	
institution	 running	 alongside	 the	 ruler,	 became	 the	 object	 of	 different	
policy	programs	with	their	own	ideological	purposes.	These	purposes	were	
attempts	to	answer	different	but	acute	practical	problems	in	the	changing	
society	 and	 its	 economy.	 In	 this	 process,	 the	 administration	 assumed	 a	
very	active	role	which	had	consequences	 for	 the	way	 legal	 thinking	and	
statehood	 developed.	 At	 the	 local	 level,	 administration	 consequently	
developed	its	own	features.	
For	 the	development	of	 the	 legal	 thinking	 in	Russia,	Peter	 the	Great´s	
reforms	were	most	interesting	because	of	the	difficulties	faced	in	the	attempt	
to	change	the	prevailing	relationship	of	law	with	the	surrounding	social	life.	
The	 public	 law	 to	 be	 incorporated	 into	 the	 state	 structures,	 had	 been	
developed	in	the	West	over	a	long	period	of	time.	It	required	a	particular	
relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society.	 In	 Harold	 Berman´s	 (1963)	
analysis	 the	 following	qualities	were	missing	 from	the	Russian	state:	1)	a	
monarch	 who	 ruled	 according	 to	 legal	 procedures	 rooted	 in	 the	 entire	
society,	 together	 with	 public	 law	 institutions	 which	 had	 an	 extralegal	
(religious)	historical	character	given	to	him	by	the	society.	2)	A	hierarchically	
coherent	rational	system	of	courts	and	government	cadres	borne	out	of	a	
locally	 active	 public	 and	 private	 legal	 and	 political	 life.	 Berman	 has	
concluded	 that	 both	 were	 difficult	 to	 attain	 in	 a	 system	 where	 the	
overwhelming	majority	of	the	population	were	slaves	without	legal	rights.	
As	 a	 result,	 the	 head	 of	 state	 ruled	 by	 his	 personal	 authority	 and	 used	















however,	 break	 his	 own	 laws.	 Before	 the	 reforms,	 the	 idea	 of	 legality	 in	
Russia	carried	a	meaning	of	strict	obedience	to	the	letter	of	the	law	and	the	
effective	 execution	 of	 this	 by	 government	 organs.	 This	 was	 a	 type	 of	
authoritarian	 relationship	with	 legislation	 in	which	 the	 “progressive”	 law	









concerned	 with	 how	 to	 handle	 the	 constitutional	 laws	 of	 the	 country	
(Osnovnye gosudarstvennye zakony)	and	new	requirement	for	separation	of	
powers	between	the	legislator	and	the	monarch.	The	liberal	critiques	of	the	













government	 by	 undermining	 the	 actual	 meaning	 of	 law	 enacted	 by	 the	
representative	organ.	(Borisova	2001:	25.	40.)	
The	meaning	autocracy	attached	to	the	practical	work	of	administration	





3.1.3 The Competing Ideologies of Administrative Change after 
the 1864 Reforms
The	reforms	of	 the	19th	 century	were	a	product	of	both	“the	 top	and	 the	
middle”.	This	was	so,	since	the	initiative	for	big	changes	came	from	both	the	










local	 level	 in	authority	structures.	 (Koivisto	2001:	122–123.)	At	 the	same	
time,	there	was	a	need	to	find	substitutes	for	the	defunct	local	administration	
institutions	 of	 the	 serfdom	 era	 in	which	 police,	 judiciary	 and	 economic	
powers	were	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	landed	aristocracy.	(Vucinich	
1960:	196.)	According	to	Hosking´s	(192)	analysis,	the	central	bureaucracy	
had	two	territorial	strategic	goals	 in	the	countryside	zemtsvo reforms:	 its	
economic	 and	military	 development	 and	 control	 of	 any	 elements	which	























of	 the	 great	 reforms,	 guidance	 was	 revised	 to	 include	 the	 concepts	 of	
publicity	 (glasnost),	 legality	 (zakonnost),	 decentralization	 and	 self-
government	(samoupravlenie).	(Pearson	199.)	The	operational	systemati-
zation	 of	 administrative	 practices	 themselves	 was	 a	 goal	 of	 change.	The	
ministries	dealt	with	the	peasant	population	directly	without	the	interference	
of	 other	 administrative	 levels	 and	 were	 very	 keen	 on	 acting	 efficiently.	
(Yaney	193:	239.)	The	following	decades	in	the	Russian	provinces	meant	a	
slow	change	toward	a	society	in	which	these	principles	took	different	shapes	
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reforms.	This	 was	 clearly	 against	 the	 psychology	 of	 a	 society	 in	 which	
questions	of	administration	could	only	be	decided	by	state	officials.	Legality	
in	 the	 new	 thinking	 became	 a	 symbol	 for	 new	 external	 relationships.	
(Taranovskii	1992:	30,	310,	312.)
Discussion	 about	 modernizing	 administration	 coincided	 with	 consi-
derable	academic	debate	over	the	concept	of	local	self-government	in	which	
different	proponents	described	their	preferences	for	the	best	way	to	organize	
center-local	 relations.	 The	 political	 ideology	 of	 administrative	 change	
essentially	became	a	quest	for	local	self-government.	Circles	who	promoted	
the	change	formulated	their	objectives	mainly	in	three	different	ways.	First	
there	 were	 promoters	 of	 communal theory,	 which	 saw	 the	 peasant	 land	






functions.	Therefore,	 the	 local	 level	which	represented	the	society	had	to	






forms:	 the	 bureaucratic	ministerial	 pyramid	 and	 the	 institutions	 of	 local	
self-government.	(Vucinich	1960:	19.)	
The	social	 and	 state	 theories	which	competed	 for	 influence	up	 till	 the	
revolution	of	191	had	the	strongest	influence	on	the	local	level	development.	
The	 differences	 of	 views	 between	 different	 political	 groups	 inside	 the	
administration	were	present	 in	 the	contradiction	of	 the	 so	called	 “police	
state”,	which	meant	a	strong	security	administration	and	sharing	of	power.	
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organization	in	the	immediate	living	environment	of	the	citizens,	and	not	
interfering	 in	 the	 political	 questions	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 philosophical	
thinking	stressed	the	interests	of	the	local	community	being	different	from	
those	of	the	state	and	thus	immune	from	state	interference.	The	zemstvos	
were	 meant	 to	 be	 purely	 local	 and	 dealing	 with	 non-political	 daily	
problems	 which	 were	 not	 considered	 to	 include	 major	 policy	 issues.	
Official	 authority	 in	 the	 situation	 was	 delegated	 by	 higher	 organs	 in	
different	 proportions,	 depending	 on	 fluctuating	 political	 courses.	 Local	
self-government	was	not	meant	to	revolutionalize	the	existing	system	but	
to	add	a	dimension	to	it.	State	and	local	were	separate	and	required	their	
own	 forms	 of	 administration.	 Local	 meant	 an	 elected	 self-government	







as	 “political”	 and	 thus	 not	 compatible	 with	 the	 state´s	 interests	 in	 the	
localities.	 The	 institutions	 of	 self-government	 were	 assigned	 certain	
administrative	 tasks	 not	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 local	 nature	 but	 because	 they	
could	handle	them	more	efficiently	than	the	state	bureaucracy.	The	zemstvos	
and	town	councils	were	considered	an	integral	part	of	the	state	structure,	




the	 state.	 Furthermore,	 the	 delegates	 were	 not	 representatives	 of	 the	
populace	but	state	officials	who	happened	to	be	selected	by	local	residents.	
(Weissman	191:15–16,	Abramov	199.)	Theoretically	 it	was	argued	 that	
the	 local	 level	 was	 protected	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 members	 of	 the	 local	
decision	making	organs	did	not	belong	to	the	professional	bureaucracy	as	
they	were	not	named	by	the	state	government.	Independence	from	the	state	
on	 these	 grounds	 was	 considered	 sufficient	 to	 guarantee	 the	 zemstvo 
members	 free	 room	 both	 in	 discipline	 and	 economics.	 (Abramov	 199,	
Lapteva	1996.)
At	 the	 turn	of	 the	20th	century,	 reformist	 ideas	were	brought	up	again	
when	the	society-state	relationship	required	re-examination.	One	proponent	













which	 was	 divorced	 from	 the	 society	 and	 thus	 doomed.	 Through	 the	
decentralization	and	development	of	public	institutions,	the	officialdom´s	
status	as	a	ruling	stratum	would	end.	The	primary	bodies	in	the	progress	of	
society	were	 the	zemstvo	 and	 the	 town	councils,	which	would	eventually	
replace	the	state	administration.	(Weissman	191:33.)
Decentralization	meant	different	things	to	different	groups	involved	in	
the	discussions.	The	Russian	 liberals	 saw	 it	necessary	 to	go	 further	 to	 “a	
real”	decentralization	which	meant	devolution	of	authority.	Mere	delegation	






autocracy	were	 legal.	They	 had	 the	 required	 conception	 of	 statehood	 in	
which	autocracy	was	unchanged.	This	was	the	concept	of	a	“national	state”,	
not	a	 “nation”	or	a	 “nation-state”	which	started	 from	the	assumptions	of	
freedom	and	sovereignty.	(Vchislo	1992:	44–45.)	The	meaning	of	reforms	
for	 the	 autocratic	 state	 was	 primarily	 in	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 state	
psychology.	 That	 is,	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 positive	 atmosphere	 for	 the	
government	and	its	initiatives.	The	meaning	was	at	the	same	time	to	erect	a	
strong	power	structure	in	the	form	of	governorship	and	limit	administrative	























activity	 was	 controlled	 by	 laws	 defining	 its	 work	 and	 organization.	The	
discussion	 concentrated	 on	hierarchy,	 territorial	 authority	 and	 economy.	
Although	representation	of	the	population	was	also	central	in	the	legislative	
reforms,	external	relations	continued	to	play	a	 less	significant	role	 in	 the	
autocratic	 culture.	 Ideologically,	 popular	 representation	 was	 introduced	
mostly	through	the	idea	of	legality	which	tried	to	underline	the	meaning	of	
state	laws	in	the	post-constitutional	framework.	
3.2 Structural Changes: State Building Since the 
1870`s
The	structural	transformation	of	the	Russian	city	government	started	rather	
late	with	 the	10	Statute	on	Cities.	Previous	 concentration	on	 the	 local	
level	 had	 been	 directed	 at	 the	 radical	 changes	 which	 took	 place	 in	 the	
countryside	 after	 161	 and	 164.	This	was	when	 the	 peasants	were	 first	
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3.2.1 The State and the Regional Administration 














The	 structure	of	 the	 tsarist	 government	 is	 shown	 in	 annexes	A	and	B	
which	show	the	position	of	the	zemstvos	and	town	administrations	in	the	
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the	 subordinate	 organs	 (podchinennye organy).	 The	 supreme	 organs	
performed	mostly	coordinating	functions.	They	included	the	State	Council,	
the	Committee	of	Ministers	and	the	Senate.	The	State	Council	advised	the	
emperor	 and	 considered	 legislative	 proposals,	 annual	 budget.	 It	 had	 the	
right	to	make	recommendations	but	no	legislative	powers.	The	Committee	
of	 Ministers	 was	 active	 in	 specific	 matters	 concerning	 the	 work	 of	 the	
administration.	It	also	had	authority	to	issue	recommendations	and	was	in	
this	sense	as	powerful	as	the	State	Council.	The	Senate	acted	as	the	Supreme	
administrative	 court	 in	 disputes	 over	 the	 legality	 of	 subordinate	 organ´s	
decisions.	 In	161	 the	Council	of	Ministers	had	been	established	 for	 the	
purpose	 of	 considering	 legislative	 proposals	 from	 individual	 ministries	








petitions	were	 also	 supreme	organs.	The	first	 two	had	 the	 right	 to	 enact	
orders	 and	 regulations	without	 the	decisions	of	 the	 State	Council	 or	 the	
Committee	of	Ministers.	(Yaney	193:	252–253.)	
Special	committees	(councils)	for	instance	in	defense,	food	supply,	fuel	









power	 into	 legislative,	 executive	 and	 judicial	 (Yaney	 193:	 254).	 The	




to	 the	 administration	 beneath	 them.	 Each	 of	 the	 ministries	 and	 major	
The TransiTion oF adminisTraTive culTure, 1870–1916
3
departments	in	the	capital	possessed	subordinate	agents	in	the	provinces.	
Through	 them,	 the	 central	 authorities	 exerted	 their	 power	 over	 local	
matters.	Questions	relating	to	the	authority	and	functions	of	local	decision	
making	were	the	concern	of	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior.	Its	position	became	
stronger	 in	 the	 19th	 century	 developments.	 (Tiihonen	 1994,	 Weissman	
191:10.)	In	15	the	Central	Statistical	Committee	had	been	established	in	














all	 institutions	 in	 his	 administrative	 area.	 This	 included	 the	 organs	 of	






The	 governor´s	 administration	 was	 accountable	 for	 public	 order,	 law	
enforcement,	 health	 and	 sanitation,	 food	 relief	 in	 time	 of	 famine,	 fire	
protection,	economic	prosperity,	local	charities	and	welfare.	Included	in	a	
day´s	 work	 could	 have	 been	 matters	 ranging	 from	 planning	 to	 prevent	
famine	to	the	granting	of	approval	for	a	charitable	ball.	These	wide	territorial	
responsibilities	 created	 tension	 with	 the	 line	 ministries.	 (Weisman	
191:10,44,	 Mezentsev	 1996.)	 In	 fact	 Robbins	 (1996),	 for	 instance,	 has	
concluded	 that	 the	 governors	 were	 legally	 outside	 the	 apparatus	 of	 any	
ministry	 (vnevedomstvennyi).	 Disciplinary	 control	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Internal	 Affairs	 was	 imperfect.	 The	 Ministry	 did,	 however,	 succeed	 in	
developing	the	administration	through	personnel	policy.	Since	the	end	of	
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the	10´s	the	educational	level	of	governors	rose	and	a	growing	number	




making	 of	 the	 local	 self-government	 organs.	 From	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	















century,	 the	Russian	 local	 level	was	 already	mushrooming	with	different	




3.2.2 The Local Level in the Post Reform Structures
The	 local	 level	 institution	of	164	were	not	organizationally	very	precise	
and	their	structures	and	 functions	partially	overlapped	with	 those	of	 the	
state	 and	 the	 estates.	The	 basis	 of	 local	 administration	 was	 a	 tripartite	
division	 into	 state	 bureaucratic,	 estate	 and	 local	 self-government	 bodies.	
Legally	however,	there	were	no	written	rules	about	their	interaction	which	
raised	questions	of	state	building.	(Weissman	191:15,1.)
The	zemstvo	 system	 is	 important	 for	 the	 town	administration	 for	 two	
reasons.	 First	 the	 political	 and	 social	 experiences	 of	 rural	 Russia	 were	













elected	 every	 three	 years	 by	 three	 electoral	 groups	 defined	 by	 property	
holdings:	 the	 landowners,	 city	property	owners	 and	village	 communities	
(peasants).	The	district	zemstvos elected	members	 to	 the	district	zemstvo	
administration	and	to	the	higher	territorial	level	of	the	province	for	a	three	
year	term.	(Vucinich	1960:	195,	Yaney	193:	231.)	The	main	functions	of	
the	 zemstvo	 assemblies	were	 levying	 taxes,	 financing	 operations	 in	 their	
administrative	organs	and	electing	executive	officers	of	which	the	chairman	
of	 the	 administration	 (predsedatel´ zemskogo	 uprava)	 was	 the	 most	
prominent.
The	 164	 zemstvo	 institution	 followed	 the	 social	 theory	 thinking	 on	
government	 which	 saw	 the	 local	 level	 as	 its	 own	 legitimate	 category	
(McKenzie	 192:	 36).	 As	 a	 political	 construct,	 the	 zemstvo system	 was	
meant	to	give	the	freed	peasants	a	say	in	their	own	local	affairs.	In	effect,	the	
decision	making	process	became	dominated	by	the	nobility	and	consequently	
the	 zemstvos regularly	 adopted	 policies	 which	 suited	 the	 nobility´s	 own	
group	interests.	At	the	same	time	the	peasants	were	 largely	 indifferent	to 
zemstvo	activities.	(Hosking	192,	Shlemin	and	Fadeev	1993,	Yaney	193:	
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the	 clergy,	 Jews,	 peasants	 and	 their	 associations	 owning	 non-allotment	
land,	merchants,	business	owners	of	a	certain	category	and	people	under	
police	 surveillance.	 Peasants	 could	 take	 part	 only	 as	members	 of	 village	
communities.	(McKenzie	192:3,	42.)





after	which	 the	matter	was	 transferred	 to	a	 judicial	organ.	 (Mamut	et.	al	
1995:	25.)	This	protected	elected	officials	from	being	the	targets	of	arbitrary	
influence.
The	 190	 Statue	 on	 the	 contrary	 demanded	 that	 the	 zemstvo board	
chairman	 had	 to	 be	 a	 person	 eligible	 for	 state	 service.	This	 meant	 that	

















and	 the	 local	 state	 administrations,	 higher	 administrative	 organs	 and	





Restricted	 authority	 meant	 that	 the	 localities	 did	 not	 have	 the	 right	 to	




















the	 welfare	 of	 legally	 free	 but	 socially	 dependent	 peasants.	 This	 meant	
organizing	 the	 collection	 of	 money	 for	 those	 in	 need,	 bread	 shops	 and	
arranged	points	for	the	inspection	of	epidemics.	Socially	the	zemstvo	system	
directed	 political	 energy	 into	 local	 development	 and	 charity	 and	 eased	










that	 the	governor´s	 role	 as	 coordinators	of	 territorial	 administration	did	
not	work	very	well.	
The	Statute	on	Towns	was	made	public	 in	10	and	 it	 introduced	city	
Duma	 (municipal	 assemblies)	 throughout	 Russia	 and	 certain	 parts	 of	
Central	Asia.	(Vucinich	1960:	195.)	The	new	structure	of	authority	which	it	
laid	down	existed	 from	10-	191.	By	 the	end	of	 the	19th	 century	 there	
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were	 four	 types	 of	 towns	 and	 cities:	 the	 provincial	 town,	 and	 its	 capital	
(gubernskii	 gorod),	 the	 county	 town	 (uezdnyi gorod),	 other	 than	 county	







proportion	 to	 their	 tax	 assessments.	 The	 executive	 board	 –	 the	 town	
administration	–	was	made	up	of	the	city	head	and	two	to	six	members.	It	
was	formulated	by	the	Duma	which	also	chose	its	members.	Similarly	the	
town	 head	 was	 elected	 by	 the	 Duma,	 even	 though	 his	 nomination	 was	














more	 equal	 representation.	 Nor	 did	 it	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 state-local	
authority	 relations	 or	 the	 dependancy	 of	 the	 municipalities	 on	 state	
government.	(Vucinich	1960:	200.)
Since	 the	 10	 statue,	 the	members	 of	 the	 town	 administration	were	
considered	 administrative	 officials	 (dolzhnostnye litsa)	 whose	 term	 was	
limited	 to	 four	 years	 (Mamut	 et	 al.	 1995:	 29).	They	were	not,	 however,	
considered	to	be	state	officials	with	the	exception	of	 the	city	secretary	 in	
provincial	cities	who	had	a	special	status.	Outright	nepotism	was	prohibited	
by	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 members	 could	 not	 be	 relatives.	 Half	 the	
members	were	re-elected	in	two	year	periods	in	a	system	of	rotation.	The	
official	guidance	of	the	administration	was	done	by	legislation	and	Duma	






information	 for	 the	 town	 duma,	 starting	 new	 projects	 for	 the	 town,	
collecting	and	distributing	town	funds,	and	defining	time	limits	and	rules	
of	financial	responsibility	of	its	workers	and	administrative	organs.	Decision	






the	 work	 of	 local	 organizations	 was	 developed	 administratively.	 For	
example,	 In	11,	 the	 local	police	were	given	 regulations	about	 criminal	
investigation.	The	prosecutor	had	the	right	to	appoint	a	named	police	officer	









were	 used	 with	 members	 from	 the	 administration	 and	 among	 eligible	
voting	 inhabitants.	 Commission	members	 could	 participate	 in	 the	 town	
executive	board	meetings	 in	cases	concerning	his	commission.	The	town	








in	many	 cases	meant	 that	 they	 had	 the	 elementary	 level	 of	 reading	 and	
writing	skills.	The	rest,	4%	could	not	read	and	write.	(Nardova	1992:	5.)	
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The	sons	of	peasants	and	members	of	 the	 lower	middle	class	 found	new	
advancement	 opportunities	 in	 local	 government.	 After	 having	 finished	
university	 level	 studies,	 representatives	 of	 these	 groups	 could	 find	
employement	as	civil	servants	in	local	administration.	(Edeen	1960:	21.)	








need	 to	 expand	 services	 and	 control	 resulted	 in	 local	 communities	






authority	 of	 the	 town	 administration	 was	 under	 double	 control	 of	 the	
governor	 and	 of	 the	 Administration	 of	 zemstvo	 and	 town	 affairs	 which	
existed	as	the	state	control	organ	in	the	provinces	from	10	to	191.	The	
organ	had	authority	over	both	 the	administration	and	 the	Duma	and	 its	
decision	was	necessary	for	the	city	executive	board.	The	governors	role	was	
strengthened	 in	his	 position	 as	 the	 chairman.	Besides	 the	 legality	 of	 the	
administrations	decisions	(and	complaints	about	them),	the	body	handled	







As	was	 the	 case	 with	 the	 zemstvo	 system	 in	which	 the	 governmental	
office	for	peasant	affairs	(from	14)	and	then	the	land	captain	system	(from	
19)	 served	 as	 the	 controllers	 of	 decisions	 with	 a	 veto	 right	 over	 any	
decision,	the	city	administration	was	also	under	monitoring.	The	mayors	of	
larger	cities	needed	approval	by	the	minister	of	the	Interior,	and	those	from	
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of	 Interior	 is	a	good	example	of	 this	development.	The	 local	prisons	and	
places	 of	 arrest	 became	 a	 part	 of	 a	 state	 administration	 restructuring	 in	






















of	 local	 hospices	 and	 public	 schools.	 In	 the	 190´s	 the	 zemstvo	 activists	
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debated	among	themselves	the	need	for	a	more	unified	zemstvo	operations	
at	 the	 provincial	 level	 and	 struggled	 with	 their	 governors	 to	 have	 the	
emphasis	of	their	work	be	in	the	social,	health	and	educational	sectors.	Yet	
this	relationship	was	not	clear	cut.	In	some	instances	the	governors	were	
responding	 to	 the	 displeasure	 of	 the	 population	 which	 did	 not	 always	
unanimously	support	all	zemstvo	programs.	
There	 was	 discussion	 about	 the	 missing	 idea	 of	 rule	 in	 the	 lower	
administrative	 levels	 and	 the	 power	 of	 governors	 and	 deputy	 governors	
being	too	weak	in	real	decision	making	relations.	In	particular,	the	activities	
of	 local	 inhabitants	 in	 towns	raised	questions	over	 the	role	of	governors.	
The	governors	themselves	criticized	the	situation	where	their	opinion	was	
not	 asked	 over	 questions	 concerning	 the	 development	 of	 services	 and	
building	projects.	It	was	argued	by	the	minister	of	Finances	(11–16),	




















use	 and	need,	or	 clearly	breach	 the	 rights	of	 local	 inhabitants.	 In	 such	a	
situation,	the	Administration	of	zemstvo	and	town	affairs	–	in	other	words	
the	 state	–	decided	 the	matter.	Further	more,	 the	coercive	powers	of	 the	
local	administration	depended	on	the	local	police	which	undermined	the	
authority	of	the	purely	administrative	organs.	The	local	organs	could	take	a	
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person	to	a	court	or	ask	the	police	to	take	action	in	case	some	one	did	not	
fulfill	 his	 specific	 duties.	 In	 the	 Russian	 Empire,	 the	 police	 retained	 an	
understanding	of	policemen	as	general	administrators.	While	their	general	
concern	 was	 law	 enforcement,	 their	 duties	 also	 included	 such	 tasks	 as	
participation	 in	 tax	 collection,	 statistical	 work,	 registration	 of	 internal	














Improvements	 in	 town	 services	were	 seen	 as	practical	matters.	Voters	
included	approximately	30	%	or	less	of	the	electorate	and	assemblies	were	
dominated	 by	 the	 merchant	 and	 honorary	 citizen	 groups.	 The	 gentry,	
meanwhile,	 played	 only	 a	 minor	 role	 in	 the	 urban	 localities,	 even	
disappearing	 altogether	 from	 the	 town	board	of	Moscow.	Politically	 two	
groups	emerged	among	the	decision	makers:	conservatives	who	protected	





of	 local	 community	 activity.	 In	 1912,	 among	 34	 provinces,	 there	 where	
approximately	 3.000	 physicians,	 1.000	 veterinarians,	 1.100	 agricultural	
experts,	 1.000	 insurance	 agents,	 1.400	 other	medical	 workers,	 including	
midwives,	 300	 statisticians,	 500	 engineers	 and	 technicians	 and	 45.000	
teachers.	(Vucinich	1960:	204.)





1906–1914.	 The	 statisticians	 worked	 with	 the	 zemstvo	 and	 carried	 out	
household	inventories	throughout	the	provinces,	resulting	in	publications	
to	determine	taxable	property.	In	193	a	law	was	passed	which	required	the	
zemstvo	 to	 carry	out	property	 assessments.	 In	addition,	 the	 statisticians´	
aim	was	to	collect	data	which	would	show	causes	of	poverty	and	indebtedness	
for	 the	 planning	 of	 reforms.	 In	 199	 the	 central	 government	 started	 to	
subsidize	but	also	closely	monitor	the	statisticians´	work.	The	activities	of	
the	 statisticians	 were	 supervised	 by	 the zemstvo,	 the	 governor	 and	 the	
ministry	in	St.	Petersburg,	all	of	which	could	veto	projects,	hold	funds	and	
reject	 the	appointment	of	 staff	members.	According	 to	 Johnson´s	 (192)	
evaluation,	 the	 professionalism	 of	 the	 statisticians	 brought	 them	 into	
conflict	with	local	governors	and	self-government	leaders.	In	these	situations	
the	administrative	control	was	not	total.	The	statisticians	could	rely	on	the	
support	 of	 the	 public,	 and	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 on	 one	 another.	 Their	
environment	was	determined	by	opinions	at	all	levels	and	spheres	of	life	in	
society.	The	 inner	 solidarity	 of	 the	 profession	 helped	 local	 statisticians.	
Publications	 influenced	 the	 way	 the	 research	was	 done	 in	 the	 localities.	





The	 Statue	 on	 Towns	 in	 10	 made	 the	 municipalities	 responsible	 for	







instructions.	 In	 10	 the	 police	 were	 organized	 under	 the	 Ministry	 of	
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del	 Rossii	 2005.)	 In	 19,	 about	 260.000	 persons	 worked	 as	 state	 civil	
servants.	Of	these	105.000	were	in	the	police.	(Edeen	1960:	26.)The	police,	








of	 educated	 professionals	 and	 other	 white	 collar	 workers	 was	 growing.	
Towns	demanded	new	efforts	from	administrative	services,	particularly	in	
sanitation	and	housing.	(Brower	196:	325,	326.)
Even	 though	 the	 historical	 literature	 points	 to	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	
local	administration	on	the	structures	and	guidance	of	central	bureaucracies,	
it	is	worth	noting	that	at	the	start	of	the	20th	century,	the	state	administration	
itself	was	 barely	 penetrating	 the	 county	 level	 in	 provinces.	According	 to	
Vchislo´s	 analysis,	 the	 government	 did	 not	 have	 real	 authority	 in	 the	
provinces	in	1906–190.	Zemstvos	did	not	attract	large	groups	of	people	to	
beneficial	 social	 activity	 and,	 generally,	 citizen	 activity	was	 not	 a	 typical	




jurisdiction.	 (Mamut	 et.	 al.	 1995:	 29.)	 How	 can	 this	 situation	 be	
understood?
One	explanation	is	that	for	the	majority	of	the	population	who	lived	in	







these	 the	 most	 important,	 traditionally,	 were	 the	 estate	 institutions.	
(Weissman	191:11,14.)
The	original	cultural	and	economic	meaning	of	estate	institutions	in	the	
urban	municipalities	 eroded	 as	 the	 towns	 themselves	 saw	 the	 “revolving	





environment	 of	 “transitory”	 opportunities.	 (Brower	 196:	 32–32.)	 As	
commerce	expanded,	direct	taxation	of	the	peasant	population	became	less	
important	and	the	meaning	of	trade	grew.	The	role	of	government	changed	
as	well.	 Instead	 of	 being	 a	mechanism	 for	 extracting	 financial	 tribute,	 it	
became	a	structure	which	rested	on	the	developing	nationwide	market.	In	




through	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 and	 by	 pursuing	 conservative	 social	
policies	which	ignored	the	economic	changes.	This	led	to	repeated	conflicts	
inside	 the	 government	 but	 did	 not	 change	 the	 official	 view	 that	





Political	 party	 representation	 at	 the	 state	 level	 was	 not	 possible	 because	
subjects	could	not	be	conceived	as	an	organized	society	but	as	loyal	people.	
The	 Tsar	 viewed	 the	 urban	 population	 with	 particular	 suspicion.	 He	
considered	it	socially	alien	of	Russian	people	even	though	his	governments	
reforms	 and	 the	 works	 of	 his	 predecessors	 had	made	 its	 birth	 possible.	
(McDaniel	1996,	Acton	196,	Shlemin	&	Fadeev	1993.)	The	contradiction	
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wages	 and	 overcrowded	 living	 conditions.	The	 rural	 culture	 which	 they	












commandant	 as	 the	 head	 were	 proposed	 to	 sort	 out	 the	 confusion	 of	
authority	 between	 government	 and zemstvo	 offices.	 The	 proposal	 was	
opposed	by	the	nobility	on	the	grounds	that	undermining	its	meaning	in	
the	 localities	would	 be	 irresponsible.	 Stolypin	 failed	 to	 get	 support	 even	
from	the	zemstvo	members	themselves,	after	which	the	reform	was	dropped.	
(Hosking	192.)
The	following	debates	 in	 the	state	Duma	hearings	and	 the	subsequent	
changes	showed	among	other	things	the	difficulties	in	turning	the	peasant	









56.)	Yet	 the	 reforms	 brought	 along	many	 structural	 changes	 at	 the	 local	
level,	which	enabled	its	institutional	development.	As	the	transition	process	
intensified,	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 local	 administration	 culture	 was	
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in	the	infrastructure	and	services.	The	difference	was	evident	in	the	manner	
these	 areas	 were	 run.	 Public	 order	 and	 the	 following	 of	 administrative	
regulations	was	a	priority	in	the	central	areas	but	in	the	marginal	districts	
arbitrariness	was	more	evident.	(Brower	196:	343.)	The	inequality	in	the	
provision	 of	 services	 and	 fair	 treatment,	 fed	 radical	 feelings	 among	 the	
poorer	 urban	 population.	 Better	 funding,	 flexible	 local	 decision	making	







the	 Russian	 empire	 were	 creating	 a	 split	 population	 of	 diverse	 ethnic	
communities.	 Even	 as	 cities	 were	 essentially	 providing	 possibilities	 for	
assimilation,	the	group	boundaries	were	even	strengthened	by	what	Brower	
calls	 “social	 communication”	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century.	 The	 suspicion	
among	different	groups	further	changed	the	social	environment.	(Brower	
196:	329.)	









elections.	 It	 also	 abolished	 the	 non-elective	 offices	 of	 police	 and	 land	
captains,	whose	 duties	were	 transferred	 to	 the	 elected	 bodies.	 (Vucinich	
1960:	20.)	These	changes	came	too	late.	
3.2.4 Law As a Tool for State Building
The	legal	development	 in	 the	19th	 century	had	a	variety	of	effects	on	 the	
administration.	It	would	seem	that	 law	played	no	part	whatsoever	 in	the	
real	formation	and	development	of	decision	making	and	execution	in	the	












Before	 that	 most	 of	 the	 population	 lived	 under	 local	 customary	 law,	
which	meant	the	decisions	of	village	elders,	landlords	and	local	aristocracy.	
The	national	law	which	existed	included	rule-decisions	and	statutes	which	
were	 often	 unpublished	 and	 contradictory.	There	 was	 no	 national	 court	
system	and	judicial	functions	were	often	adjunct	to	administrative	functions.	
Judges	could	be	former	soldiers	or	administrators	who	had	no	formal	legal	
training.	 (Levin-Stankevich	 1996:	 224.)	A	major	 change	of	 this	 situation	
took	place	when	a	reform	of	the	judiciary	was	implemented	in	165–166.	
It	 established	 a	 hierachy	 of	 courts.	 Judges	 who	 were	 appointed	 by	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Justice,	were	 required	 to	 have	 legal	 qualifications,	were	 paid	
salaries	and	had	life	tenure.	(Bowring	2000.)






of	 the	 administration	 itself	 also	 required	 application	 of	 standard	 rules.	







did	 not	 correspond	 with	 the	 ideals	 of	 people	 knowing	 written	 law	 or	
uniform	 national	 court	 system.	The	 state	 law	 which	 developed	 was	 not	
antagonistic	to	national	definitions	and	re-definitions	of	ethical	behavior.	











of	 this	 law	was	 the	ukaz,	 a	decree	 from	 the	 sovereign	which	maintained	
public	order,	as	did	other	administrative	decisions	(polozhenie estestvennogo 
prava).	 In	 a	 vast	 geographical	 area	 with	 a	 social	 contract	 between	 the	
population	and	the	state	that	did	not	involve	mutual	constraints	or	trust,	
the	 decrees	 also	 served	 as	 a	 method	 of	 control	 upon	 administration.	
Administrative	law	did	not	offer	protection	from	discretionary	decrees	(of	
the	 sovereign).	 Its	main	 purpose	 was	 to	 secure	 compliance	 and	 not	 the	
rights	of	individuals.	(Taranovskii	1992:	302–303.)
The	different	reform	policies	reflected	in	the	laws	were	often	difficult	for	
the	 civil	 servants	 to	 implement.	 George	 Yaney	 has	 contended	 that	 an	
imperial	Russian	 government	 agency	 “often	had	not	 only	 to	 perform	 its	
official	 functions	 and	 enforce	 its	 rules	 but	 also	 to	 conduct	 a	 crusade	 on	
behalf	 of	 them,	 a	 crusade	 that	 went	 on	 simultaneously	 within	 its	 own	
organization	and	in	the	society	at	large.	This	is	why	so	many	of	the	statutes	
of	Russian	law	throughout	the	period	of	111–1905	were	not	enforceable	
legal	 rules	 but	 exhortations	 to	 behave	 or	work	 according	 to	 this	 or	 that	
ideal.	[…]	…	the	laws	either	could	be	ignored	entirely	or	they	could	serve	a	
strong-willed	 official	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 compelling	 people	 to	 do	 his	 bidding	
regardless	of	regulations	to	the	contrary.”	(Yaney	193:21.)	Law	in	this	sense	














Legal	protection	of	 the	population	and	a	more	general	 idea	of	 service	
were	only	beginning	to	emerge	as	concepts	of	administrative	work.	State	
building	was	 still	 steered	 toward	 the	management	 of	 the	 population	 for	
order	and	stability.	Because	the	legal	guarantee	was	weak,	the	population	
did	 not	 possess	 any	 rights	 as	 such.	 The	 Constitution	 of	 1906	 formally	
changed	this.	The	elements	of	legal	culture	were	two-fold.	The	use	of	appeal	
was	institutionalized	into	the	practices	of	the	system.	Yet,	the	lack	of	political	
freedoms	 resulted	 in	 the	 strengthening	 of	 security	 organs	 and	 arbitrary,	
secretive	 behavior	 inside	 the	 administration.	 Characteristic	 of	 the	
administrative	culture	was	that	these	two	sides	were	not	connected	directly	
because	 they	 represented	 different	 categories.	 One	 was	 dealing	 with	
authority	 borders,	 the	 other	 with	 the	 secretive	 world	 of	 political	
dissidence.	
An	example	of	the	latter	was	the	counter-reform	of	Alexander	III	(11–
194) who	wanted	to	act	against	growing	political	risks	 to	 the	autocratic	
order	 and	 required	 a	 strong	 security	 administration	 to	 ensure	 political	
stability.	The	Tsar´s	main	advisor	was	K.	P.	Pobedonostsev	who	opposed	
the	 reforms	 of	 the	 previous	 Tsar	 Alexander	 II	 and	 distrusted	 political	
freedom	and	popular	representation.	The	Emperor	demanded	that	the	civil	
service	was	a	unified	 front	against	 the	changing	 society.	The	Ministry	of	
Interior	directed	the	political	control	and	the	counter	revolutionary	work	
through	 its	 locally	 working	 security	 police	 force	 (okhrana)	 which	 was	
separated	 from	 the	 governors	 and	 governor	 generals	 and	made	 into	 an	







Appellation,	 for	 instance,	had	become	an	important	 instrument	 in	the	




jurisdiction	 being	 described	 by	 a	 multitude	 of	 legal	 regulations.	 The	













of	 all	 tax	 complaints)	 after	which	 the	 governors	 started	 to	 veto	 zemstvo	
taxes	more	frequently.	(Fallows	192:	15–190.)	
For	local-center	relations	the	success	of	the	local	self-government	organs	




administration	 which	 won	 in	 almost	 all	 the	 cases	 it	 initiated.	 Thomas	
Fallows	 has	 presented	 three	 interpretations	 for	 these	 results.	 First	 is	 the	
liberal	 claim	 in	 which	 the	 zemstvo	 victories	 were	 seen	 as	 proof	 of	 the	
capricious	 ruling	 style	 of	 the	 state	 administration.	The	 second	 is	 to	 see	
zemstvo	success	in	the	Senate	as	a	proof	of	the	governor´s	style	of	discretion	
(proizvol).	The	 third	 is	 to	 see	 the	 appeal	 successes	 as	 showing	 that	 self-
government	organs	did	indeed	have	their	own	authority	and	were	not	as	
persecuted	as	they	saw	themselves.	Maybe	even	more	important	is	the	fact	
that	 private	 citizens	 also	 enjoyed	 some	 institutional	 protection	 against	
capriciousness.	The	governors	often	took	the	side	of	private	parties	against	
local	self-government	organs.	Fallows	has	concluded	that	this	eroded	the	




164	 changed	 the	 position	 of	 procurators	 (prosecutors)	 which	 had	 an	
alternating	 role	 in	 the	 administrative	 system	 of	 Russia	 throughout	 the	
centuries.	The	prosecutor´s	office	appeared	in	Russia	during	Peter	the	Great´s	
reign	 as	 a	 borrowed	 European	 institution.	 As	 the	 ministerial	 system	 of	
government	was	introduced	to	Russia	in	102,	the	Prosecutor	General´s	post	
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and	 its	 own	 organizational	 weakness.	 It	 was	 not	 an	 integrated	 system	 of	
harmonious	 policy	 but	 an	 organization	 subordinated	 to	 a	 minister	 and	








what	 type	 of	 legal	 supervision	 the	 government	 needed	 in	 Russia.	 The	
prosecutor´s	office	was	one	of	the	most	loyal	supporters	of	the	autocratic	
regime	and	there	were	fears	it	would	use	its	authority	to	protect	autocratic	
legality	 over	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 (Kazantsev	 199:	 54–59.)	The	 prosecutors´	




one-man	 management	 and	 educational	 requirements	 were	 set.	 The	
prosecutor´s	 office	 did	 indeed	 become	 a	 central	 tool	 for	 combating	
revolutionary	movements	 in	Russia.	 It	 treated	 law	from	the	viewpoint	of	
struggle	 against	 unwanted	 political	 elements	 and	 effective	 general	
supervision	 of	 administration	 was	 secondary.	 The	 idea	 that	 general	
supervision	would	 have	 resulted	 in	 growing	 legality	 did	 not	materialize.	
Instead	 dysfunctions	 from	 neglect	 and	 outright	 lawlessness	 continued.	
(Kazantsev	199:	54–59.)
The	 hierarchy	 of	 norms	 did	 not	 change	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 different	
administrative	 changes	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	19th	 century.	The	 rulings	of	 the	
State	 Council	 which	 were	 confirmed	 by	 the	 Tsar	 should	 have	 been	 the	
foremost	 source	 of	 authority	 in	 the	 country	 and	 taken	 precedence	 over	
other	 decisions.	A	minister´s	 order	 should	 have	 been	 taken	 to	 the	 State	
Council	 before	 it	 took	 the	 force	 of	 law.	 In	 actual	 fact,	 the	 Tsar	 himself	
decided	 whether	 his	 ministers	 made	 laws	 without	 consulting	 the	 State	
Council	 first.	Orders	of	 the	Emperor	had	 the	 force	of	 law,	 even	 in	 cases	




decision	 before	 it	 was	 taken	 to	 the	 State	 Council,	 and	 that	 he	 did	 not	
interfere	with	the	Council´s	decision	making.	(Yaney	193:	261.)	
During	 the	 reign	 of	 Alexander	 III	 in	 15,	 a	 decree	 was	 passed	 that	
proclaimed	all	acts	of	the	Emperor	to	have	equal	force	of	 law	despite	the	






was	 not	 a	 law	 but	 the	 Emperor´s	 command.	 A	 difference	 between	 an	
administrative	 order	 and	 a	 law	 was	 hard	 to	 distinguish	 because	 neither	
administrative	officials	nor	judges	in	courts	had	the	right	to	pass	judgement	
on	 the	 validity	 and	 judicial	 strength	 of	 tsar-approved	 laws.	Nor	 did	 the	
Senate	 have	 the	 right	 to	 stop	 these	 laws.	The	 Judicial	 Code	 from	 164	
allowed	courts	to	decide	cases	on	the	basis	of	contradictions	between	laws.	
This	rule	was	preserved	in	the	Code	till	1905.	(Yaney	193:	264.)	The	need	




Levin-Stankevich	 has	 concluded	 that	 when	 the	 government	 failed	 to	
create	a	legal	officialdom	which	satisfied	its	view	of	legal	culture,	it	altered	
the	work	environment	of	officials	in	the	“judicial	counter	reforms”.	Crimes	
which	 were	 considered	 political	 were	 removed	 from	 the	 jury	 trial	 and	





the	 principles	 of	 basic	 parliamentarism	 and	 popular	 legal	 control	 of	 the	
administration	of	government.	(Manifesto	of	1	October	1905.)
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tutionalism	of	 the	monarchy,	 it	was	problematic	 that	 the	 there	was	not	a	





authority,	 particularly	 in	 the	 economical	 sphere	 to	 pass	 administrative	
regulations	alone.	Second	was	the	right	of	judicial	review	which	in	principle	
also	belonged	to	 the	ruler	but	was	 in	 fact	administered	through	officials.	



















not	 subject	 to	 publication	 if	 they	 were	 issued	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
Constitution.	(Russian	Fundamental	Law	1906:	articles	I,	III.)	In	this	sense,	
the	autocratic	legal	culture	at	the	top	of	the	state	was	unchanged.	
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Similar	 to	 the	 developments	 in	 the	 teaching	 profession,	 lawyers	 as	 a	
profession	had	become	a	liberal	force.	Many	lawyers	were	motivated	by	career	












3.3 The Administrative Culture After 1906: Risk 
Administration Elements in Town Administrations
The	political	ideology	of	administrative	change	in	the	late	19th	century	and	
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•	 Strengthening	 of	 the	 state	 by	making	 governing	 of	 the	 provinces	
easier	through	decentralization.	













of	 town	government	authority	and	the	 fourth	was	 the	delegation	of	state	
tasks,	which	resulted	in	new	practical	demands	at	the	local	level.	
The	 transition	of	 administrative	 culture	produced	new	 risks.	This	was	
mostly	due	to	an	inflexible	administrative	market	(comp.	Kordonskii´s	use	
of	the	concept	“administrative	market”	in	the	analysis	of	Soviet	and	present	




the	 autocratic	 ruling	 culture	 at	 the	 top	of	 the	 state,	which	did	not	 allow	
political	changes	and	in	which	the	formal	ties	between	the	three	parts	of	the	
administrative	market	were	not	clear	or	specified	directly	by	law.	In	these	
factors	 there	were	 no	 clear	 changes	 during	 the	 studied	 period,	 not	 even	
after	the	1906	Constitution.	
The	relationship	between	law	and	state	up	to	and	after	the	acceptance	of	




high	 power	 distance	 between	 him	 and	 the	 people	 he	 ruled.	This	 power	
distance	 was	 replicated	 in	 the	 office	 cultures	 around	 Russia	 where	
administrative	authority	was	in	practice	personal.	
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Yaney	(193)	has	contended	that	the	autocratic	rule	at	the	top	of	the	state	
penetrated	 the	 whole	 cultural	 system.	 The	 background	 to	 the	 legal-
administrative	 relationship	which	 both	 the	 center-local	 relationship	 and	
superior-subordinate	 relationship	 in	 imperial	 Russia	 had,	was	 the	 extra-
legal	 position	 of	 the	 ruler.	The	 hierarchy	which	 existed,	 although	 it	was	
structurally	 quite	 elaborate	 (particularly	 in	 the	 state	 level),	 remained	 a	
system	of	mostly	personal	relationships.	
The	Emperor	retained	a	three	dimensional	role	as	the	head	of	the	state.	
He	 was	 the	 highest	 legislative	 authority	 as	 well	 as	 judicial	 reviewer.	 In	
addition	he	was	the	head	of	the	state	administration	through	which	judicial	















It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 before	 the	 19th	 century	 reforms	 the	 legal	
norms	 of	 Russia	 prohibited	 any	 civil	 servant	 (slugi)	 to	 use	 discretional	
power	(i.e.	to	decide	matters	based	on	his	own	evaluation).	A	major	factor	
was	 the	 lack	 of	 formal	 education	 among	 officials.	 The	 servants	 of	 the	








democratic	 administration.	Weissman	 (191)	 has	 described	 how	 all	 the	







Those	officials	who	worked	 for	 local	 administrations	were	overburdened	
with	all	kinds	of	routine	tasks	which	were	piling	up,	taking	their	attention	
away	 from	 the	 main	 interest	 of	 the	 work.	 Weissman	 argues	 that	 the	
administrative	culture	was	marked	by	slowness,	delays	and	corruption,	of	






personnel.	The	 lack	 of	 clear	 outlines	 for	 the	 autocracy	 itself	meant	 that	
regulated	social	communication	was	most	important	in	the	decision	making	
process.	The	level	of	administration	was	less	important	than	situational	and	
political	 factors	 (comp.	Mustonen	 199).	The	 lower	 level	 administrators	
were	expected	to	respect	supervisor	autocracy	and	avoid	taking	initiatives	








and	 central	 administrations	 had	 their	 vertical	 lines	which	 produced	 the	
same	effects	 in	addition	 to	having	no	contact	between	 themselves	 in	 the	
administrative	process.	(Shepelev	1999:	.)
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The	 new	 demands	 for	 legality	 which	 the	 1906	 Constitution	 formally	
instituted	 were	 in	 conflict	 with	 the	 elements	 of	 culture	 connected	 with	
personnel.	Bribery,	 as	 a	means	of	 getting	 results	 and	 sustaining	 stability,	
conflicted	 with	 the	 intended	 role	 of	 civil	 servants	 in	 modernizing	
administration.	Elite	recruitment	in	which	a	personal	patron	was	necessary	




viewed	 themselves	 as	 public	 decision	 makers.	 The	 connection	 between	
titles	and	actual	responsibility	was	rather	weak.	Loyalty	and	submissiveness	
were	 regarded	higher	 than,	 for	 instance,	 “legal	 consciousness”.	 In	 reality,	
administrative	guarantee	(a	 type	of	mutual	understanding)	protected	 the	
administrators	from	having	responsibility.
The	administrative	market	 in	 the	 towns	was	made	of	 four	 influencing	




decision maker	 effecting	 the	 local	 level.	 Provinces	 were	 headed	 by	 the	
governors	whose	job	was	to	plan,	supervise	and	coordinate	all	task	execution	
in	their	respective	geographical	area.	
The	 town	 government	 line	 was	 made	 up	 of	 the	 four	 year	 Duma,	 its	
executive	board	and	the	mayor	who	was	accepted	by	the	Ministry	of	Interior.	
The	town	administrators	were	at	first	not	considered	state	officials	but	after	
the	 190´s	 the	 centralization	 needs	 changed	 their	 formal	 position.	The	
estates	 continued	 to	 have	 their	 own	 rights	 of	 influence	 after	 the	 1906	
Constitution.	 The	 legal	 boundaries	 between	 the	 bureaucratic	 bodies	 of	
ministerial	 and	provincial	 authorities,	however,	were	not	 clear.	 Similarly,	




center	 relations.	 On	 the	 whole,	 the	 administrative	market	 was	 prone	 to	
great	risks	if	any	part	of	the	structure	changed.	
In	 terms	 of	 delegating	 tasks,	 after	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 the	 local	
administrative	 culture	 was	 affected	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 localities	 could	 not	
have	 their	 own	 programs	 or	 coordinate	 their	 efforts	 together.	 Their	
















judicial	 review,	 arbitrary	 action	was	 easy	 to	 take.	Corruption	flourished.	
“An	administrative	guarantee”	protected	the	civil	servants	from	being	taken	








Developing	 professionalism	 and	 civil	 society	 worked	 as	 a	 mediating	
force	in	the	local	administration.	As	a	side-effect	of	delegating	tasks	to	local	









and	 to	 a	 different	 extent.	These	 groups	 included	 for	 instance	 commerce	
organizations,	 students,	 newspaper	 staff,	 farming	 societies,	 religious	
societies,	 groups	 of	 national	 minorities,	 professional	 associations	 and	
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work.	The	 teachers	 in	 19th	 century	Russia	 had	 low	 formal	 qualifications,	








major	 part	 of	 the	 load.	 The zemstvo	 did	 not	 find	 adequately	 prepared	














epidemics	 in	the	190´s.	The	reactions	of	ordinary	people	 in	these	 times	






which	 most	 notably	 took	 their	 form	 in	 industrialization	 and	 agrarian	
difficulties	of	outdated	 farming	 systems	had	many	effects	upon	 the	 local	





22,	 2.)	The	 tsarist	 administration	 came	 to	 resemble	 the	 Soviet	Union	 a	
hundred	years	later	in	its	formal	omnipotence	but	daily	inability	to	enact	
needed	action.	
Marc	Raeff	has	 concluded	 that	 communication	between	 the	 state	 and	




improve.	But	 it	 did	not	 change	 the	 center.	Raeff	 sees	 the	 revolution	 as	 a	
direct	end	result.	(Raeff	1966:	35–3.)






state	elite´s	goals.	The	social	 system	around	the	Tsar	was	 important	 to	 it	
both	 economically	 and	 socially.	 For	 administration	 this	 connection	 had	
historically	meant	the	creation	of	a	social	culture	inside	it,	in	which	formal	
rules	and	norms	were	equal	 in	 importance	to	personal	debts,	 family	and	
mutual	favoritism.





anti-bureaucratic	 attitudes	 among	 the	 elite	 were	 reinforced	 by	 parallel	
sentiments	among	conservatives.	(Weissman	191:30,	36.)
The	Constitution	of	1906	could	be	said	 to	have	 formalized	 those	 legal	
rights	of	legal	protection	which	had	begun	to	develop	after	the	164	political	
and	 legal	 reforms.	 Appellation	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 successfully	
institutionalized	 practices	 of	 the	 19th	 century.	 At	 the	 level	 of	 practices,	
appellation	became	an	actively	used	method	of	correcting	administrative	
mistakes.	 More	 importantly,	 it	 could	 be	 used	 by	 both	 individuals	 and	
organizations.	Appellation	served	as	a	means	to	institutionalize	jurisdiction	
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limits	of	different	levels	of	administration	in	certain	areas,	such	as	taxation.	
Through	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Senate	 as	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 a	 type	 of	 legal	




of	 jurisdiction	 or	miscalculation	 in	 decision	making.	 A	most	 important	
such	area	was	taxation.
Local	courts	helped	bind	the	population	to	state	structures	and	developed	














only	when	 asked,	 instead	 they	 aspired	 to	 identify	 state	 “necessities”	 and	
create	 plans	which	 could	 be	 executed	 by	 government	 agencies.	 Law	was	
something	 that	 would	 come	 in	 the	 process	 of	 reform	 programs	 which	
carried	 abstract	 conceptions	 of	 necessity	 for	 the	 good	 of	 the	 society.	 In	
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Earlier	 studies	 (for	 instance	 Hosking	 192	 and	 Shepelev	 1999)	 have	
concluded	 that	 the	 administrative	 culture	 was	 burdened	 with	 risks	 as	 a	
result	of	the	autocratic	rule.	Hosking,	for	instance,	came	to	the	conclusion	




The	 ethical	 connotation	 of	 authority	 as	 independently	 based	 on	 and	
regulated	by	religion,	did	not	exist	in	Russia.	Also	missing	before	the	first	
Constitution	was	the	idea	of	the	sovereign	individual	as	not	just	an	object	of	
the	 authority	 but	 a	 participant	 in	 the	 process	 of	 defining	 that	 authority.	










of	 different	 services.	 Economically,	 however,	 the	 administrations	 were	




The	 changes	 in	 estate	 structures	 due	 to	 industrialization	 and	 the	











The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
116
To summarize,	 this	 chapter	 has	 analyzed	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 local	
administration	 in	 the	 autocratic	 structures	of	 the	 imperial	Russian	 state.	
The	stucturation	process	created	a	town	administration	culture	which	had	
its	 own	 limited	 and	 non-political	 authority	 base.	 This	 authority	 was	
mediated	 by	 the	 decision	 making	 procedures	 which	 underpinned	 the	
autocratic	 character	 of	 the	 state.	 Local	 actors	 could,	 within	 their	 own	




The	weakness	of	 the	administrative	authority	 (both	 the	organizational	
and	 civil	 servants´),	 however,	 created	 dysfunctions	 (bureaucratism,	
multiplication	of	paper	work)	and	risks	(poor	feedback	and	an	authoritarian,	
personal	decision	making	style).	The	lack	of	a	clear	separation	of	powers	
between	 the	 representational,	 executive	 and	 judicial	 created	most	 of	 the	
side-effects	in	the	transition.	These	were	in	conflict	with	the	strenghtening	
of	 law-based	administration	and	more	democratic,	effective	government.	
The	 next	 chapter	 will	 show	 how	 these	 features	 of	 local	 administration	
continued	to	exist	in	the	new	system	after	191.	
11













building	 process	 were	 the	 creation	 of	 uniform	 command	 structures	 for	
policy	implementation	and	information	gathering,	new	personnel	policies	
and	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 a	 Soviet	 legal	 culture.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 this	
chapter,	 I	 analyze	why	 the	 resulting	 local	 administration	culture	differed	
from	the	original	purposes	of	change.	
4.1 The Political Ideology of Administrative 




first	 of	 these	 ground	 purposes	 was	 the	 relationship	 between	 state	 and	
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citizen.	The	 earlier	 basis	 of	 the	 state	 as	 the	 provider	 of	 order	 between	
different	 social	 groups	 while	 being	 legally	 subordinated	 to	 the	 personal	
interests	of	the	autocrat,	was	replaced	in	the	revolution	by	the	continuation	
of	the	provisional	government´s	idea	of	state-society	relationship.	The	great	
rupture	 was	 Lenin´s	 concentration	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 state	 as	 the	
representative	of	all	society	(Lenin	196:	154).	Structurally,	Lenin	saw	the	
zemstvos	 as	 essential	 parts	 of	 tsarist	 administrative	 culture	 which	made	
them	incompatible	with the	new	ideology.	(Vucinich	1960:	20.)
As	Russian	society	at	the	time	of	the	revolution	did	not	yet	correspond	
with	 the	 class	 structure	 of	 a	 socialist	 state,	 one	 of	 the	 central	 tasks	 of	
revolutionary	 change	 became	 “the	 fight	 against	 oppressors”	 and	 the	
neutralization	 of	 the	middle	 class	 by	 the	 dictatorship	 of	 the	 proletariat,	
which	constituted	the	second	ground	purpose.	Essential	to	understanding	
the	 political	 theory	 of	 both	 administrative	 change	 and	 principles	 of	
guidance,	was	 the	 fact	 that	 they	were	both	 relative	 to	different	historical	
moments	rather	than	constant	fixed	concepts	in	the	organization	of	action.	
This	 is	 why	 Lenin´s	 own	 writings	 show	 different	 positions	 in	 different	











eventual	 disappearance	 of	 all	 classes	 from	 society,	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	
proletariat	needed	for	its	authority	a	state	with	a	centralized	machinery	of	





the	 revolution”	 and	 the	 political	 choices	 of	 the	 Bolshevik	 leadership.	
(Makarenko	199:120.)	For	Lenin	the	administrative	ideology	was	above	all	
a	 matter	 of	 ownership,	 from	 which	 all	 other	 elements	 followed.	 Thus,	
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structural	matters	were	not	as	essential	as	the	people	who	worked	in	them.	
The	 old	 culture	 of	 repressive	 state	 machinery	 (chinovniki)	 was	 different	
from	 the	 socialist	 regulative	 and	 economic	 ideal	 culture	 of	 government.	




be	 looked	 at	 more	 concretely	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 organizational	 effects.	
Administratively	 the	 ground	 purposes	 of	 the	 revolution	 meant	 a	 dual	
development	 in	 building	 the	 new	 state	 and	 the	 new	 socialist	 life	 style	
through	administrative	regulation.	These	can	be	dealt	with	here	under	two	
headings,	as	follows:
1) Active enforcement of proletarian dictatorship in which	administration 
and law were used as instruments for education and the elimination of	the 
opposition
The	purpose	of	 centralization	was	 thus	 connected	 to	 a	more	 concrete	
problem	of	guidance	and	control.	The	human	“material”	which	at	the	time	
of	 the	 revolution	was	 available	 to	 govern	 the	 country,	 did	 not	meet	 the	
practical	 requirements	 of	 administration.	 Since	 resources	 were	 scarce,	
Lenin	 saw	 it	 necessary	 to	 concentrate	 knowledge	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	
administrative	 system.	 (Susiluoto	 199:	 6.)	 Centralization,	 which	 was	




collective	 in	which	this	 individual	was	useful	 for	the	general	good	of	the	
majority.	 Later	 on,	 the	 general	 good	was	 to	 be	 interpreted	 solely	 by	 the	
party.	For	Lenin,	individualism	in	the	capitalist	sense	inevitably	meant	the	
rise	 of	 opportunistic	 and	 oppressive	 persons	 who	 used	 others	 for	 their	
personal	financial	gain	and	thus	eroded	the	foundation	of	real	democracy.	





machinery	 to	 advance	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 economically	 disadvantaged	
majority.	Yet	it	was	no	longer	seen	as	a	state	in	its	normal	sense.	It	was	a	
transitional	 state:	a	process	advancing	apparatus,	which	was	supposed	 to	
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evidently	die	away	in	its	old	forms.	(Lenin	1964.)	The	socialist	economy	was	
to	 give	 birth	 to	 a	 socially	 evolutionary	 state	 where	 the	 process	 of	





the	 elaboration	 of	 the	 transitional	 process	 itself.	 In	 this	 sense,	 political	
education	and	continuous	control	of	cultural	reorientation	were	particularly	
meaningful.	 Lenin	 pointed	 out	 how	 confusion	 becomes	 evident	 in	 all	
proletarian	revolutions,	particularly	in	the	Russian	case,	where	the	country,	
in	his	opinion,	was	backward	and	petty	bourgeois	by	nature.	This,	for	Lenin,	








were	 used	 to	 explain	 and	 ideologically	 legitimate	 the	 differences	 in	 the	
administrative	 cultures	 of	 the	 old	 and	 new	 leadership.	 The	 image	 of	
administration	as	a	class	based	privilege	with	extraordinary	powers	was	to	
be	changed	into	something	serving	the	new	state	and	its	purposes.	
For	 this,	 Lenin	 elaborated	 as	 to	 how	 it	was	 necessary	 to	 immediately	
rebuild	the	civil	service	in	order	to	diminish	its	meaning	and	to	one	day	be	
rid	 of	 it	 all	 together.	 In	 his	 opinion,	 capitalism	 had	 created	 a	 “simple	
democracy”	(of	which	the	equal	pay	was	an	example)	by	perfecting	mass	





“no	control”	was,	 for	Lenin,	 the	same	as	postponement	of	 the	revolution	
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elements	 for	 the	organization	of	 the	first	 stage	of	 the	communist	 society	
where	 all	 people	 become	 employees	 of	 the	 state.	When	 the	majority	 of	
people	start	to	practice	this	type	of	control	over	state	functions	(their	work	
assignments),	control	which	is	distributed	on	an	individual	basis	but	owes	









functions	 loose	 their	 political	 nature	 by	 becoming	 mere	 bureaucratic	
actions.	At	the	end	of	this	evolution,	the	idealized	communist	state	would	
have	 meant	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 people	 use	 internalized	 traditions	 and	
guidelines	on	a	voluntary	basis	without	coercion	(Lenin	196:	219–220.)
In	this	sense	the	line	between	state	and	society	was	to	be	abolished,	and	
the	 two	 were	 to	 become	 one	 at	 both	 an	 ideological	 and	 practical	 level.	
Administration	was	not	supposed	to	exist	as	a	separate	unit	in	the	chain	of	
power	centers	but	as	a	means	for	the	overall	organization	of	the	new	state	













system	of	 administrative	 control	 over	work	processes	 started	 to	produce	
results.
A	government	was	supposed	to	be	based	on	the	specific	requirements	of	
the	 majority	 of	 people	 which	 consisted	 of	 poorly	 educated	 or	 illiterate	
peasants	and	factory	workers	who	survived	19th	century	poverty.	The	class	
struggle	concept	meant	discarding	the	idea	that	the	interests	of	these	masses	
could	 be	 protected	 by	 the	 good	 will	 of	 the	 more	 well	 to	 do	 classes	 in	
parliamentary	elections.	Further	more,	democratic	development	meant	the	
disciplinary	 training	 of	 the	masses	who	 at	 the	 outset	might	 not	 be	 fully	
aware	of	the	benefits	of	this	direction.	The	general	good	was	thus	central	to	








Logically,	 instead	of	 concentration	on	 the	 state-local	 level	 relations	 as	
such,	the	idea	was	“total	administration”	which	would	include	all	aspects	of	
the	new	life	style.	More	so,	the	political	goal	was	to	involve	all	people	in	the	
decision	 making	 and	 daily	 running	 of	 the	 state	 which,	 in	 this	 relation,	
became	 legitimately	 theirs.	The	required	control	protected	 the	 long	 term	
interests	of	 those	wanting	 to	 see	 the	 state	being	 free	 from	 individualistic	






At	 the	 practical	 level,	 introduction	 of	 the	 new	 ideology	 first	 meant	
concentrating	on	rapidly	getting	rid	of	the	effects	of	the	old	social	system.	
One	 of	 the	 first	 practical	 acts	 of	 this	 class	 struggle	 for	 the	 Bolshevik	
government,	was	the	differentiation	of	attitude	toward	social	organizations.	






of	 “elastic	 organization”	 which	 initially	 replaced	 both	 capitalist	 law	 and	




coercion	 and	 dictatorship.	 Crushing	 opposition	 was	 necessary	 for	 its	
superiority	 in	 knowledge,	 wealth	 and	 organization.	 Confusion,	 shifting	
positions	and	uncertainty	were	natural	results	of	the	transitions.	Ideological	
and	practical	control	in	this	situation	were	to	be	implemented	through	the	
courts,	 in	 which	 the	 education	 of	 obedience	 was	most	 effectively	 done.	
(Lenin	196:	455–45.)
Legal	 thinking	 evolved	 from	 the	 early	 “purely	 ideological”	 (such	 as	
Rejsner)	thinking	toward	a	more	institutionally	oriented	version	(Kivinen	
19:	6).	In	192	P.I	Stuchka,	the	first	President	of	the	USSR	Supreme	Court,	






who,	as	 the	architect	of	 the	first	socialist	 theory	of	 law,	saw	the	 idea	of	a	
social	contract	underlying	a	political	order	which	was	based	on	the	alleged	
harmony	of	equal	individuals.	Law,	by	nature,	is	contractual	and	individual	








relations	 in	 the	 society	 to	 be	 objective	 facts	 which	 norms	 reflect.	Thus	
norms	could	not	be	separated	from	this	level	into	something	primary,	as	an	
abstract	set	of	rules.	(Kivinen	19:	6,	39.)	




all,	 the	 possibility	 of	 external	 control	 over	 official	 decision	 making,	






administrative	 structures.	Kivinen	has	described	how	 the	 legal	 theory	had	
already	discarded	the	methodological	premises	of	Pashukanis	and	began	to	
comtemplate	 the	 concept	 of	 justice	 itself,	 which	 included	 a	 connection	
between	justice	and	a	certain	amount	of	free	will.	(Kivinen	19:	.)
To	go	back	to	the	roots	of	this	change	in	the	ideology,	it	is	useful	to	look	
at	 the	 initial	 legitimation	 which	 Lenin	 gave	 the	 combination	 of	 soviet	
democratism	and	individual	dictatorship	in	the	realization	of	the	needed	
control	of	working	processes.	In	Lenin´s	opinion	it	was	a	completely	rational	
result	of	 the	external	 relations	of	government.	The	amount	of	 repression	
was	 linked	with	 the	educational	 level	of	 the	revolutionary	class,	 the	after	




to	 the	will	of	one	person.	 Ideally,	 as	 all	were	 to	have	 the	 same	goal,	 this	
direction	should	have	been	quite	pleasant	but	nevertheless	complete.	Lenin	
saw	the	historical	role	of	the	party	as	a	leader	of	the	population	who	had	to	







interests	of	minority	groups.	The	Soviet	version	was	 instead	used	 for	 the	
involvement	of	the	masses	in	a	historical	creative	work.	The	interests	of	the	
majority	were	interpreted	by	the	party	which,	in	this	sense,	involved	in	itself	
both	 ideological	 and	 bureaucratic	 (administrative)	 features.	 (Makarenko	
199:	120.)






legitimation	of	dictatorship.	Graeme	Gill	 (1990)	has	 interpreted	 the	core	
principle	of	the	political	system	to	mean	that	political	authorities	were	not	
accountable	 in	 any	 direct	 sense	 to	 the	 populace	 for	 their	 actions.	 “With	
history	interpreted	in	terms	of	abstract	class	forces,	notions	of	responsibility	
and	accountability	in	an	immediate	and	practical	sense	were	inappropriate.	








within	 that	 party.	The	 party	 became	 an	 organ,	 the	 role	 of	which	was	 to	
communicate	the	orders	of	the	leadership.	At	the	same	time,	as	marxism	
became	 state	 ideology,	 it	 was	 institutionalized	 as	 a	 faith	 in	 the	 party.	








took	 the	 places	 of	 those	 who	 had	 either	 died,	 withdrawn	 or	 had	 met	
expulsion	from	the	ranks.	In	addition,	many	workers	started	their	tasks	in	
new	 regions	 to	which	 they	 had	moved.	The	 institutionalization	 of	 party	













local	 freedom	 was	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 need	 to	 advance	 proletarian	
dictatorship.	It	also	posed	a	threat	to	the	party	itself.	
Lenin	 worked	 for	 the	 redirection	 of	 power	 to	 the	 party	 in	 the	








from	 above.	 The	 legitimation	 was	 that	 the	 roots	 of	 the	 much	 hated	
“bureaucratism”	were	 to	 be	 removed	 from	 the	 administrative	 culture	 in	
order	to	build	communism.	Double	bureaucracy	was	also	connected	with	












alternating	 political	 choices.	These	 choices	 depended	 on	 the	 situational	
historical	 demands	 of	 strengthening	 political	 power	 and	 adding	 to	
production	efficiency.	The	political	ideology	of	administrative	change	was	
not	an	issue	for	the	masses	to	discuss	or	vote.	Real	outside	and	inside	threats	
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Elite	formation	was	already	being	debated	among	Communists	during	
the	 early	 transition	 years.	One	 view	 emphasized	 the	Russian	 proletariat,	
which	was	different	from	the	more	industrialized	(and	in	this	sense	more	
revolutionarily	 advanced)	 proletariat.	The	 new	Bolshevik	 administration	
was	mostly	a	victim	of	the	old	tsarist	bureaucracy	which	had	infiltrated	the	




working	 class	 and	 which	 was	 promoted	 by	 Lenin	 himself,	 won.	 (Sakwa	
19:	195.)
The	 utopian	 vision	 of	 a	 non-bureaucratic	 administrative	 culture	 was	
combined	with	a	need	to	create	a	solid,	dependable	state structure.	Double	
bureaucracy,	which	had	built-in	systems	 for	party	control	and	new	work	
ethics,	 were	 combined	 in	 the	 writings	 concerning	 the	 new	 model	 of	
administration	in	which	the	best	“material”	would	be	collected.	This	model	
administration	 took	 the	 form	 of	Workers´and	 Peasants´Inspection.	The	
requirements	for	the	administrators	included,	first	of	all,	recommendations	






An	 important	 aspect	 of	 party	work	 inside	 the	 administration	was	 the	
underlining	 of	 theoretical	 and	 educational	 requirements	 for	 adminis-
trative	 work.	 Lenin	 supported	 the	 creation	 of	 special	 books	 about	 the	
organization	 of	 administrative	 work,	 and	 sending	 representatives	 with	






not	 just	 a	 method	 of	 political	 control	 but	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 ethical	
transformation	 of	 administrative	 culture.	 For	 Lenin,	 this	 transformation	
was	 the	 essential	 requirement	 for	 the	 success	 of	 the	 revolution	 which	
needed,	most	of	all,	trust	between	the	administration	and	those	it	governed.	
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(Lenin	1964:	390,	393.)	Ethically	then,	Lenin´s	ideas	present	an	ideal	type	
administration	 in	 which	 the	 formerly	 disadvantaged	majority	 of	 people	
could	both	have	food	on	the	table	and	learn	new	social	and	political	roles	




administrators	 into	 anything	 else	 except	 concepts	 which	 could	 only	 be	
interpreted	by	a	dictatorial	head.	At	the	ideological	level,	there	was	only	a	
vague	 connection	 between	 the	 changing	 existing	 structures	 and	 the	
principles	 upon	 which	 administrative	 practices	 would	 be	 built.	 In	 this	
respect,	the	most	concrete	elements	of	the	political	ideology	have	to	do	with	
concepts	of	effectiveness	and	legality.	
2) Fulfilling the economic needs of the peasant class through industrialization 
by changing legal principles and introducing	 organizational models which 
underlined control, accountability and discipline.
Lewin	 (1995)	 describes	 the	 Russian	 social	 system	 as	 being	 archaic,	
meaning	 that	 the	 peasantry,	 which	 had	 now	 in	 actuality	 become	 the	
dominant	 force,	 relapsed	 back	 to	 pre-capitalism.	This	 was	 the	 result	 of	
cumulative	processes	started	at	the	beginning	of	World	War	I	and	finished	











culturally	 distant	 from	 the	 ideological	 aims	 of	 the	 Bolsheviks.	 (Lewin	
1995.)
To	 tackle	 social	 challenge	presented	by	 the	peasant	population	and	 to	
bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 different	 economic	 realities	 of	 Russia,	 Lenin	
underlined	 the	 economical	 aspects	 of	 the	 revolution.	 He	 demanded	 a	
focusing	of	all	governing	functions	“from	the	management	of	people	to	the	
management	 of	 material	 things	 and	 productive	 processes”	 as	 rapid	
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industrialization	 was	 crucial	 to	 the	 socialist	 development.	 (Lenin	 196:	
154.)	This	meant,	above	all,	the	creation	of	an	economy	in	which	there	was	
not	a	guarantee	of	a	(peasant)	individual,	but	a	collective	entity	–	the	class	




















hand	 in	 hand.	 Legal	 theories	 and	 practices	 were	 developed	 as	 the	
administrative	programs	and	laws	were	put	into	action.	In	this	sense	it	is	
hard	 to	 separate	 the	 two.	 Laws	 and	 administrative	 programs	 became	
ideological	 as	 revolutionary	 purposes	materialized	 through	 their	 imple-
mentation.
Legal	 thinking	 in	 the	 socialist	 society	 was	 a	 key	 sustaining	 achieved	
changes.	Somehow	these	changes	needed	to	be	legally	grounded,	explained	
and	 justified.	Civil	 law	which	concentrated	on	 the	 economic	 relations	of	
actors	 was	 the	 foundation	 of	 new	 Soviet	 administrative	 law.	 Evgeni	
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legal	 nature	 of	 economic	 organizations	 would	 disappear.	 (Pashukanis	
195.)	
Pashukanis	criticized	the	use	of	norms	as	a	tool	for	the	study	of	objective	
justice	 in	 society.	Since	 legal	 relations	were	born	as	a	 result	of	economic	
relations,	 norms	 could	 not	 exist	 outside	 of	 this	 reality.	 Similarly,	 it	 was	
impossible	for	the	state	as	such	to	support	the	authority	of	norms,	if	they	
were	mere	formal	statements	in	government	laws.	A	connection	between	
real	 social	 relations	 and	 law	 was	 needed,	 particularly	 since	 power	 and	
suppression	 could	 not	 be	 included	 in	 the	 legal	 concept	 of	 the	 state.	
Pashukanis	critized	the	concepts	of	“capitalist	state”,	“origin	and	meaning	of	




previous	 system)	 to	 find	 out	whether	 something	was	 permitted	 “from	 a	
legal	 point	 of	 view”.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 inspection	 of	 legislation	 with	 the	








party	 which	 now	 represented	 the	 general	 interest	 (a	 goal	 which	 was	
undoubtedly	also	supported	by	Lenin).	For	this	reason	Harold	Berman,	for	
instance,	paradoxically	describes	Lenin´s	thinking	as	being	in	line	with	the	
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the	 form	 of	 Taylorism	 was,	 for	 Lenin,	 a	 weapon	 against	 bureaucratism.	
(Susiluoto	199:	3,	6.)





after	 the	 revolution	only	0,6	%	of	 all	 cultured	 land	belonged	 to	 the	 state	
farms.	Moreover,	these	state	farms	owned	only	1,1%	farming	land	compared	
to	9,	3%	of	private	farms.	(Nove	199.)	
Rationalization	 strategies	 were	 considered	 too	 weak	 in	 this	 situation	
where	technology	was	getting	too	old	for	a	more	refined	division	of	labor.	
Stalin´s	line	meant	the	aggressive	use	of	Western	technology	and	production	
methods.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 Stalin	 saw	 that	 the	 social	 situation	 required	























of	 the	 working	 class	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 less	 useful	 peasants	 and	 the	
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politically	unwanted	middle	class.	Second,	the	binding	of	this	class	to	the	
needs	 of	 a	 socialist	 economy	 which	 required	 simultaneous	 ideological	
socialization.	In	these	processes,	ideology	went	through	changes	which	had	
severe	consequences	for	the	development	of	administration.
4.2 Structural Changes: State Building Since 1917
The	background	to	the	building	of	the	state	at	the	local	level	was	the	work	
achieved	by	 the	 short	 lived	 legacy	of	 the	Provisional	 government,	which	




and	 their	 attitudes.	 A	 general	 right	 of	 voting	 was	 passed	 and	 the	 town	
governments	were	made	more	independent	bodies	whose	members	could	





intended	 to	 replace	 the	 administrative	 culture	 of	 the	 former	 regime	 by	
quickly	building	new	 institutions	and	methods	according	 to	 the	popular	
demands	of	legal	consciousness	(pravosoznanie)	which	had	emerged	from	
the	19th	century	reforms.	(Orlovsky	199:102,105.)The	zemstvos	and	towns	
governments	 were	 supposed	 to	 absorb	 the	 police	 and	 administrative	
authorities	of	the	central	bureaucracy.	The	civil	governors	were	replaced	by	
commissars	who	 came	 from	 a	 zemstvo	 background	 and	where	 to	 act	 as	
links	 between	 the	 street	 level	 and	 the	 government.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	
changes,	as	an	attempt	to	separate	powers,	a	law	was	passed	calling	for	the	
creation	 of	 administrative	 courts	 which	 would	 have	 dealt	 with	 conflicts	
between	 the	 state,	 self-government	 institutions,	 individual	 citizens	 and	
various	 public	 organizations.	 (Orlovsky	 199:104,	 106–112.)	This	 would	
have	meant	the	possible	beginning	of	a	profound	progress	in	the	citizen-
state	 relationship	 which,	 along	 with	 the	 1906	 Constitution,	 could	 have	
created	legal	control	of	the	administration´s	work.	
The	 October	 revolution	 stopped	 these	 processes.	 State	 building	 was	
started	on	an	ideological	basis	as	a	result	of	which	the	Communist	party	











4.2.1 The Legislative Foundation of the State and the 
Bureaucratization of the Party
The	 revolutionary	 transition	 was	 led	 by	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 People´s	
Comissariats,	 the	Sovnarkom	(Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov),	which	 took	
over	 the	 work	 of	 cabinet	 with	 practically	 absolute	 power.	 It	 had	 been	
formulated	officially	by	the	decree	which	established	the	body	as	a	collegiate.	
(Rigby	199:	3.)	The	Council	worked	as	the	early	government	with	a	high	
decree	of	 spontaneity	 and	 constant	 changes	of	 persons.	At	 the	 local	 and	




functioning	 of	 the	 state.	 Effectiveness	 being	 the	 primary	 interest	 of	 the	
revolutionary	 leadership,	 the	 keeping	 in	 motion	 of	 the	 old	 structures	
became	its	preoccupation.	(Rigby	199.)	
Each	 commissar	 acted	 as	 a	 chairman	 of	 a	 commission	 (later	 boards/
kollegii)	which	brought	 an	element	of	 collective	decision	making	 into	 the	








the	 institutionalization	 of	 local	 administration	 in	 the	 provinces	 did	 not	




seemed	have	a	 rather	 large	 space	 for	 regional	 and	 local	decision	making	
within	the	limits	of	the	general	political	orientation.	
As	 the	 power	 in	 the	 provincial	 centers	 was	 passed	 to	 the	 Bolshevik	



















from	the	part	of	many	old	civil	 servants	 to	work	 for	 the	new	 leadership,	
which	 the	 Bolsheviks	 saw	 as	 sabotage.	The	 second	 had	 to	 do	 with	 the	
organization	of	control	bodies	outside	the	normal	bureaucracy	or	soviets.	
Rigby	 has	 described	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 new	 Soviet	 central	
bureaucracy	through	three	stages.	First,	the	people´s	commissars	with	the	
help	 of	 only	 a	 handful	 of	 assistants	 set	 up	 their	 offices	 in	 the	 Smolny	
(administrative	 building	 in	 Petrograd),	 from	 which	 they	 build	 contacts	
with	their	respective	ministries.	Second,	the	commissars	moved	into	their	
ministerial	 locations	 while	 leaving	 their	 staff	 in	 the	 Smolny.	 Lastly	 the	
commissariat	staff	moved	to	the	ministries	and	these	two	structures,	one	
old	 and	 historic,	 the	 other	 new	 and	 revolutionary,	 began	 to	merge.	The	
officials	 of	 the	 old	ministries	 rejected	 their	 legitimacy	 and	 either	 simply	
refused	to	work,	or	failed	deliberately	to	implement	decisions	and	prevented	
information	from	reaching	the	commissars.	(Rigby	199:	40,	44–45.)









After	 the	financial	order	had	been	established,	 the	Soviet	 government	
could	 start	 handling	 the	 resistance	 to	 the	 changes.	 Along	 with	 the	
information	war	which	was	waged	on	all	fronts	(work	places,	offices	and	in	
the	media),	the	new	leadership	made	decisions	which	lowered	the	salaries	
of	 the	 top	officials	 and	 raised	 those	 in	 the	 lower	 ranks.	The	 commissars	
themselves	received	500	rubles	a	month	which	was	roughly	the	equal	of	the	
salary	earned	by	a	skilled	worker	at	the	time.	(Rigby	199:	44.)	










A	 third	 risk	 involved	 in	 the	 early	 days	was	 the	 lack	 of	 clear	 decision	
making	 hierarchy	 in	 the	 provinces.	The	 local	 level	 enjoyed	 considerable	
autonomy	in	the	beginning	which	also	meant	that	operational	procedures	
were	 weakly	 regularized	 and	 jurisdictions	 unclear.	This	 posed	 a	 serious	
immediate	risk	to	the	party´s	independence	and	strength.	Although	most	
Duma	 and	zemstvo	 organizations	 disappeared,	 the	 party	 faced	 challenge	
from	the	soviets	which	acquired	roles	in	decision	making.	This	paradox	is	
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In	 Karelia,	 the	 Olonetsky	 regional	 soviet	 of	 soldier	 and	 peasant	
representatives	 emerged	 in	 191	 as	 the	 authoritative	 new	 representative	




the	 latter	 group	 functioned	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 regional	 soviet.	The	
committees	of	soldiers	established	their	rule	in	the	Petrozavodsk	garrison	
and	guard	for	the	Murmansk	railroad.	(Shumilov	1999:	0–2.)	




security	 and	 economic	 development,	 and	 to	 use	 the	 locally	 garrisoned	
military	 to	 achieve	 these	 ends.	 It	had	 the	 right	 to	 arrest	without	 a	 court	
order	and	detain	for	a	period	of	one	month	people	who	were	considered	
dangerous	 to	 the	 state	building	process.	 It	 could	also	 release	 earlier	 civil	














The	 local	 soviets	 executed	 the	 decision	 of	 higher	 soviets	 and	 state	
administration	organs	and	were	given	the	right	to	decide	matters	of	purely	
local	importance	for	their	given	territory.	Territorially	the	state	was	divided	
into	 several	 administrative	 levels	 of	 village	 (volost´),	 districts	 (uezd),	
province	 (guberniia)	 and	 regional	 (oblast´)	 levels	 which	 made	 up	 the	
republics.	In	these	regional	levels	were	the	territorial	Congresses	of	Soviets	
which	controlled	the	local	soviets	under	their	jurisdiction.	City	soviets	were	




executive	 committees	which	were	 accountable	 to	 them.	 (Constitution	 of	
191,	paragraph	10:	section	53,	55.)










Russian	 Central	 executive	 committee	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 People´s	
Commissars.	(Constitution	of	191.)





important	 local	 events.	 (The	 People´s	 Commissariat	 of	 Internal	 Affairs	
191	in	McAuley	199:	14.)
Economic	problems	penetrated	 the	 integration	of	 the	new	culture	at	all	
levels.	In	Karelia,	for	instance,	the	soviets	at	first	had	to	start	working	without	
any	 central	 government	 financing.	 This	 made	 them	 resort	 to	 levying	
emergency	taxes	and	payments,	and	compulsory	orders,	all	to	the	grievance	
of	the	already	suffering	people.	The	early	confusion	and	violence,	including	




body	 and	 an	 operative	 commissariat	 administration	 at	 the	 regional	 and	
local	 levels.	Decision	making	was	 to	be	 administratively	holistic.	 Ideally,	
both	 the	 local	 level	 economic	 and	 social	 information	 gathering	 by	 the	
soviets,	 and	 the	 commissariat	 task/service	 specific	 execution	of	 centrally	
gathered	and	processed	information,	met	in	the	structures.	In	this	way,	the	
foundation	of	institutional	totalitarism	was	established.	
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The	new	191	Constitution	of	the	RSFSR	united	Soviet	democracy	and	
individual	 dictatorship	 in	 a	 new	 hierarchial	 structure	 which	 had,	 as	 its	
practical	 head	 of	 state	 authority	 the	 All-Russian	 Central	 Executive	




People´s	Commissars	 for	 the	 general	 administration	of	 the	 country.	The	
administration-government,	 the	Council	 of	 the	 People´s	Commissariats,	
consisted	of	1	line	administrations	in	which	the	Commissariat	consulted	a	
board	 of	 advisors	 but	 made	 personal	 decisions.	 (Constitution	 of	 191,	
paragraph	:	section	43,	45.)	


















125.000	 inhabitants.	 Elections	were	held	 in	 the	provincial	Congresses	 of	




hands	 of	 its	 21	 member	 Presidium.	 The	 Central	 Executive	 Committee	
ordered	the	legislative	and	administrative	work	and	defined	the	sphere	of	
activity	of	 its	Presidium	and	the	Council	of	 the	People´s	Commissariats.	
 The TransiTion oF adminisTraTive culTure, 1917–1938
139
(The	Soviet	of	1924,	paragraph	III:	sections	–10,	paragraph	IV:	1,	21,	26.)	





Their	 republican	 level	was	based	on	 the	 commissariat´s	 sector	of	 affairs.	
Those	which	dealt	with	purely	external	matters	 (Foreign	Affairs,	Foreign	
Commerce,	 Ways	 and	 Communications,	 Postal	 and	 Telegraph	 services,	
Military	 and	 Naval	 Affairs)	 had	 their	 delegates	 at	 the	 republican	 level	




collegiate	 whose	 members	 were	 chosen	 by	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 People´s	
Commissars.	 Decision	 making	 authority	 was	 constitutionally	 personal	




The	Commissariat	 for	 Justice,	 Public	Health	 and	 Social	Welfare	 did	 not	
have	 a	 counterpart	 at	 the	 center.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Commissariats	 for	
Supplies,	Finances,	Labor	and	the	Inspectorate	of	Workers	and	Peasants	of	
the	 member	 republics	 executed	 the	 orders	 of	 the	 Central	 Executive	






Council	 of	 Soviets	 and	Council	 of	Nationalities	 brought	 to	 them	by	 the	






the	 general	 rules	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 life,	 or	 making	 substantial	













except	as	an	elective	organ	 for	 the	Congress	of	Soviets	of	 the	USSR.	The	
hierarchy	 and	 authority	 relations	 of	 republican	 and	 local	 level,	were	 not	









(Stalin	 2002.)	This	 marked	 the	 official	 recognition	 of	 the	 centralization	
process	 and	 was	 consolidated	 as	 a	 key	 objective	 of	 administrative	
development.
The	191	Constitution	had	 formally	placed	 the	commissars	under	 the	
authority	of	the	party´s	CEC	which	was	itself	responsible	for	the	Congress	
of	 Soviets,	 representing	 the	 local	 level	 of	 the	 country.	 After	 the	 Sixth	
Congress	 of	 the	 Soviets	 (which	 approved	 the	 first	 Constitution)	 met	 in	
191,	the	congresses	began	to	meet	annually.	In	this	sense,	they	were	not	
parliamentary	 organizations,	 yet	 they	had	more	 than	 a	mere	 ceremonial	
role.	The	authority,	as	well	as	the	actual	institutional	power	of	the	Sovnarkom,	



















Commissariats	 (Malyi Sovnarkom)	 in	 191	 and	 the	 Labor	 and	 Defense	




national	 economic	 planning	 and	 control	 over	 its	 execution.	A	 system	of	
planning	 hierarchy	 responsibilities	 was	 established	 down	 to	 the	 level	 of	
enterprise.	 Private	 trade	 of	 consumer	 goods	 was	 prohibited	 along	 with	
inheritance.	Ration	cards	for	commodity	distribution	and	general	compul-
sory	labor	were	installed.	In	1921,	a	new	State	General	Planning	Commission,	
Gosplan,	 was	 established	 and	 attached	 to	 the	 STO	 which	 appointed	 its	
officials.	(Berman	1963:	30–3,	Gill	1990:	54.)
Immediately	after	 the	 revolution,	 the	Sovnarkom	had	been	a	 constant	
battle	 ground	 for	 the	 Left	 Srs	 (Social	 Democracts),	 Mencheviks	 and	
Bolsheviks,	 who	 still	 shared	 power.	 Examples	 of	 the	 policy	 and	 power	
battles	included	disputes	over	the	structure	and	control	of	local	government	





was	more	firmly	 institutionalized,	 the	party	began	 to	 involve	 itself	more	
and	more	in	the	economic	questions	of	the	country.	(Rigby	199:	16.)	The	
separation	of	economic	questions	into	their	own	administrative	organization,	
intensified	 the	 diversification	 (see	 next	 chapter	 4.2.2.)	 of	 administrative	
organizations	 which,	 in	 time,	 continued	 to	 reduce	 the	 meaning	 of	
independent	local	decision	making.	









the	 lower	 level	 soviets	 and	 particularly	 their	 executive	 committees	 as	
avenues	through	which	the	Sovnarkom	executed	its	decisions.	The	provincial	
organs	of	the	old	ministries	through	which	the	Sovnarkom	was	suppose	to	
run	 the	 country	 were	 not	 an	 effective	 system	 for	 this	 purpose.	 The	
Sovnarkom	had	to	rely	on	the	assistance	and	cooperation	of	the	new	local	




local	 soviets.	 During	 the	 course	 of	 the	 war	 their	 image	 changed	 from	
ineffective	 local	 organs	 to	 much	 needed	 frameworks	 for	 the	 “socialist	
legality”	(see	chapter	4.2.2)	as	a	means	of	reconstruction.	Since	the	threat	to	
the	 Bolshevik	 leadership	 was	 acute,	 the	 government	 began	 to	 use	 the	
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government	bodies.	Yet,	as	the	actual	power	of	the	Sovnarkom	declined,	the	
beneficiary	 was	 the	 party	 central	 organization,	 the	 Political	 Bureau	
(Politburo)	 and	 the	 Organizational	 Bureau	 (Orgburo)	 of	 the	 Central	
Committee	which	were	established	by	the	Eighth	Congress.	(Rigby	199:	
15–16.)	Looking	at	the	bureaucratization	process	of	the	party	structures	
into	a	parallel	decision	making	organization,	 it	 is	possible	 to	view	it	as	a	
side-effect	of	the	institutional	power	sharing	of	the	top	authorities.	At	the	
same	 time,	 this	would	undermine	 the	most	directly	 ideological	 elements	
involved	 in	 the	building	of	 administrative	 culture.	Of	 these	 information,	
leadership	 and	 personnel	 stand	 out	 in	 particular	 as	 parameters	 in	 the	
development	of	the	system.	
After	 the	 revolution	 a	 new	 elite	 formation	 was	 needed.	The	 political	
decision	making	elite	included	members	of	the	central	party	organs	which	
were	 linked	with	 the	 lower	 level	 through	party	congress.	The	unplanned	
growth	of	governing	organs	and	the	fluidity	of	links	were	not	just	risks	of	
the	 revolution	 but	 also	 partially	 preferred	 by	 the	 elite	 to	 avoid	firm	 and	
binding	boundaries.	(Gill	1990:	51.)
As	 the	recruitment	of	new	party	members	did	not	 result	 in	 the	direct	
growth	of	control	in	the	country,	a	parallel	control	organization	principle	
was	created.	In	part,	the	parallelism	was	a	result	of	the	transitional	personnel	
questions.	The	 army	which	 had	 been	 vital	 for	 the	 success	 of	 Revolution	
became	the	testing	ground	for	the	new	government.	Since	the	officials	of	
the	tsarist	regime	were	necessary,	a	system	of	control	had	to	be	developed	
to	 ensure	 the	 loyalty	 of	 the	 huge	 army	 apparatus.	 This	 so	 called	 “war	
commissar	system”	was	under	party	control	and	provided	the	foundation	
for	the	practical	implementation	of	the	principle.	(Susiluoto	194:	19.)	
As	 important	 was	 the	 organizational	 factor	 involved.	The	 ideological	
guidance	 of	 the	new	 state	 had	 to	 be	 resolved	 in	 a	manner	which	would	
institutionalize	and	secure	the	party´s	authority.	The	task	of	implementing	
the	 party´s	 will	 in	 concrete	matters	 was	 primarily	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 state	
organs.	The	Central	Executive	Committee	was	to	a	differing	degree	involved	
in	governmental	decision	making	but	at	the	local	level	the	Communists	in	




departments	 which	 appeared	 under	 the	 Central	 Committee	 Secretary.	
These	had	corresponding	departments	at	the	provincial	and	town	levels	in	
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
144




decline	 in	democratic	practices.	 In	Moscow,	 for	 instance,	which	was	as	a	
major	city	with	city	district	soviets,	the	city	Soviet	had	decided	already	in	






the	 center	 and	 the	 localities,	 which	 was	 done	 with	 the	 help	 of	 Central	
Committee	 instructors	 sent	 to	 the	 provinces.	 The	 Central	 Executive	
Committeeprovided	funds	for	their	salaries	and	in	1920	the	CEC	started	to	
operate	financing	for	party	organs	outside	of	the	Commissariat	of	Internal	
Affairs.	This,	 together	with	 the	 even	more	 significant	 party	 instructions,	
created	a	centralized	system	of	personnel	control.	The	Eighth	Party	Congress	
Resolution	 demanded	 strict	 adherence	 to	 CEC	 decision	 making	 about	




Further	more,	a	 system	of	 rotation	was	created	which	 the	CEC	regularly	
reassigned	party	workers	from	one	field	of	work	to	another	and	different	
locations	 in	the	name	of	effectiveness.	The	personnel	question	was	taken	
seriously	 from	 the	beginning.	 In	1920	 the	CEC	was	making	about	1.000	

















subordinate	 their	decisions	 to	 the	 local	party	 centers.	 (Rigby	199:	11.)	
This	 parallel	 control	 organization	 (which	 was	 not	 specified	 in	 the	





local	 party	 secretaries	 or	 the	 executive	 organs	 (Gill	 1990:	 3).	Thus	 the	












nomenklatura system	which	was	officially	established	 in	1923	 (Sungurov	
199:4).	In	this	system,	those	state	posts	both	in	administrative	organs	and	
social	organizations	which	were	considered	meaningful	enough	were	filled	
by	 candidates	 who	 had	 been	 previously	 selected,	 recommended	 and	
confirmed	 by	 a	 party	 committee	 from	 the	 district	 committee	 (town	
committee)	to	the	Central	committee.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	25.)
The	 list	 of	 official	 posts	 in	 the	 nomenklatura	 was	 not	 fixed.	 It	 was	
examined	every	year	and	the	number	of	official	posts	it	included	changed	
annually.	There	were	in	fact	two	main	lists	(no	1	and	no	2).	The	first	was	for	
decisions	made	 solely	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 regulating	 the	Politburo	 of	 the	
party	Central	 committee.	 In	addition	 it	 included	elected	posts	 for	which	
candidates	 were	 confirmed	 by	 the	 Central	 committee.	 The	 second	 list	
consisted	of	post	which	required	the	confirmation	of	a	special	organizational	
inspection	department	of	the	Central	committee.	Lists	of	names	for	a	third	
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group	 not	 belonging	 to	 either	 of	 the	 previous	 lists	 were	 to	 be	 prepared	
according	to	confirmation	of	the	same	department	of	Central	committee.	
This	list	appeared	from	1925	on	and	it	was	called	“agency	nomenklatura”.	
(Korzhikhina	 1995:	 25,	 Sungurov	 199:	 4.)	 In	 1930,	 a	 handbook	of	 the	




responsibilities	 of	 functionaries	 and	 their	 privileges	 were	 not	 public	
information.	 From	 1932	 on,	 the	 lists	 of	 office	 posts	 and	 persons	 having	
these	positions	became	a	state	secret.	(Sungurov	199:	4.)
In	 addition	 to	 the	 nomenklatura,	 the	 general	 personnel	 policy	 in	 the	




was,	 of	 course,	 one	of	 the	 essential	 tools	 as	well	 as	 goals	 of	 the	 socialist	
government.	 The	 policies	 were	 enacted	 in	 four	 different	 areas:	 salary,	
housing,	 education	 and	 titles.	The	first	 one	 to	 change	was	 the	 system	of	









measures	 which	 were	 already	 used	 in	 191.	 Insufficient	 goods	 were	
distributed	according	to	social	and	utilitarian	criteria	in	which	the	worker	
had	the	first	place.	Utilitarian	needs	soon	added	different	types	of	specialist	




non-manual	 workers	 with	 exceptional	 qualifications	 received	 similar	
rewards.	(Carrére	d´Encausse	190:20.) The	parallel	control	principle	which	
created	a	body	of	party	functionaries	contributed	to	this	development.	
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Rigby	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 “the	 capacity	 to	 reward	 loyal	 service	 by	
promotion	 and	 to	 reassign	 ‘awkward’	 Communists	 to	 less	 sensitive	
positions	did	more	than	anything	else	to	transform	the	party	itself	into	a	
passive	 instrument	 of	 a	 disciplined	 officialdom	 and	 politically	 disarm	
internal	party	critics	of	the	ruling	oligarchy.”	In	1920	the	CEC	instructed	
that	local	staff	of	central	government	agencies	could	not	be	transferred	to	
another	 area	 without	 its	 approval.	 Internal	 transfers	 inside	 an	
administrative	area	required	the	approval	of	its	party	committee.	Junior	
staff	were	appointed	by	the	Central	Committee	Records	and	Assignment	






















was	 made	 to	 transfer	 10.000	 of	 the	 200.000	 Moscow	 office	 workers to	
Petrograd.	(Sakwa	19:	191–193.)	This	plan	was	not	realized	but	it	is	telling	
of	the	side-effects	of	risk	planning.	









state	 and	 police	 officials	 had	 controlled	 salaries	 based	 on	 comparative	
worker	salaries	but	were	compensated	with	distribution	of	 food,	housing	
and	transportation.	The	army	had	a	better	than	average	pay,	a	good	pension	
system,	 educational	 privileges,	 special	 stores	 and	 housing.	 The	 creative	
intelligentsia	could	achieve	housing,	special	food	rations,	travel	opportunities	





closed	 stores	was	 established	which	multiplied	and	diversified	with	 the	






a	 type	of	bonus	system	was	also	developed	 in	 the	 form	of	envelopes	of	
money	 from	 the	 20´s	 on.	This	 enabled	 them	 to	 shop	 in	 Soviet	 luxury	





had	 private	 apartments.	 The	 workers	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 lived	 often	 in	
kommunalkas	where	 they	had	one	private	 room	and	 shared	kitchen	 and	
toilet	 facilities	 with	 other	 inhabitants.	 From	 1932	 on,	 free	 lodging	 was	




to	 advance	 admission	 of	 workers	 to	 their	 own	 institutions	 (Rabfak	 –	 a	
preparatory	 course	 leading	 to	 higher	 education)	while	 entering	 university	
level	 education	 was	 made	 difficult	 for	 other	 elements	 of	 society.	 Soon	 it	
became	apparent	that	education	was	an	essential	privilege	for	those	who	were	
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politically	most	 reliable	and	 suitable	 for	general	public	work.	 In	 the	20’s	 a	
system	of	quotas	gave	party	organizations,	the	Komsomol and	the	unions	the	
right	to	advance	their	members’	higher	education.	In	1926,	the	children	of	the	





was	 formed.	This	 was	 the	 creation	 of	 socialist	 titles	 which	 replaced	 the	











working	 classes.	 In	 addition	 he	 stressed	 that	 even	 in	 case	 the	 recruited	
persons	did	not	have	these	backgrounds,	the	intelligentsia	would	remain	a	
stratum	and	not	 a	 class	 in	 the	 socialist	 sense	of	 the	word.	 (Stalin	 2002.)	
With	this	type	of	a	reasoning,	the	policies	which	created	incentives	in	forms	
of	 privileges	were	 legitimized	 for	 not	 being	 antagonistic	 to	 specific	 class	
interests.	The	political	legitimation	for	administrative	action	which	in	fact	




of	 the	 system	 toward	 a	 professionally	 specialized,	 politically	 guided	 (in	
parallel	 as	 a	 double	 administration),	 socially	 homogenized,	 yet	 very	
hierarchical	system.	The	hierarchical	nature	of	the	system	in	all	 its	major	
aspects	 (economic	 planning	 system,	 leadership,	 personnel	 policies,	 rule	
making)	was	 a	 side-effect	 of	 the	 control	 and	 effective	 guidance	 problem	
which	was	central	to	the	political	change	ideology	of	administration.	The	
results	 of	 this	 mediation	 process	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 new	 culture	 of	
administration	formed	during	the	institutionalization	stage	of	transition.	
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4.2.2 Information Gathering, Control, Socialist Law and the 
Diversification of Institutions 
One	of	the	main	social	goals	of	the	revolution	had	been	to	transform	the	
peasant	population	into	either	industrial	workers	or	collective	farm	workers	
whose	production	would	 feed	 the	urban	dwellers.	The	 countryside	went	
through	a	major	transformation	during	the	civil	war	when	an	earlier	influx	











In	 the	 new	 administrative	 ideology,	 controlling	 land	 use	 and	 indus-
trialization	 to	 modernize	 the	 country	 were	 connected	 within	 adminis-
tration	in	two	ways.	First	of	all,	land	was	socialized	and	its	use	needed	to	
be	 reorganized	 for	 efficiency.	 This	 required	 the	 controlling	 of	 work	
processes	and	results.	Economical	control	was	highly	political	work	and	it	
required	trusted	organizers.	Second,	industrialization	meant	that	a	growing	









the	 public.	 The	 new	 language	 was	 the	 language	 of	 the	 collectivization.	
Socialist	writers	were	required	to	understand	the	socialist	content	of	party	
decisions	and	the	pronouncements	of	comrade	Stalin.	The	aim	of	course	
was	 to	 create	 a	 manner	 of	 speech	 which	 was	 nonthreatening	 to	 state	
authority.	 (Gorham	2000:	149.)	Censorship	of	any	written	public	writing	




delam literatury i izdatel´stva)	(Pietiläinen	1994:	31).	
The	new	Head	administration	was	under	the	People´s	Commissariat	of	
Education	 and	 its	 local	 organs	 under	 the	 provincial	 departments	 of	
education.	The	main	ideological	purpose	was	to	find	and	stop	all	agitation	
against	 the	 new	 state,	 the	 revealing	 of	 military	 secrets	 and	 to	 stop	 the	
“dissemination	of	 false	 information”	and	material	having	a	pornographic	
character.	(Regulations	of	the	Glavlit 1922	in	Sakwa	1999:	135.)
For	 the	 administration	 then,	 a	 new	 environment	 for	 accumulating,	






form	 of	 building	 of	 an	 administrative-command	 system.	 This	 was	 the	
practical	 application	 of	 soviet-style	 democracy	 on	 the	 executive	 side	 to	
provide	for	class	economic	needs.	The	main	social	reason	for	the	need	of	
stricter	guidance	was	the	educational	and	political	level	of	the	population	
and	 “democracy	 of	 meetings”,	 which	 both	 led	 to	 an	 inability	 to	 make	
progress	 in	legislative	work	and	accept	party	decisions.	As	was	described	





new	 system	 of	 information	 gathering.	 This	 was	 first	 used	 to	 prevent	
opposition	forces	from	gaining	more	power,	and	then	as	an	organization	of	
routine	social,	economic	and	political	information	gathering	upon	which	







(secret	 police	GPU,	 then	KGB,	 presently	 FSB)	which	 set	 up	 their	 own	




information	procedure,	which	was	 a	more	 “open”	 and	 routine	decision	
making	process	in	terms	of	its	documentation	and	reporting.	The	meaning	
of	 political	 information	 gathering	 resided	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 gave	 the	
leadership	a	rather	accurate	idea	about	what	people	thought,	i.e.	what	the	
sentiments	in	the	provinces	in	fact	were.	In	this	sense,	political	information	
gathering	 replaced	 open	 political	 discourse	 even	within	 the	 party	 as	 a	
means	 to	find	out	what	 reactions	and	 ideas	 lay	 in	different	parts	of	 the	

















others,	 was	 established	 during	 this	 period.	 All	 together	 60	 different	
ministerial	 level	 all-union	 organs	 were	 established	 between	 1920–1940.	
(Korzhikhina	1995:	22,	32–41.)
State	level	development	at	the	early	stages	of	the	transition	meant	building	





1.	 professional	 industry	 units	 (otraslevye)	 which	 were	 government	
branch	 agencies	 of	 their	 specific	 commissariats.	 Examples	 were	
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3.	 product	specific	(po vidam produktsii)	units,	of	which	examples	were	
Head	administrations	of	Salt	and	Tea	in	the	Commissariat	of	Food	
Supply	(BCHX).
4.	 general	 management/service	 (obshchie obsluzhivaiushchie)	 units	
which	appeared	in	all	government	organizations	in	large	numbers.	




specialized	 responsibilities)	 is	 the	 example	 of	 the	 Commissariat	 of	
Transportation	which	 included	 the	Central	 administration	 of	 rail	 roads.	
The	central	administration	had	the	Department	of	machinery,	which	had	a	
department	 unit	 of	 locomotives.	 Inside	 of	 the	 department	 unit	 was	 the	
unit´s	 division	 of	 transportation.	 The	 republican	 and	 local	 level	
administrative	 organs	 followed	 the	 same	 pattern	 in	 their	 organizational	
development.	(Korzhikhina	1995:3.)
The	 third	 development	 was	 the	 functional	 separation	 of	 different	
bureaucratic	fields	into	political,	representational	and	economical,	the	latter	
becoming	 the	 core	 of	 the	 administrative	 system.	 The	 local	 level	 was	
obviously	affected	by	these	structural	changes	of	the	central	government.	
Besides	 the	 Cheka,	 in	 December	 191	 the	 National	 Economic	 Counsil	
(NEC	–	Vserossiiskii Sovet Narodnogo Khoziaistva/VSNKh)	was	established.	
Its	tasks	included	the	preparation	of	norms	and	plans	for	economic	life	in	
the	 country,	 co-ordination	 of	 the	 local	 and	 central	 regulating	 organs	
(committees	on	fuel,	metals,	transport,	food	supply	et.c.)	and	the	integration	
of	workers´	 control	movement	 into	 the	 industry	which	 ensured	 that	 the	
worker	 organizations	 which	 participated	 in	 the	 running	 of	 industry	
exercised	their	power	according	to	the	Sovnarkom	policies.	The	decisions	
of	 the	new	organ	were	 binding	 on	 local	 soviets	which	were	 to	 act	 as	 its	
agents.	 (CEC	 Chairman	 Sverdov	 and	 Sovnarkom	 Chairman	 Ulianov	
[Lenin]	in	191	in	McAuley	195:	231,	Rigby	199:	50–51.)





were	 subordinated	 to	 the	 local	 organs.	The	 need	 to	 have	 more	 sectoral	
coordination	 led	 to	 a	 creation	 of	 trusts	 between	 enterprises	 of	 the	 same	





was	 mostly	 directed	 to	 the	 developing	 system´s	 own	 defects	 and	 not	
towards	the	culture	of	the	past.	Power	was	seen	to	have	moved	too	far	from	






city	 department	 of	 state	 control	 was	 formed	 in	 the	 same	 year	 by	 the	
presidium	of	the	city	Soviet.	The	inspection	was	carried	out	mainly	through	
the	city	district	soviets	which	had	traditionally	good	links	with	the	factories.	
The	worker	 inspection	was	meant	 to	be	 a	way	 to	 combat	bureucratism.	
(Sakwa	 19:	 196–19.)	 It	 was	 meant	 to	 reduce	 the	 actual	 power	 of	
officialdom	 in	 work	 places	 by	 exposing	 it	 to	 outside	 examination	 and	
popular	will.	At	the	same	time	the	intention	was	to	secure	the	grass	roots	
influence	of	the	party.	
Stalin	 as	 the	 commissar	 for	 the	Goskontrol, drew	up	plans	 to	 involve	
more	 public	 participation	 in	 the	ministry´s	 work	 in	 1919.	 Yet	 concerns	
about	 a	 possible	 opposition	 being	 born	 in	 the	 work	 place	 inspection	
structures	 partially	 led	 to	 a	 reorganization	 of	 worker	 control	 in	 1920.	
Control	 organs	 were	 integrated	 into	 a	 People´s	 Commissariat	 of	
Workers´and	 Peasants´Inspection	 (Rabkrin).	 The	 worker	 inspection	
members	 were	 to	 be	 elected	 and	 local	 Rabkrin	 departments	 were	 to	 be	
formed	under	the	city	district	(raion)	soviets	and	subordinate	to	the	soviet.	











earlier	 in	 chapter	 4.2.1),	 particularly	 that	 part	 concerned	 with	 the	
compulsory	 administration:	 People´s	 Commissariat	 of	 Internal	 Affairs	
(Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del – NKVD),	different	types	of	control	





The	 second	 reaction	 by	 the	 Bolshevik	 government	 to	 the	 risks	 of	
resistance	and	inefficiency	was	the	creation	of	“security-political	control”	
organizations	to	strengthen	Bolshevik	hold	of	the	country.	The	structure,	
which	combined	both	 in	 the	beginning	of	 the	 transition	period,	was	 the	
Military-Revolutionary	Committee	(MRC	–	Voenno-revoliutsionnyi komitet)	
which	had	captured	power	in	the	capital.	It	can	be	described	as	a	government	





In	 this	 sense	 it	was	 the	first	 formation	of	power	 through	which	 the	 later	
developed	principle	of	party/administration	union	emerged.	As	Rigby	has	
documented,	it	contained	of	groups	of	commissars	and	representatives	of	
other	 institutions	 whose	 first	 problem	 was	 to	 win	 authority	 from	 the	
minority	 socialists	 in	 the	 Central	 Executive	 Committee	 and	 secure	 the	
loyalty	 of	 supporters	 to	 its	 own	 instructions.	 Military	 and	 other	 power	
connections	 were	 used	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 commands	 of	 the	MRC	were	
listened	to.	In	principle	the	commissars	of	the	MRC	were	supposed	to	stay	
out	of	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ministries.	In	reality	though,	the	MRC	gave	




An	 important	part	of	 its	 role	was	 the	control	of	 the	press	by	supervising	







quickly	 replaced	 this	 goal.	 Lenin	quotes	Engels	who	 thought	 that	 perfect	
local	self-government	happens	through	administrators	who	are	elected	in	a	
general	election	and	this	meant	the	abolishment	of	all	state	appointed	local	
and	 county	 positions.	 (Lenin	 196,	 19.)	 As	 previously	 mentioned,	 the	
Soviets	at	the	local	level	were	in	fact	very	active	in	different	matters	at	first,	









open,	since	purposes	themselves	were	more	 important	 for	the	 leadership	
than	translation	to	procedures.	(Gill	1990:	3.)The	improvisation,	structural	
fluidity	and	ad hoc	adaptation	to	different	situations	by	the	MRC	bodies	led	
to	 new	 organizational	 risks.	 When	 the	 more	 established	 governmental	
organizations	 started	 to	work	 in	 a	more	organized	and	efficient	manner,	
parallel	organization	and	duplication	in	decision	making	also	began	to	raise	
criticism.	 The	 structures	 of	 Military-revolutionary	 committees	 were	
abolished	on	December	5th,	191.	(Rigby	199:	20–21.)
The	 remaining	 acute	 problems	 of	 possible	 counter-revolution	 and	
resistance	opened	the	door	to	Dzerzhinskii´s	proposal	for	a	special	organ	
concentrating	on	combating	counter-revolution.	A	result	was	the	birth	of	
the	 All-Russian	 Extraordinary	 Commission	 for	 Combating	 Counter-
Revolution,	 Speculation	 and	 Sabotage	 (the	 VeCheka/	 Vserossiiskaia 
Chrezvychainaia Komissiia po Bor´be s	 Kontr-revoliutsiei, Spekuliatsiei i 
Sabotazhem	 ).	The	Military-Revolutionary	 Committees	 had	 served	 their	
role	which	Rigby	has	defined	as	“a	structural	coupling	device	linking	two	
successive	political	systems”.	(Rigby	199:	20–21.)
The	 duties	 of	 the	VeCheka were	 impressive.	 It	 had	 to	 investigate	 and	
nullify	 all	 possible	 counter-revolutionary	 acts	 and	 attempt	 of	 sabotage,	
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conduct	preliminary	investigations	and	bring	the	suspects	to	Revolutionary	
Tribunals.	 The	 Commission	 was	 divided	 into	 sections	 of	 information,	
organization	of	work,	and	fighting.	Practical	measures	which	were	dictated	
by	Lenin	in	his	order,	included	publication	of	the	names	of	the	enemies	of	









soon	 led	 to	 a	 Sovnarkom	 decision	 to	 use	 terror	 as	 a	 governing	 policy.	
People´s	 Commissar	 of	 Justice	 Kursky	 gave	 an	 order	 in	 191	 in	 which	
concentration	 camps,	 executions	 of	 White	 Guard	 members	 and	 other	





were	 executed	 for	 counter-revolution,	 632	 for	 crime	 of	 office,	 21	 for	















the	 Bolshevik	 government	 as	 an	 inheritance	 from	 tsarist	 times.	 In	 the	




New	 Economic	 Policy	 (NEP)	 replaced	 the	 early	 policies	 on	 law	 and	
economics.	The	 testing	 ground	 for	 the	 practical	 implementation	 of	 the	
ideology	came	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	first	five	year	plan	which	was	 formally	
adopted	 in	 1929.	The	main	 feature	 of	 planning	 and	 government	 policy	
became	speed.	The	targets	of	the	first	five	year	plan	affected	system	building	
by	setting	limits	too	high.	Labor	productivity,	costs	and	yields	had	ambitious	
targets	 if	 the	national	 income	was	 to	be	 sharply	 increased.	The	planners	
were	 at	 the	 same	 time	 under	 high	 political	 pressure,	 fearing	 punitive	
measures,	if	they	did	not	comply	with	the	idealistic	goals.	Bukharin,	Rykov	
and	 Tomsky	were	 examples	 of	 names	who	 dared	 to	 openly	 criticize	 the	
ambitious	version	and	personally	suggested	a	more	modest	plan	along	with	
a	two-year	plan	for	agriculture.	(Lewin	1995:	95–99.)




individualism.	 Four	 issues	 come	 together	 in	 192	 in	 his	 writings	 about	
industrialization	of	the	country	and	the	right	wing	within	the	Communist	
party:	contra-individualism,	legal	relativism,	the	grain	problem	and	rapid	







is	 often	 done	without	 the	 explicit	 referral	 to	 either	 of	 the	 elements.	The	
rationalization	used	by	Stalin	in	his	writing	about	the	situation	of	agriculture	
offers	a	prime	example	of	this	logic.
At	 the	 level	 of	 state	 building	 the	 major	 change	 took	 place	 when	 the	
administration	 turned	 from	acting	as	 the	keeper	of	order	 to	 that	of	 total	
economical	 provider	 with	 no	 alternatives.	 For	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	
citizens	this	meant	that	control	took	on	a	different	type	of	form.	While	the	
Tsar´s	 administration	 could	be	 characterized	 as	 taking	 the	 form	of	 local	
police,	the	new	local	administration	took	the	form	of	economic	controller/
provider,	 a	 role	 which	 was	 secured	 by	 political	 inspection.	 The	 Soviet	






in	development	 since	 the	early	days	of	 the	revolution.	The	speech	which	
Stalin	gave	in	1936	can	be	seen	as	the	culmination	of	a	process	of	legitimation	
of	political	decision	making	 and	administrative	 action	on	 legal	 grounds.	
Administration	 and	 law	 were	 used	 as	 instruments	 of	 education	 and	
elimination	of	opposition	 in	several	ways.	 Ideologically,	melting	 together	
the	concept	of	class	struggle	and	state	building	through	their	relationship	





any	 legal	norms.	Moreover,	 this	was	not	 even	 economically	possible.	 In	
this	situation	the	capitalist	norms	would	not	have	been	replaced	and	the	
state	would	 continue	 to	be	needed	as	 a	protector	of	 socialized	property	
ownership	which	guaranteed	equality	 in	work	and	in	the	distribution	of	
products.	Before	the	higher	stage	of	communist	society	could	be	reached,	





organizations	 both	 at	 the	 central	 and	 municipal	 levels.	 Some	 had	 been	
paramilitary	 organizations	 for	 revolution,	 others	 helped	 the	 local	
government	 in	practical	 political-economic	 tasks	 such	 as	 confiscation	of	
surplus	from	private	farmers.	Others	still	participated	in	civil	war	in	aid	of	





In	 practice	 this	 led	 to	 the	 decree	 of	 Court	 in	 191	 which	 abruptly	
proclaimed	the	end	of	courts,	the	prosecutor´s	offices	and	the	advocacy	and	
the	 installment	 of	 a	 new	 organization	 of	 revolutionary	 justice	 (Bowring	
2000).	The	first	years	of	this	experimentation	meant	the	coexistence	of	old	
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laws	 and	 revolutionary	 lawyers	 with	 new	 decrees	 and	 institutions.	 The	
decisions	 reached	 at	 the	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 were	 dependent	 on	 the	












denial	 of	professional	 advocacy	 as	 an	 inalienable	 right	of	 the	 individual.	
Particularly	 harmful	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 individual	 rights	 was	 the	
possibility	of	denying	the	presence	of	attorney	in	preliminary	investigations	
if	 the	 court	 felt	 that	his	 presence	might	hinder	 the	finding	of	 true	 facts.	
(Hazard	1960:	9,	51.)
Secondly,	 moral	 and	 legal	 relativism	 was,	 in	 this	 practical	 measure,	
equated	with	the	principle	of	dialecticism	which	meant	looking	at	practical	
choices	in	terms	of	the	conditions	set	by	time	and	place.	The	connection	






crisis,	 hunger	 in	 the	 army	 and	 in	 the	 cities.	 In	 Stalin´s	 assesment,	 the	
Bolshevik	 government	 could	 neither	 use	 market	 manipulation	 to	 bring	
down	 the	 “kulak´s	 prices”,	 nor	 did	 it	 have	 the	 foreign	 currency	 reserves	
needed	to	buy	grain	from	outside.	Both	situations	might	have	prevented	the	
repressive	measures	which	 –	 expressly	 underlined	 by	 Stalin	 –	 should	 be	
avoided	 in	 the	 future	by	 taking	care	of	 the	principle issues.	 (Stalin	1951:	
191–192.)
The	 combination	 of	 decentralized	 legislative	 authority	 and	 growing	
centralization	of	political	power	–	which	legitimized	random	use	of	coercive	
force	against	the	population	–	led	to	the	erosion	of	trust	between	state	and	
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citizenry.	 Most	 poignantly	 it	 effected	 the	 justice	 system	 –	 which	 in	
democratic	societies	is	the	last	independent	control	against	administrative	
power.	This	control	ceased	to	exist.	The	status	of	a	law	was	also	quite	prone	
to	 bureau	 regulations	 and	 even	 party	 decisions	 (from	 the	 Politburo	 to	
regional	committees).	It	was	thus	impossible	to	talk	about	the	priority	of	





politicized	 and	 norms	 simplified.	 Eugene	Huskey	 has	 named	 the	 period	
from	 192–1932	 “naked	 instrumentalism”	 in	 which	 law	 was	 embraced	
when	it	was	needed	in	the	campaigns	of	collectivization,	industrialization	
or	social	re-education.	When	law	was	not	in	line	with	the	leadership´s	goals,	





26	million	 productive	 household	 units	 which	 had	 existed	 in	 1929	 were	
replaced	with	235.000	collective	farms	by	193.	This	enabled	the	feeding	of	
















law	 in	 the	 state	 building	 process	 received	 new	meaning	 in	 the	 ideas	 of	










purely	 prosecutorial	 functions.	 The	 prosecutor´s	 office	 was	 made	
independent	 of	 local	 and	 regional	 authorities	 and	 it	 was	 to	 supervise	
administration	and	citizenry.	In	192	the	prosecutor´s	office	took	care	of	an	
impressive	list	of	matters:	the	review	and	appeal	of	civil	and	criminal	cases,	





its	 involvement	 in	 the	 repression	 which	 commenced	 at	 the	 close	 of	 the	
1930´s.	(Smith	199:	350.)







was	 its	 involvement	 in	 the	 economic	 decision	 making	 within	 the	




be	seen	as	 the	boundaries	of	 the	 legal	profession.	Also	the	triple	role	of	a	
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fundamental	 law	 was	 to	 be	 viewed	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 as	 a	 basis	 of	
administrative	state	building.	Stalin	brought	up	two	issues.
Firstly,	 the	 transitional	 character	 of	 the	 state	 was	 emphasized	 by	 the	
statement	 that	 the	 fundamental	 law	was	 a	 proclamation	 of	 those	 things	
which	 (according	 to	 the	 leadership)	 had	 already	 been	 achieved,	 not	 a	
program	which	was	to	set	the	goals	for	the	future.	Stalin	underlined	that	the	
qualities	of	a	future	state	of	full	communism	could	not	be	included	in	the	
fundamental	 law,	only	 those	 features	of	 the	society	which	had	materially	
been	changed.	Secondly,	he	stated	that	the	Constitution	was	not	a	code	of	
laws	 and	 does	 not	 preclude	 routine	 legislative	 work	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
legislative	 bodes.	 (Stalin	 2002.)	This	 formulation	 for	 the	meaning	 of	 the	
Constitution	 is	 interesting	 for	 the	 development	 of	 legal	 thinking	 in	 the	
Soviet	Union.	As	law	itself	was	transitional,	and	its	application	instrumental,	
there	 could	 be	 no	 fixed	 legal	 standards	 for	 the	 assessment	 of	 future	
developments.	 As	 the	 Constitution	was	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 proclamation	 of	
already	achieved	changes	and	not	a	document	enlisting	basic	principles	of	




During	 the	 reign	 of	 Stalin,	 the	 interpretive	 lense	 through	 which	 the	
Constitution	 could	 be	 read	 was	 institutionalized	 via	 various	 legal,	
administrative	and	political	methods.	The	most	striking	case	is	the	freedoms	
of	 citizens	 which	 are	 listed	 in	 the	 articles	 124–126	 of	 the	 Constitution.	
Formally,	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 political	 change	 ideology,	 the	
interpretive	context	meant	most	of	all	the	class	based	interest	analysis	of	all	
situations.	 In	practice,	 according	 to	 the	Constitution,	 “the	 interest	of	 the	

























requirements.	 This	 transition	 of	 social	 life	 also	 exposed	 them	 to	 other	












The	 state	 imposed	 terror	 on	 party	 members	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 the	
prosecutors´	investigators	who	had	free	hands	in	the	methods	used	against	









ruined.	 Its	members	 became	 alienated	 from	 each	 other	 in	 a	meaningful	
political	sense,	which	served	their	integration	into	the	state	machinery.	At	







4.3 The Administrative Culture in the 1930´s: 
Political Totalitarianism in All-State Planning of 
Local Administration
Three	 processes	 can	 be	 discerned	 in	 the	 revolutionary	 administrative	
transition	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 local	 administration.	 First,	 the	
organizational-bureaucratic	process	(“rational	reasons”)	in	which	demands	







power	 concerns	 produced	 different	 types	 of	 control	 and	 repression	
mechanisms.	 Lenin´s	 socialism	 was	 both	 vague	 organizationally	 and	
strict	in	terms	of	political	control.	In	reality,	the	separation	between	the	




thinking	 was	 a	 deep	 suspicion	 of	 any	 spontaneous	 political	 or	 social	





had	been	a	monolithic	 state	 (comp.	Rowney	199:	).	Logically,	 forcing	
order	violently	on	people	was	justified.	Trust	which	is	central	to	a	rule	of	
law	 state,	was	 secondary	 to	 the	 interests	of	 the	new	 transitional	 socialist	









revolution	 to	 the	 provinces,	 but	 soon	 it	 also	 needed	 to	 be	 guided	 in	 an	
effective	manner	to	control	these	same	geographical	areas.	
The	 ideological	 purposes	 of	 administrative	 change	 were	 channelled	
through	 three	 avenues.	 First	 of	 these	 had	 to	 do	with	 the	 changes	 of	 the	
administrative	market	as	a	result	of	new	decision	making	hierarchies.	This	
development	 included	 changes	 aimed	 at	 creating	 uniform	 command	
structures	 for	 implementation	 and	 information	 gathering.	 The	 second	
development	 had	 to	 do	 with	 the	 personnel´s	 educational	 background,	





These	 developments	 together	 resulted	 in	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 party,	









the	 workers	 (in	 other	 words	 the	 soviets)	 could	 control	 elements	 of	 the	
dictatorship	 of	 the	 proletariat.	 Bureaucratization,	 however,	 meant	 that	
political	power	was	in	the	party	apparatus,	the	military-economic	system	














economy.	 The	 administration	 did	 not	 exist	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 state	 but	
encompassed	 it.	The	 transitional	 state	 was	 not	 an	 arbitrator	 of	 different	
social	 and	 economic	 interests	 or	mere	 provider	 of	 order.	 It	 became	 the	
economy	by	sucking	 in	all	 functions	which	had	earlier	been	provided	by	
individuals	 and	 organizations	 in	 capitalist	markets.	 Because	 the	 socialist	
government	 emphasized	 economic	 growth,	 “non-political”	 led	 to	 the	
concentration	on	numbers	as	goals.	Meeting	the	requirements	of	existing	























and	 the	 town	 executive	 committees	 were	 de-politicized	 in	 this	 manner.	
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Because	of	the	one-party	parallel	decision	making,	the	political	specialists	
became	 strong	 and	 weakened	 other	 platforms	 for	 political	 decision	
making.	
The	 structural	 changes	 led	 to	 new	 external	 relations.	 If	 in	 the	 tsarist	
system	 the	 town	 administrations	 had	 consisted	 of	 the	 town	 people	




non-economical)	 organizational	 facts.	This,	 in	 fact,	 is	 reminiscent	of	 the	
“non-political”	 mandate	 of	 the	 tsarist	 town	 governments.	 Actual	 policy	
remained	outside	the	decision	making	at	the	lowest	level.	
Relations	 between	 the	 citizenry	 and	 administrators	 changed.	 The	
politically	 controlled	 and	 legally	 alternating	 decision	 making	 meant	
transferring	those	individual	client	rights	which	had	began	to	develop	in	




















legal	 positivism	 which	 considers	 all	 laws	 to	 be	 commands	 of	 sovereign	
power.	As	a	continuation	of	 this	 cultural	 element,	Lenin	built	 an	 idea	of	
socialist	government	which	gave	orders	and	punishments	in	the	interest	of	
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the	majority	–	the	proletariat	which	it	represented.	(Berman	1963:	25.)	The	
legitimation	 of	 political	 decision	making	 and	 administrative	 action	with	
law created	the	authority	of	the	dictatorship.	This	logic	of	legal	culture	was	
descriptive	 of	 the	 state-individual	 dichotomy	 of	 the	 new	 order.	 Where	











revolutionary	 tribunals	 handled	 crimes	 against	 the	 new	 state	 and	 its	
property	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 individual	 qualities	 of	 cases	 and	 by	 the	 earlier	
mentioned	 revolutionary	 consciousness.	 Defendant´s	 rights	 were	 nearly	

















administrative	 and	 “illegal”	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Then	 it	 had	 rebuilt	 the	
connection	 by	 positivist	 legalism	 in	 which	 the	 letter	 of	 the	 law	 was	
interpreted	 in	 a	 mechanistic	 manner.	 Civil	 law	 concentrated	 on	 new	




Emergency	 regulation	 was	 used	 in	 consolidation	 of	 the	 command-
economic	 system.	 It	 included	 a	 collection	 of	 principles	 and	methods	 of	
governance	based	on	massive	 repression	which	were	both	 court	ordered	
and	 extralegal.	The	 state	 of	 emergency	 became	 “a	 way	 of	 life”	 the	main	
justification	for	which	was	the	need	for	rapid	industrialization.	The	state	of	
emergency	 was	 created	 through	 the	 use	 of	 politically	 and	 economically	
motivated	legislative	interpretation	in	administrative	decision	making.	The	
peak	 of	 the	 legislation	 particularly	 favorable	 to	 arbitrary	 and	 repressive	
decision	making	was	1930–1932.	In	that	period	party	decisions	were	made	
concerning	 the	 collectivization	 and	 liquidation	 of	 farm	 owner	 peasants.	




people”	 appeared,	 and	 the	 development	 culminated	 in	 the	 1934	Central	
committee	 law	on	 terrorist	 acts.	The	 inquiry	 into	 such	 crimes	 could	not	
proceed	longer	than	10	days,	the	hearing	was	conducted	without	the	parties	
present,	 all	 rights	 of	 appeal	 and	petitions	 for	 clemency	were	denied	 and	
sentences	were	carried	out	immediately.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	19–20.)
These	 developments	 meant	 transferring	 those	 individual	 client	 rights	
which	 had	 began	 to	 develop	 in	 the	 tsarist	 culture	 to	 the	 new	 Soviet	
institutions.	The	individual	in	this	process	was	dependent	on	the	policies	of	
authorities	whose	actions	were	not	based	on	reliable	law.	The	resignation	of	




was	 born	 as	 a	 side-effect	 of	 the	 state-society	 relationship	 in	which	 final	
mediators	were	not	independent	legal	institutions.	Law	had	lost	its	authority	
over	 the	party	which	was	beyond	 legal	 control.	 In	 this	way	 the	previous	
situation	 where	 the	 law	 depended	 upon	 the	 ruler´s	 personal	 discretion	
continued.	Before	the	revolution	this	personal	legality	had	been	delegated	
to	the	appropriate	local	officials	of	the	Tsar.	In	the	Soviet	system	personal	
(dictatorial)	 legality	 was	 delegated	 to	 the	 party	 officials.	 This	 cannot,	
however,	be	considered	a	failure	of	the	legal	reform	since	its	aims	were	the	
opposite	of	 the	 liberal-democratic	 ideal,	which	 stresses	 the	 separation	of	
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powers.	The	devolution	of	 law	into	an	instrument	of	both	administrative	
mechanism	and	political	 control	 supported	 the	creation	of	 a	 state	which	
represented	the	society.	








communism.	 In	 this	 sense	 it	 was	 quite	 understandable	 that	 courts	were	
used	as	a	means	of	political	control.	This	was	compounded	by	the	fact	that	
the	 prosecutor´s	 office	 which	 investigated,	 prosecuted	 and	 generally	
supervised	 the	 administrative	 decision	 making,	 including	 economical	
matters,	 also	 guided	 the	 courts.	The	 prosecutor´s	 office	 in	 this	 manner	
became	 more	 than	 just	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 legal	 system.	 Its	 authority	 was	
extended	to	political-organizational	matters	to	help	steer	the	country	into	
rapid	economical	growth.	






an	 organizational	 level,	 seniority	 and	 authority	 which	 had	 been	 the	
cornerstones	 of	 tsarist	 administration	were	no	 longer	 connected	 to	 each	
other	(see	Rowney	199:	29).	New	types	of	recruitment,	advancement	and	
reward	policies	were	required.	During	the	Stalin	era,	fragility	of	positions	
and	 upward	mobility	 became	 central	 to	 the	 administrative	 culture.	New	
avenues	opened	up	to	loyal	persons.	At	the	same	time,	democratic	political	
control	of	personnel	policies	was	not	possible,	 as	 rules	depended	on	 the	
supreme	authority.	
Recruiting	 people	 from	 previously	 excluded	 groups	 into	 the	 decision	
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even	though	Lenin	tried	to	replace	them	as	fast	as	new	personnel	could	be	
trained.	Transition	happened	most	 thoroughly	 in	 the	exchange	of	power	
positions	 and	 role	 of	 different	 social	 classes	 inside	 the	 Russian	 society.	
(Hazard	 196:	 9–99,	 Rowney	 199:	 12.)	 A	 new	 “suitable	 background”	
appeared	 and	 those	 with	 wrong	 credentials	 saw	 their	 world	 and	 their	













tendencies	 inside	 the	 administration.	 In	 Stalinism,	 political	 dictatorship	
was	transformed	into	a	bureaucratic	culture	in	which	a	general	obligation	
to	inform,	categories	of	enemies,	harmful	behavior	against	the	state	and	a	
de-politicized	 party	 decision	 making	 process	 were	 consolidated	 as	 the	
ground	“rules”	which	guided	policy	more	than	objective	statements	in	laws.	
A	side-effect	was	the	substitution	of	open	social	discussion	with	secrecy.	It	
is	debatable	whether	 the	 transition	 failed	 in	 its	 original	purposes	 in	 this	
sense	 or	 not.	 The	 romantic	 view	 of	 grass	 roots	 activism	 was	 already	

















the	 state	which	 represented	 the	 society	was	 not	 the	 same	 as	 equality.	 In	
Lenin´s	assessment	the	capitalist	society´s	equal	 justice	meant	 the	use	of	
the	same	measurements	for	different	types	of	people	who	were	not	equal	or	
similar	 in	 their	 needs.	 Problems	 of	 distribution	 and	 justice	 would	 also	
appear	in	the	beginning	of	the	communist	state	as	long	as	distribution	was	
based	on	work.	(Stalin	1951:	211–212.)
Repression	 was	 interestingly	 connected	 with	 other	 areas	 in	 the	










The	 control	 of	 development	 in	 all	 the	major	 state	 building	 elements:	
administration	structures,	 law	and	 legal	 thinking	and	personnel	policies,	
required	language	purification.	This	was	essential	to	the	legitimation	of	the	
repressive	administration.	It	was	by	no	means	a	simple	 task	 in	the	social	
environment	of	 the	1920´s	when	 the	 educational	 level	of	 the	population	
was	still	low.	It	was	the	task	of	the	revolution	to	make	“them”	“us”.	The	state	
had	to	dominate	discussion	in	the	society	by	creating	an	image	of	stable	and	







language	 and	 ideological	 literacy”.	 Similarly,	 regional	 and	 class	 speech	
differences	 (portrayed	 in	 literature)	were	 expressions	of	 populism	which	
separated	peasants	from	that	which	they	should	be.	(Gorham	2000:	133–
14.)
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Language	 effected	 laws	 and	 administrative	 decisions.	 Law	 remained	 a	
weak	 instrument,	 since	 it	was	 interpreted	 through	 orders	 from	different	
levels	of	decision	making	and	wider	policies	which	could	be	written	into	
law	were	not	open	 to	discussion	at	 the	administrative	organization	 level.	
This	effect	was	compounded	by	the	general	flow	of	information,	which	was	
restricted	and	agitative.	The	new	language	was	distant	from	the	population	






of	 the	 new	 soviet	 administrators,	 particularly	 those	 who	 were	 in	 direct	
contact	 with	 the	 population,	 language	 purification	 was	 not	 of	 minor	
importance.	It	constituted	a	major	part	in	the	socialization	of	the	society.	It	







went	 through	 a	 change	 from	 a	 revolutionary	 communication	 to	 a	




the	 administration	 is	 more	 open	 but	 highly	 structured	 and	 vertically	
organized.	 Communication	 serves	 as	 a	 socialization	 function	 to	 replace	
terror.	Structured	communications	along	 formal	channels,	guided	by	 the	





Secrecy	 was	 evident	 in	 citizen	 behavior	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 organizational	
behavior	inside	the	different	sectors	of	administration.	Categories	for	state	
secrets	 and	 agency	 secrets	 (administrative	 secrets	 of	 a	 particular	 organi-
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zation)	 developed	with	 consequences	 for	 decision	making	 authority	 and	
actual	power	(Makarenko	199).	At	the	same	time,	this	need	for	restricted	




decision	making	 (see	 “Sovershenno	 Sekretno”	 2001,	 tom	 1,	 chasti	 1–2).	
Language	also	effectively	separated	different	levels	of	administration	from	
each	other.	
Formalism	 had	many	 direct	 consequences	 in	 the	 client-administrator	












Organization	 building	 led	 to	 task	 diversification	 and	 multiplication	
which,	along	with	the	new	administrative	roles	attached	to	them,	required	
armies	of	specialists.	Control	required	that	no	one	should	have	too	much	of	
a	 decision	making	 power.	 Responsibility	was	 diluted.	 Specialists	 formed	
new	ranks	which	replaced	the	old	tsarist	ones.	Specialists	and	exceptional	
individuals	represented	the	ideological	purposes	of	the	new	state	and	where	




When	 these	new	practices	were	 institutionalized,	particularly	 through	
the	nomenklatura	system,	they	were	transformed	into	a	fixed	organization	
of	 status.	 As	 centralized	 control	 was	 also	 institutionalized	 through	 the	
command-economic	 planning	 and	 the	 party	 became	 an	 administrative	
“arbitration	court”,	the	representational	political	organs	lost	power	(if	not	
formal	 authority)	 to	 the	 technocratic,	 specialized	 executive	 side.	 At	 the	













society	 was	 that	 the	 administrative	 (governmental)	 sector	 used	 political	
language	and	symbolism	in	a	formal	manner.	
One	 of	 these	 side-effects	 of	 the	 representational	 organs	 diminishing	
power	 was	 that	 hierarchical	 structures	 became	 strong	 and	 rational-legal	
authority	was	formally	in	place.	At	the	same	time,	the	party	system	took	the	
place	of	traditional	social	systems	by	being	outside	the	core	of	administrative	
structures.	 (Comp.	 Peters	 194.)	 This	 way,	 independent	 administrative	
authority	based	on	law	was	diminished	and	assumed	a	formalistic	character,	
one	which	 in	 fact	has	been	 typical	 for	developing	 countries.	The	 second	
side-effect	was	 the	 elimination	 of	 independent	 social	 activism.	The	 civil	
society	was	incorporated	either	into	the	administrative	structures	or	into	
the	party.	





processes	 themselves	 and	 the	 bureaucratization	 of	 the	 political	 process,	





At	 an	 organizational	 level	 a	 transition	 to	 a	 phenomenon	 called	
“vedomstvennost‘	 “or	 “a	 culture	 of	 governmental	 agencies”	 took	 place.	 It	
meant	a	development	in	which	separate,	specialized	ministries	(narkomats)	
operated	 both	 as	 administrative	 organs	 of	 government	 and	 as	 economic	
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institutions.	As	their	resources	grew	and	the	companies	and	other	economic	
institutions	under	 their	guidance	multiplied,	 they	began	 to	nurture	 their	
own	interests	in	the	execution	of	plans.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	23.)	This	created	





side	 effect	 of	 the	 specialization,	 the	 specific	 areas	 of	 responsibility	 often	




in	 localities	having	authority	above	the	 law.	This	was	the	 legal	and	social	
result	of	the	parallel,	extra	legal	control	function	of	the	party.	The	guardian	
role	of	 the	party	 taught	 the	non-party	organs	 to	 turn	to	 it	 in	all	possible	















newly	promoted	workers	 replaced	 those	who	had	 just	 assumed	work.	 In	
time,	 it	 became	 necessary	 for	 the	 Soviet	 government	 to	 reward	 persons	
whose	abilities	and	political	loyalty	were	necessary	for	the	building	of	the	
administration.	(Carrére	d´Encausse	190:	26.)
The	building	of	 administrative	 reward	 systems,	which	were	needed	 to	
ensure	loyalty	and	incentive,	had	several	side-effects	in	the	transformation	
of	 the	 administrative	 culture.	 It	 is	 also	one	of	 the	most	 striking	 cases	 of	
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structural	change	(in	this	case	personnel	removals	and	promotions)	which	
was	 contradictory	 and	 ineffective	 for	 transitional	 purposes	 and	 caused	
unintended	 effects.	 In	 this	 case,	 new	 long	 term	 risks	 arose	 for	 the	
administrative	system	in	two	ways.
The	first	creation	of	new	long	term	risks	was	made	by	linking	together	
employment	 position	 and	 deficit	 material	 conditions.	 Sungurov	 has	
concluded	that	the	main	difference	between	the	tsarist	table	of	ranks	and	
the	 nomenklatura system	was	 that	 the	 latter	was	 a	 closed,	 secret	 system	
(Sungurov	199:	4).	In	comparison	the	table	of	ranks	was	a	public,	legally	
regulated	organization	of	positions	and	tasks.	
The	second	way	 in	which	new	long	term	risks	were	created	was	 in	 the	
recruitment	system.	Social	differentiation	was	intensified	by	developments	
in	 the	field	of	higher	education.	As	 the	party	organization	members	were	
given	 a	 preference	 over	 others,	 this	 right	 in	 fact	 assumed	 a	 “hereditary”	
nature.	In	1923–24,	children	of	soldiers	and	army	political	cadres	were	given	













Secondly,	 the	 original	 equality	 ideal	 was	 replaced	 with	 a	 vanguard	
thinking	 in	 which	 socialist	 individual	 heroism	 became	 an	 ideological	






out	 a	 different	 type	 of	 government	 culture	 to	 that	 which	 Lenin	 had	
envisioned.	 Rotations	 and	 general	 politically	 based	 management	




non-political.	Past	 experience	 and	organizational	history	were	no	 longer	
useful,	but	instead	a	hindrance	to	rapid	socialization	and	development.	At	
an	 organizational	 level,	 seniority	 and	 authority	 which	 had	 been	 the	
cornerstones	 of	 tsarist	 administration	were	no	 longer	 connected	 to	 each	
other	(see	Rowney	199:	29).
The	nomenklatura system	which	 effected	both	 the	 leadership	 and	 the	
personnel,	was	an	answer	to	both	the	social	and	political	needs	of	this	de-
politicized	 government.	 It	 confirmed	 the	 change	 of	 social	 position:	 the	





replaced	 the	old	 rank	and	 title	hierarchy	of	 the	Tsars.	 Similarities	 in	 the	
qualities	 which	were	 again	 required	 from	 those	who	wished	 to	 advance	
their	 individual	 careers	 in	 socialism	 were	 striking:	 political	 correctness,	







To summarize,	 this	 chapter	 has	 analyzed	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 totalitarian	
administrative	culture	at	the	local	level	in	191–193.	The	results	show	that	
the	 structuration	process	produced	an	administrative	 culture	 the	 core	of	
which	remained	essentially	same	compared	to	the	tsarist	system.	This	meant	
that:	1)	final	authority	continued	to	be	beyond	and	above	the	law	(in	the	
party);	 2)	 local	 administration	 was	 non-political	 (concentration	 on	
quantity);	3)	administrative	procedures	based	on	trust	between	organizations	
and	citizens	were	not	created	(no	rule	of	 law	or	 legal	protection);	4)	 law	
remained	weak	(formalism);	and	5)	bureacratic	language	and	secrecy	were	
used	 (separation	 of	 different	 administrative	 levels	 and	 actors	 from	 each	
other).	
The	main	difference	compared	to	the	tsarist	period	was	the	creation	of	
personnel	 policies	 (based	 on	 education)	 which	 incorporated	 the	 civil	





were	 intensified	 because	 of	 risks	 to	 the	 revolution	 itself	 (civil	 war,	 great	
economic	 difficulties,	 political	 opposition).	 As	 a	 result,	 wide	 terror	 was	
used	as	a	side-effect	of	administrative	control	needs.	As	before,	the	main	
side-effect	of	the	system	can	also	be	attributed	to	the	lack	of	separation	of	
powers.	 The	 most	 important	 side-effect	 was	 the	 bureaucratization	 of	










dysfunctions	 in	 the	 bargaining	 system	which	made	 up	 the	 core	 of	 local	
administrative	culture.	I	will	show	how	the	perestroika	policies	of	adminis-
trative	 reform	 were	 negated	 by	 the	 existing	 dysfunctions	 of	 the	 Soviet	
system	and	how	new	risks	to	this	system	were	born	in	the	process.	
5.1 The Political Ideology of Administrative 
Change: Harmonizing Official and Unofficial 
Cultures 
Mikhail	Gorbachev	became	the	head	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	a	situation	were	
the	 planning	 system	had	 reached	 its	 cultural	maturity	 and	was	 showing	
different	 types	of	dysfunctions.	Looking	at	 the	Soviet	administration	 is	a	
complex	task	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	liberal-democratic	conception	of	
administrative	systems.	This	is	because	the	executive	bureaucracy	which	is	













had	 their	 stakes	 in	 the	 practical	 execution	 of	 centrally	 decided	 policy	
programs.	The	mature	Soviet	system	proceeding	the	perestroika	period	was	
based	on	a	 communication	 system	reminiscent	of	 the	pluralist	model	 in	
which	much	information	flowed	within	laterally	related	groups,	providing	
a	 basis	 for	 informal	 coalitions.	 Participation	 was	 allowed	 in	 official	
administrative	 communication	 through	 regulated	 channels,	 such	 as	
complaint	 books	 and	 legislative	 inquiries.(Sternheimer	 193:	 13–13.)	
Gordon	Smith	has	described	the	method	of	influencing	as	being	primarily	
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as	 control	 agencies	 used	 by	 the	 executive	 committee	 to	 oversee	 the	
development	and	execution	of	its	decisions.	This	latter	group	and	additional	
agencies	which	 serviced	 and	 coordinated	 the	work	 of	 all	 others	were	 in	
local	control	and	funded	by	the	communities.	The	control	branch	included	
administrative	 inspection	 organizations,	 the	 prosecutors	 and	 the	 courts.	
(Kordonskii	2000,	Sternheimer	190:	4–5.)
In	terms	of	conceptualization	of	this	web	of	decision	making	hierarchies,	
I	 have	 chosen	 to	 call	 all	 of	 the	 earlier	 mentioned	 branches	 together	 “a	
government”	and	separate	out	in	it	sub-systems	which	I	call	administrations.	
The	main	 features	 of	 the	 Soviet	 government	 structure	 in	 the	perestroika 
period	 are	 shown	 in	 annex	D	which	 is	my	 illustration	of	 the	 system.	 In	





administration.	 Furthermore	 their	 staff	 also	 participated	 in	 the	 decision	
making	for	localities	and	their	servicing.
The	 functional	back	bone	of	 the	whole	 administrative	 system	was	 the	





needs	of	 the	people	by	way	of	political	decision	making.	In	the economic 




accounting.	 In	 the	 formal	 structural	 sense,	 the	 local	 level	 was	 a	 direct	
extension	of	the	ministry	in	each	category	of	questions.	The	main	practical	





Since	 the	 1960´s,	 an	 expansion	 of	 the	 economic	 administration´s	
independence	 was	 allowed	 by	 increasing	 the	 output	 volume	 that	 the	
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economic	 units	 could	 sell	 by	 themselves.	 In	 actuality	 the	materials	 and	
products	 were	 bartered	 in	 the	 administrative	 market.	 The	 economic	
autonomy	of	 enterprises	was	 subordinated	 to	 the	 implementation	of	 the	
plan	because	it	still	defined	the	real	flows.	Bartering	in	the	administrative	
market	mainly	supplemented	and	reinforced	the	allocation	of	resources.	In	





sector	 of	 production,	 or	 a	 singular	 factor	 would	 be	 located.	 Different	
parts	 of	 the	 federal	 state	 served	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 economy	which	
directed	 their	 general	 cultural	 development.(Jacobs	 193:	 6–,	 Sakwa	
1990:	152.)	Kirkow	has	pointed	out	that	since	the	ministries	dominated	
territorial	 planning,	 the	 industrial	 structure	of	 local	 and	 regional	 units	
was	one	of	 the	most	 important	single	 factors	determining	their	budget.	
For	the	turn	over	of	tax	and	payment	from	profits	in	the	local	budget,	the	
number,	 size	 and	 jurisdiction	of	 enterprises	 in	 a	 certain	 area	was	 vital.	
(Kirkow	199:	35.)
The	local	budget´s	income	came	mainly	from	two	sources.	First	was	the	
legally	 secured	(zakreplennyi)	 income	which	came	 from	 local	enterprises	
(including	municipal	services	and	enterprises),	local	taxes	and	payments,	
income	 tax	 on	 cooperatives	 and	 public	 organizations,	 and	 payments	 for	
legal	services	such	as	the	notary.	Second	was	the	regulated	(regulirovannyi)	
income	 which	 came	 from	 federal	 revenues,	 tax	 of	 the	 population	 and	
republican	enterprise	profits	which	were	collected	annually	in	the	area	of	
the	 soviet.	 In	 addition,	 the	 local	 level	was	helped	 to	meet	 its	obligations	






one-third	of	 the	housing	sector	 in	 its	area	since,	 in	 the	Russian	republic,	
almost	3/4	belonged	to	ministries	and	enterprises.	Local	budget	spending	
on	territorial	industry	and	agriculture	was	only	5	and	10	%	respectively.	At	
the	 same	 time,	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 services	were	 also	
financed	by	work	organizations.	(Kirkow	199:	3.)




The	first	was	 the	 elected	 soviet	 (council)	of	deputies	 and	 the	 second	 the	
executive	committee	which	worked	as	the	head	of	the	municipal	adminis-
tration.	The	 most	 important	 task	 for	 the	 local	 soviets	 was	 supervising,	
monitoring	 and	 reporting	 responsibilities	 through	 deputies,	 standing	
committees	 and	 finance	 departments.	Control	 over	 the	 non-subordinate	
enterprises	 in	the	area	was	mostly	 formal	and	varied	with	the	soviet,	 the	





in	 coordination.	 In	 fact,	 the	 implementation	 of	 decisions	was	 left	 to	 the	
executive	committee	and	the	party	organization.	(Kirkow	199:	40.)
The	chairman	of	the	executive	committee,	who	acted	as	a	mayor,	had	the	
highest	 authority.	 Behind	 him	 were	 the	 first	 vice-chairman,	 other	 vice-





city	 budget,	 adoption	 of	 the	 plans	 for	 the	 city-run	 enterprises,	 issuing	
ordinances,	election	of	the	executive	committee,	and	approve	its	nominations	





commissions	 of	 the	 soviets,	 electoral	 commissions,	 street	 and	 house	



















Melin	 (199)	 has	 pointed	 out,	 factory	 managers	 were	 important	 local	





of	 enterprises	 and	 organizations,	 controlled	 their	 work,	 and	 financed	 it	
when	these	organizations	were	under	their	subordination.	For	actual	power,	
the	executive	committees	needed	the	cooperation	of	the	branch	enterprise	
directors	 to	 negotiate	 the	 amount	 and	 distribution	 of	 resources	 in	 their	
administrative	 area.	 The	 position	 of	 the	 executive	 committees	 in	 the	













the	 key	 public	 official	 who	 was	 used	 for	 approving	 and	 appealing	 for	
citizens´requests.	The	 Soviet	members	were	 in	 fact	 seen	 as	 representing	
most	of	the	qualities	which	were	required	from	a	good	Soviet	representative.	
Citizens	 turned	 to	 executive	 committee	 members	 and	 to	 heads	 of	
departments	with	requests	concerning	mostly	housing,	services,	pensions	
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and	 work.	 In	 addition,	 complaints	 were	 made	 against	 the	 bureaucrats	
themselves.	 Yet	 there	was	 also	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 local	 representatives	 being	
inefficient	 as	 a	 source	 of	 problem	 solving,	 preferring	 friends	 and	 family	
instead.	(Friedgut	193:	112–124.)	









the	 party	 instructors	 of	 the	 geographical	 area.	 The	 party	 coordinated	
relations	between	all	 the	other	administrations	 in	 the	municipality	while	
the	executive	committee	of	the	soviet	oversaw	the	actual	daily	execution	of	
decisions.	 In	other	words,	 the	party	created	 the	policy	and	 the	executive	






term	 actions.	 Furthermore,	 the	 party	 had	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	
management	of	the	economic	administration	through	party	members	who	
worked	 in	 factories	 and	 service	 organizations	 regardless	 of	 the	 formal	
subordination.	Through	these	links	the	party	enforced	national	policies	at	
the	local	level	(i.e.	party	intervention,	podmena,	with	local	state	functions)	
(Kirkow	 199:	 39).	 This	 link	 was	 not	 merely	 practical.	 It	 followed	 a	
fundamental	principle	of	territorial-production	systems	which,	along	with	
the	 concept	 of	 democratic	 centralism,	 created	 the	 basis	 for	 functional	
organization.	(Kordonskii	2000:	4,	Hammer	196:	1.)	
The	 territorial-production	 system	 principle	 meant	 that	 each	 party	





The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
1
it	served	as	a	channel	for	political	information	with	the	help	of	members	
specializing	 in	 its	distribution	 (politinformatory).	Third,	 it	monitored	 the	
workplace	to	prevent	authority	 leakage.	In	other	words	a	situation	where	
the	management	started	using	organizational	resources	and	goals	for	other	
than	 their	 original	 purposes.	 Fourth,	 it	 elected	 the	 town	 party	 congress	
which	then	chose	the	town	party	committee.	(Hammer	196:	1–3.)
The	official	 communication	between	different	 levels	 of	 administration	
was	almost	completely	in	the	hands	of	the	party.	This	included	both	vertical	






Much	of	 the	actual	decision	making	was	out	of	 the	direct	 control	of	 the	
local	 level	 such	 as	 all-union	 enterprises,	 research	 institutions,	 much	 of	
heavy	 industry,	 defence	 establishments	 and	 the	 railways.	The	municipal	
government	was	also	restricted	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 could	not	 raise	 taxes.	
(Sternheimer	193:	155,	Sokolov	1995.)
The	party	used	a	considerable	amount	of	synergy	as	a	basis	for	its	decision	
making	 and	 control	 power,	 without	 being	 formally	 inside	 the	 other	
bureaucracies.	 It	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 say	 that	 the	 party	 was	 the	 super	
administration	which	delegated	tasks	to	other	institutions.	Each	workplace	
had	 its	 leaders	of	workers	among	 those	who	were	party	members.	These	






factory	 organization	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 sectoral	 (in	 this	 case	 economic)	
administration.	It	represented	the	territorial	aspect	of	the	management.	In	
the	 cases	of	 the	most	 important	 economic	agencies	 at	 the	 local	 level	 the	
verticality	was	the	strongest.	These	dealt	with	matters	of	finance,	construction	
(especially	housing)	 and	planning.	Decisions	were	 in	 fact	made	by	non-
elected	officials	from	higher	territorial	level.	(Smith	190:	6.)
Functionally,	the	local	and	the	center	were	united	at	the	central	level	in	
two	 ways.	 First,	 in	 the	 paid	 professional	 staff	 agency	 serving	 the	 party	






executive	 institutions.	 Most	 of	 all,	 its	 role	 was	 to	 gather	 and	 process	
information	to	give	the	leadership	an	informed	view	on	the	developments	
in	 the	 country.	 It	 also	 gave	 directives	 downward	 to	 the	 party	members.	
(Hammer	196:	9.)
The	second	functional	connection	took	place	in	the	bureaucracy	of	the	
Central	Committee	which	meant	 about	 twenty	 administrative	 organs	 or	
departments.	 Each	 department	 supervised	 one	 or	 more	 ministries,	
government	 agencies	 or	 public	 organizations.	This	 supervision	 included	
control	of	appointments	through	the	nomenklatura	system	of	official	name	
list-appointments	 by	 different	 level	 party	 committees	 and	 collecting	
information	through	primary	organizations	about	their	parent	organization.	
A	placement	both	in	the	sectoral	and	territorial	administrations	could	only	





12).The	 party´s	 organizational	 work	 department,	 for	 instance,	 was	
responsible	 for	 the	appointments	 at	 territorial	 levels,	 the	Komsomol	and	
the	trade	unions.	(Hammer	196:	92–93.)	In	this	way	the	basis	of	personnel	
policy	in	the	administration	was	outside	of	general	law.	
Analogous	 political	 and	 general	 administrative	 (economic	 and	
representative)	 systems	 existed	 at	 each	 level	 of	 the	 administration.	The	
party	 system	 was	 headed	 by	 a	 first	 secretary	 who	 had	 from	 2–4	 vice-
secretaries	 for	 ideological,	 organizational,	 industrial	 and	 farming	 issues.	
Similar	to	the	structure	of	the	executive	committees,	the	party	elected	1–2	
department	heads	of	city	party	committee	who	were	in	charge	of	ideological	




of	 economic	 operations	 in	 the	 industries	 through	 line	 directors.	 The	
opinions	 of	 the	 town	 party	 secretaries	 were	 taken	 into	 account	 by	 the	
executive	committees	at	 the	regional	 level	 to	appoint	the	management	of	
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any	 factory	 or	 service	 organization.	This	 meant	 that	 all	 decision	 about	
personnel	policy	were	in	fact	made	at	the	regional	level.	This	third	level	of	
party	 hierarchy	 was	 formed	 by	 the	 functionaries	 of	 the	 regional	 party	









for	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 five	 year	 plans	 through	 the	 line	 ministries	 and	
processed	 it	 in	 the	 Gosplan,	 the	 Communist	 party	 Central	 Committee	
departments	had	 their	own	proposals	and	analysis	which	considered	 the	
interests	 of	 the	 party	 nomenklatura	 and	 regional	 power	 groups.	 The	
territorial	 (oblast	 and	 republic)	 planning	 followed	 the	 same	 pattern:	
economic	 reports	 and	 suggestions	 came	 from	 the	 executive	 committee	
heads	 of	 the	 elected	 organs	 to	 the	Gosplan,	 and	 reports	 from	 the	 oblast	
party	committee	heads	to	the	party´s	Central	Committee.	(Sungurov	199:	
49.)	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 hierarchy	 inside	 the	 political	 administration	 itself	
influenced	the	decision	making	concerning	all	of	society.	The	inner	party	






and	 the	 party	 buro.	 The	 town	 level	 elected	 delegates	 to	 this	 level.	 The	
regional	committee	which	was	thus	formed	by	these	delegates	elected	the	




the	 administrative	 market	 because	 it	 had	 the	 authority	 to	 supervise	 all	
activities	of	the	region.	This	was	a	considerably	larger	responsibility	than	
the	regional	executive	committee	had.	The	party	leaders	mediated	many	of	
the	competing	 institutional	conflicts	of	 interest	 since	 influential	heads	of	




pluralism”,	 “bureaucratic	 pluralism”	 and	 “participatory	 bureaucracy”	 to	
describe	 this	 phenomenon.	 The	 buro	 was	 in	 fact	 responsible	 for	 the	









status	of	 actors	within	 the	official	 structures	 of	 authority.	 In	 the	market,	
however,	the	actual	power	of	different	actors	also	depended	on	a	variety	of	
factors	 which	 contributed	 to	 their	 actual	 status.	Thus,	 for	 instance,	 the	
resources	of	the	economic	administration	were	distributed	by	the	factory	





upon	 the	 knowledge	 of	 alternative	 allocation	 patterns	 available	 to	 one´s	
superiors,	 independent	 contacts	 with	 suppliers	 and	 the	 span	 of	 control	
which	the	superior	body	had.	Inaccurate	information	was	deliberately	sent	
upward.	 The	 plan	 was	 seen	 as	 setting	 unrealistic	 deadlines,	 unable	 to	
coordinate	 demand	 and	 sources	 for	 materials,	 and	 unable	 to	 allocate	




who	 had	 their	 specific	 social	 position	within	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 influence.	
These	 were	 workers	 and	 holders	 of	 similar	 status	 (for	 instance	 junior	
researchers	 and	 line	 administration	 officials),	 line	 directors,	 functional	
specialists,	 vice-directors	 of	 organizations	 and	 directors	 of	 local	 organi-
zations	 (who	 belonged	 to	 the	 nomenklatura	 of	 the	Communist	 party	 in	
their	area).	The	functional	groups	were	universal	because	relations	between	
different	groups	were	similar	 in	spite	of	 the	field	of	activity	(for	example	
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for	 instance.	 (Kordonskii	 2000:	 2,	 Kivinen	 199:	 126.)	 The	 local	 and	
regional	administrative	markets	had	a	significant	meaning	for	the	creation	
of	budgets,	since	the	political	power	of	the	political	administration	at	these	
levels	 and	 their	 relations	 with	 the	 industry	 managers	 with	 higher	
subordination,	played	 a	 role	 in	 the	way	 the	 local	 budget	was	 structured.	
(Kirkow	199:	35.)
In	 practice	 “local”	 in	 this	 decision	making	 culture	meant,	 on	 the	 one	






declined	 the	 request.	 (Piskotin	 1993:4.)	The	main	 structuring	 of	 power	
shares	was	mostly	done	inside	the	party	itself.	One	of	the	main	problems	for	













which	were	 based	 on	 laws	 and	 supported	 their	 implementation.	These	
legal	 acts	 were	 binding	 troughout	 the	 USSR.	 (The	 Constitution	 of	 the	
USSR	19:	articles	15,	16.)	In	addition	to	this,	the	Council	of	Ministries	
issued	 joint	decrees	with	 the	Communist	party	 central	 committee	 (van	
der	Berg	1992:	153).	The	19	Constitution	does	not	recognize	such	acts	
explicitly.	In	this	way,	in	fact,	 legislative	acts	which	directly	affected	the	





of	 the	 state.	 The	 main	 foundations	 of	 daily	 legal	 authority	 were	 the	
instruction	of	 the	Central	Committee	and	 the	Council	of	Ministers	who	
also	 issued	 joint	 decrees	 (postanovlenie).	Of	 these	 the	 latter	 acted	 as	 the	
legally	legitimate	source,	while	the	party	ensured	its	execution.	Actual	laws	
which	 the	 representative	 organs	 of	 the	 country	 passed	 were	 of	 minor	
importance	or	merely	decorative.	The	decisions	of	concrete	administrative	





















party	offered	a	 channel	 for	upward	mobility,	 although	a	 less	 stable	one	
than	 in	 the	 representational	 administration,	 for	 instance.	 The	 Soviet	
ministries,	for	example,	were	professional	organizations	where	employees	
easily	spent	their	whole	working	careers.	In	contrast,	the	first	secretaries	
of	 oblasts	 were	 intentionally	 transferred	 from	 one	 place	 to	 another	 to	
avoid	 them	 representing	 regional	 or	 local	 interests.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	
regional	 party	 leaders	 were	 also	 members	 of	 the	 Communist	 party´s	
Central	Committee	affected	their	sense	of	identity.	Their	status	was	that	




























an	 important	 factor	 in	 Stephen	 Sternheimer´s	 case	 study.	 Greater	
cooperation	and	effort	 could	be	 expected	 in	 exchange	 for	 extra	 vacation	
days,	extra	paid	free	time,	unreported	salary	bonuses	and	so	on.	(Sternheimer	
193:	143.)	In	this	sense,	those	having	any	type	of	decision	making	power	
in	 the	system	also	depended	on	 the	 informal	practices.	Further	more,	 in	
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goods	 and	 services	 was	 played	 by	 middlemen	 (blatnye)	 who	 could	 be	
secretaries	of	directors	or	secretaries	of	party	organizations,	 for	 instance.	
These	were	individuals	who	possessed	knowledge	of	what	people	to	use	in	
different	 situations	 to	 achieve	 a	 desired	 goal.	They	 could	 point	 out	 the	
conditions	in	which	exchange	of	material	benefits	or	statuses	could	be	done	
satisfactorily	for	all	parties	concerned.	Conflicts	between	different	groups	





formal	 institutions	 of	 the	 economy,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 allowing	 the	
formal	rules	and	principles	to	be	observed	as	legitimate.	Informal	mutual	
assistance	was	 a	way	 of	 securing	 civil	 rights	 in	 the	 political	 and	 control	
bureaucracies.	 (Ledeneva	 2000:	 322–323.)	 Zinoviev	 has	 called	 these	
practices	and	ways	of	thinking	“the	communal	behavior”	which	created	an	
additional	 social	 risk.	 It	 was	 consciously	 learned	 as	 a	 set	 of	 social	 skills	
which	allowed	the	person	to	maintain	and	better	his	position.	There	were	
many	 instances	 of	 trivial	 communal	 behavior	 but	 also	 some	 which	
determined	the	nature	of	the	society.	Moreover,	communal	behavior	became	
natural	and	habitual,	“innocent”.	People	developed	a	survival	mechanism	in	
which	 life	 became	 a	 system	 of	 mutual	 benefit	 and	 assistance	 and/or	
competition.	(Zinoviev	1991:	6.)	
An	example	of	how	the	unofficial	and	the	official	were	connected	in	the	
daily	 administrative	 work	 was	 the	 use	 of	 written	 official	 documents	 to	
secure	the	decisions	and	promises	made	in	personal	phone	calls	between	
members	of	a	social	network.	The	telephone	was	the	key	channel	through	
which	 things	 were	 done	 in	 time	 and	 as	 wanted.	 Yet	 these	 business	 like	
informal	 networks	 required	 that	 decisions	 were	 legalized	 through	
























that	 success	 and	plain	 comfortable	 life	 required	more	 than	 just	 input	 in	
their	formal	job	tasks,	a	cycle	of	poor	work	culture	was	created.	Zinovjev	
has	concluded	that	the	co-operation	needed	meant	that	individuals	(both	
administrators	 and	 others)	 shifted	 unpleasant	 tasks	 which	 were	 their	
responsibility	 on	 the	 shoulders	 of	 other.	 His	 critical	 view	 is	 that	 “the	




The	 social	 system	 which	 was	 created	 in	 part	 by	 the	 effects	 of	 the	
nomenklatura culture,	 and	 partly	 by	 the	 overall	 legal	 position	 of	 the	
administrators,	returned	these	effects	to	the	routine	work	of	the	organizations.	
There	was	no	symmetry	between	power	and	responsibility,	which	made	it	











representative	 administrations	 (obshchestvennyi)	 there	 existed	 a	 special	
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non-state	control	agency	 in	 the	 form	of	a	social	organization	whose	task	
was	to	control	the	execution	of	the	plan.	This	people´s	control	organization	
inspected	 possible	 problems	 in	 the	 making	 of	 products	 within	 its	 own	












acted	 as	 the	 agents	 of	 central	 government,	 looking	 after	 the	 lower	 level	










party´s	 position	 was	 also	 weak	 because	 the	 prosecutor	 had	 the	 right	 to	
appeal	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 court	 in	 case	 he	 found	 them	 unsatisfactory.	
Through	the	party	control	he	could	affect	the	decision	making	of	the	judges.	
This	led	to	a	cycle	of	negative	court	rulings.	(Sungurov	199:	5.)







production.	 It	 was	 usual	 for	 prosecutors	 to	 call	 factory	 and	 kolkhoz	










The	 practices	 of	 information	 use	 in	 decision	 making	 enforced	 the	
dysfunctions	 in	 all	 of	 the	 bureaucracies.	 Information	 about	 economic	




administrations,	 deadlines	 for	 submitting	 them,	 addresses	 of	 submission	
and	general	instructions	for	the	process	were	confirmed	by	the	Goskomstat.	
It	checked	the	accuracy	of	 the	received	 information	and	 if	a	discrepancy	






became	one	of	mostly	 tradition	and	mobilization	with	 little	meaning	 for	
policy	guidance.	The	legal	rights	of	the	soviets	fell	below	their	actual	powers.	
(Sokolov	1995:	155.)	The	environmental	relations	of	executive	committees	
thus,	were	routinized	with	 little	flexibility	 to	enact	changes	reflecting	 the	
motions	of	 the	 “outside”	 (citizens	of	no	connections	 to	 the	party	 and	 its	
nomenklatura,	“the	insiders”).	The	language	of	administration	became	one	
of	“plan”	for	the	citizen.	
According	 to	 Hough	 (1990)	 there	 were	 two	 mechanisms	 of	 local	






but	 relied	on	economic	 statistics	or	profiles	of	general	 conditions,	which	
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were	rhetorical	safeguards	for	the	organizations.	Most	people	making	them	
were	 themselves	 members	 of	 the	 (party)	 elite	 (e.g.	 employees	 of	
administrative	 organs,	 factory	 directors,	 party	 officials	 and	 so	 on).	 In	
addition	they	usually	dealt	with	production	organizations	such	as	enterprises	
or	collective	farms	and	not	with	the	administration.	(Hough	1990:	–9.)
Institutionally,	 the	 language	 of	 administration	 was	 embodied	 in	 the	
Goskomstat.	The	Goskomstat	had	an	important	general	role	in	the	guidance	
of	 the	 top	 leadership	 because	 it	 gave	 them	 regular	 bulletins,	 topical	
information,	analyses	and	reports.	Quarterly	and	annual	information	was	
more	 comprehensive	 and	 included	 elements	 of	 analysis	 of	 the	 country´s	
socio-economic	development,	and	criticism	of	the	plan´s	fulfillment.	The	
focus	of	criticism	was	in	these	cases	a	ministry	or	agency,	such	as	Gosplan	
or	Gosstroi.	The	party	 and	 the	 representational	 administration	were	not	
criticized.	(Eydelman	199:	1.)
The	non-publicness	of	information,	which	was	wide	in	the	instructions	
of	 the	political	 administration,	was	duplicated	 in	 the	 line	ministries	 and	
central	administrative	organs.	The	Goskomstat	gave	its	information	to	the	
leadership	with	the	classifications	of	“top	secret”	or	“secret”.	These	contained	








publish.	 Top	 secret	 and	 secret	 analysis	 contained	 information	 about	 the	







of	 state	 level	 organizations	 (for	 instance	 the	Ministry	 of	 Defense,	 KGB,	
Gosplan)	 formed	 a	 commission	 which	 determined	 the	 classification	 of	
documents.	The	distribution	of	the	material	was	also	carefully	recorded	in	
a	list	showing	the	type	of	material,	 its	official	classification,	organizations	





liberal-democratic	 thinking.	 This	 concept,	 however,	 was	 not	 based	 on	





followed	 the	historical	development	of	Soviet	 society	and	understood	 its	
ideals.	There	was	thus	no	“general”	freedom.	(Pietiläinen	1994:	30–31.)	In	
this	 type	of	 society,	 the	 information	which	could	be	made	public	and	 its	
interpretation	 needed	 to	 be	 tightly	 controlled.	This	 was	 due	 to	 the	 ever	
present	 danger	 of	 “generalism”,	 unpolitical,	 revisionist	 and	 unideological	
thinking	penetrating	 the	 texts.	This	 risk	 applied	whether	 they	be	media,	
cultural,	scientific	or	administrative	information	sources.	





gave	 birth	 to	 these	 unofficial,	 folklore	 sub-characters	 of	 Soviet	 citizens.	
Within	 all	 official	 groups	 (classes	 and	 strata)	 there	 were	 people	 who	
belonged	 to	 the	 unofficial	 ideal	 types.	 In	 daily	 life	 people	 changed	 their	




saw	 themselves	 through	 the	 space	 and	 time	 organization	 of	 the	 state.	
Their	personal	realities	were	structured	by	the	economic	plans	and	official	
festivities	of	the	state	which	took	place	in	proper	physical	spaces.	There	




















To	 understand	 the	 products	 of	 administrative	 culture	 such	 as	 official	
party	and	administrative	texts,	it	is	helpful	to	use	Kordonskii´s	classification	
of	 behavioral	 forms	 which	 all	 groups	 had.	 In	 other	 words	 there	 were	
functional,	 every-man	 and	 dissident	 behavior	 within	 all	 groups.	 For	




the	 “functionary”	 group	 included	 revealing	 public	 statements	 and	
performance,	while	the	“bourgeois”	behavior	of	this	group	included	gossip	
and	anecdotes	of	party	and	administrative	 life.	The	dissident	behavior	of	
the	 “dissident”	 group	 meant	 the	 “language	 of	 truth”,	 the	 concrete	
manifestation	 of	 which	 included	 self-made	 publications	 (samizdat).	
(Kordonskii	2000:	169.)
Kordonskii	(2000)	has	described	the	repressive	sanctions	as	an	attempt	
to	 diminish	 the	 cleavage	 between	 the	 latent	 and	 the	 official,	 normative	
social	 systems	 in	 the	 administrative	 market.	The	 methods	 chosen	 were	
ideologically	legitimated	as	“a	fight	against	the	petty	bourgeois	attitudes”	or	




dialects	 and	 behavior,	 then	 one	 would	 have	 to	 look	 at	 the	 meaning	 of	
different	 written	 rules,	 legal	 documents	 and	 instructions	 in	 the	 Soviet	
Union	through	this	interpretation.	Administrative	work	was	the	combination	
of	multilayered	regulation	at	 the	 institutional	 level	on	one	hand,	and	the	
strong	separation	of	“official”	and	everyday	space	for	interpretation	on	the	





for	 administrative	 information	 gathering	 and	 its	 meaning.	 Officially,	 in	
Soviet	society,	all	 type	of	information	was	supposed	to	work	together	for	
the	same	goal.	In	particular,	the	press	was	an	important	source	of	opinion	









basic	 working	 principles.	 Among	 its	 main	 principles	 were	 party	 views,	
ideology,	truthfulness,	as	well	as	mass	orientation,	democracy,	objectivity.	
In	 the	 perestroika	 era	 humanism	 (which	meant	 a	 general	 orientation	 of	





required	 that	 any	 a	 socially	 important	 actor	 such	 as	 a	 journalist	 (or	 an	
administrator)	understood	the	concept	of	class	struggle	and	the	role	of	the	
communist	party	in	it.	It	required	“	an	obligation	to	interpret	all	internal	
and	 foreign	policy,	 economical,	 cultural	 and	 social	phenomena	 from	 the	
point	of	view	of	the	party”.	Truthfulness	was	connected	with	the	difference	
in	interpretation	of	the	Russian	words	pravda (truth)	which	refers	to	truth	




not	 need	 to	 be	 only	 truthfully	 expressed	 but	 also	 analyzed	 in	 order	 “to	
distinguish	 from	 the	present	 task	 those	which	 can	be	 solved	only	 in	 the	
future.”	(Pietiläinen	1994:	21–24.)
In	 correspondence	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 democratic	 centralism,	 the	
ability	to	criticize	the	party	committee	of	a	municipal	area	was	reserved	for	












consolidation	 and	 building	 of	 a	 nomenklatura	 led	 life,	 the	 state	 had	 a	




(which	 was	 represented	 in	 the	 administration	 throughout	 the	 country)	
became	 the	 only	 official	 subject	 and	 discussant,	 and	 thus	 did	 not	 have	
anyone	to	exchange	information	with	(Pietiläinen	1994:	59).
In	actuality	the	soviet	administration	consisted	of	layers	of	non-public	







not	 able	 to	 rely	 on	 information	which	would	have	 allowed	 it	 to	 actually	
predict	future	economic	developments.	Besides,	such	activity	was	beyond	
the	role	of	the	local	bureaucracies.	Although	the	local	level	actually	provided	
the	 information	 though	 the	 vertical	 line	 of	 information	 processing,	 its	
potential	to	form	a	realistic	general	opinion	about	the	whole	country	was	
limited	by	the	central	policy	on	information.	
Finally,	 along	 with	 the	 media,	 the	 court	 system	 had	 a	 very	 different	
formal	 position	 and	 role	 than	 that	 in	 the	 liberal-democratic	model.	The	
court	 system	 was	 incorporated	 structurally	 into	 the	 representative	
administration.	The	court	had	a	less	significant	direct	control	impact	on	the	
creation	of	administrative	culture	than	it	has	in	liberal-democratic	countries.	
Sungurov	 has	 described	 how	 many	 civil	 organizational	 conflicts	 where	
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resolved	 outside	 of	 the	 court	 system	 within	 the	 administrative	 hierarchy	
either	by	the	supervisor	in	charge,	or	if	they	involved	different	organizations,	




Legal	 protection	meant	 different	 things	 for	 different	 individuals	 in	 the	




cases,	 transfers	 to	 another	 place	 of	 work.	 For	 ordinary	 party	 members,	















depended	 on	 having	 good	 relations	 with	 the	 administrators	 within	 the	
executive	and	party	committees	of	the	town.	(Sungurov	199:	5.)	
At	the	beginning	of	the	Gorbachev	led	reform	period	during	195–196,	














The	 political	 ideology	 of	 administrative	 change	 concentrated	 on	 the	




















(for	 instance	 Kordonskii´s	 ideal	 type	 behavior)	 and	 official	 (normative)	
ones.	The	change	in	the	administrative	ideology	mostly	took	place	in	the	
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accepted	standard	for	achievement.	Harri	Melin	(199)	has	described	the	
plan	 as	 a	matter	 of	 fact	 law	which	was	 taken	 for	 granted	 by	 production	





or	 activity),	 work	 became	 more	 administratively	 routine	 than	 business	
building.	As	a	side-effect,	maintenance	and	cost	control	did	not	have	a	high	
priority.	(Boycko,	Schleifer	and	Vishny	1994:	3.)





of	 all	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 investment	 and	 structural	 policies.	 In	
Gorbachev´s	view,	attention	should	have	been	moved	from	the	quantity	of	
production	 to	 its	 quality,	 and	 from	 expansion	 of	 resources	 to	 their	
reorganization.	 In	 this	attempt,	 the	machine	building	 industry	played	an	
important	 role	 because	 in	 it,	 fundamental	 scientific-technical	 ideas	
materialized.	 Automation	 in	 production	 was	 a	 key	 element	 in	 the	
development	 of	 efficiency.	 (Materialy	XXVII	 S´ezda	Kommunisticheskoi	
Partii	Sovetskogo	Soiuza	196:	93,	24–26.)
As	 the	 primary	 purpose	 of	 the	 reform,	Gorbachev	 raised	 solving	 the	




the	 stable	 development	 of	 agriculture.	 Raising	 the	 self-consciousness	 of	
farms	over	these	questions	would	have	in,	Gorbachev´s	ideology,	been	the	
creative	 adaptation	 of	 Lenin´s	 principle	 on	 food	 tax.	 (Materialy	 XXVII	
S´ezda	Kommunisticheskoi	Partii	Sovetskogo	Soiuza	196:	30–32.)




by	 local	 communities	 was	 contrary	 to	 the	 political	 guidance	 based	 on	
democratic	centralism.	Centralism	was	meant	to	ensure	the	protection	and	
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growth	of	socialist	society	in	which	all	interests	would	be	equal	and	harmful	
separatism	could	not	 lay	 roots	 in	any	area	of	 the	country.	 “Too	much	of	
localness”	was	deemed	to	be	antagonistic	to	the	general	well	being	of	people.	
Guidance	over	these	rules	thus	emphasized	the	need	to	follow	the	hierarchy	
in	every	decision.	The	 intent	was	 to	exercise	power	 in	 the	 interest	of	 the	
whole	society	so	as	to	avoid	“a	vulgar	democracy”	which	hid	anti-social	acts	
and	demagogy.	Structurally	a	socialist	society	could	not	mean	a	combination	








introduced	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 interrelations	 between	 different	 enterprises	









that	 the	 transition	 ideology	 which	 Gorbachev	 initiated,	 was	 a	 defining	




to	make	 a	distinction	between	doctrine	 and	 ideology.	The	doctrine,	 the	






discussion	 on	many	 social	 issues	 not	 dealt	 with	 before,	 set	 in	motion	 a	











of	 unsatisfactorily	 developed	 socialist	 democracy.	 The	 work	 of	 soviets,	
unions,	 the	 Komsomol and	 different	work	 collectives	was	mentioned	 as	
important	for	speeding	up	this	process.	Glasnost was	marketed	to	mean	the	
revival	 of	 the	 Leninist	 activism	 which	 denounced	 the	 earlier	 line	 of	
“government	being	a	privilege	of	a	narrow	group	of	professionals”.	Still,	the	
doctrine	of	democratic	centralism	and	the	party	as	the	leader	of	the	society	
were	 initially	 kept	 intact.	The	 emphasis	 was	 on	 ensuring	 that	 the	 local	
soviets	could	in	fact	govern	their	geographical	area,	and	be	interested	in	the	
results	of	 those	 local	 enterprises	which	were	at	 the	 same	 time	under	 the	
direction	of	higher	organs	within	the	hierarchy.	(Materialy	XXVII	S´ezda	
Kommunisticheskoi	 Partii	 Sovetskogo	 Soiuza	 196:	 55–56.)	 This	
contradiction	created	a	risk	from	the	outset.
Glasnost	 was	 connected	 to	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 later	
representational	administrations	with	the	party	position	intact.	Gorbachev	
wished	to	create	an	atmosphere	were	the	circulation	of	accurate	information	
was	 possible	 by	 relaxing	 censorship	 and	 political	 control	 of	 the	 media,	
science	and	culture.	The	purpose	was	to	increase	more	accurate	information	
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Glasnost was	 an	 attack	 on	 the	 secretive	 and	 protective	 information	
atmosphere	 in	 the	 government.	 Yet	 it	 was	 strategically	 included	 in	 the	
definition	of	pravda (truth	in	the	functional	sense	as	right	interpretation).	
Glasnost	was	officially	interpreted	to	be	the	new	basic	norm	of	Soviet	life	
which	 included	not	only	publicness	 and	accessibility	of	 information,	but	





the	 functional	 necessity	 to	 know	 about	 threats	 to	 people´s	 daily	 lives.	
(Bezuglov	&	Kriazhkov	19:	,10.)	












as	 it	 existed	 in	 the	 Soviet	Union.	A	new	aspect	 in	Gorbachev´s	political	
thinking	was	the	idea	of	learning	from	the	practice	of	other	countries	which	
had	 liberal-democratic	 traditions.	This	meant	 advancing	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	
introducing	 a	 system	 of	 checks	 and	 balances	 and	 holding	 competitive	
elections	to	secure	accountability	and	prevent	the	abuse	of	power.	A	new	
concept	of	 “socialist	 law-based	 state”	was	 founded.	The	aim	was	 a	 social	
contract	in	which	individuals	rights	were	respected	and	the	administration-
party	was	under	legal	control	(Shelley	1992:	6).	For	the	administration,	the	





of	 control	 organizations	 in	 the	 system	 of	 an	 administrative	market.	The	
hierarchy	 of	 decision	makers	 to	which	 this	 new	 idea	was	most	 essential	
included	 the	 chairman	of	 the	 committee	 for	people´s	 control,	 the	oblast 
prosecutor	 and	 the	 chairman	 of	 the	 regional	 court,	 heads	 of	 inspection	
subordinate	to	the	republican	level,	and	the	heads	of	inspection	subordinate	










pensions	 and	 other	 social	 services.	They	 also	 included	 infringements	 by	
officials	 of	 citizens´labor	 rights	 and	 illegal	 impositions	 of	 administrative	
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as	 a	 social	 goal	 was	 thus	 something	 that	 was	 contrary	 to	 the	 social	
functionality	of	the	prevailing	culture.	This	was	not	a	matter	of	“illegality”	
as	such,	it	was	merely	a	side	effect	of	the	lack	of	the	separation	of	powers.	







executive	 bureaucracy.	 For	 administrators	 this	 simultaneously	 meant	 a	
double	identity	of	professional	expertise	without	the	independence	usually	
attached	 to	 such	positions.	There	was	 limited	personal	 responsibility	 for	
policy	 issues	 since	 the	 workplace	 was	 not	 the	 primary	 place	 for	 such	
planning.	 Unintentionally,	 this	 intensified	 the	 need	 for	 monitoring	 and	
direct	control.	
Questions	 of	 legality	 collided	with	 the	 administrative	market	 in	which	
state	institutions,	formal	hierarchies	and	relations	in	them	were	mostly	non-
independent	 civil	 service	 elements	 which	 sustained	 one´s	 position	 in	 it.	
Instead	of	underlining	 laws	 and	 their	 execution	 in	 the	Soviet	 system,	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 see	 the	 administrative	 logic	 as	 one	 in	 which	 actors	 in	 the	
administrative	market	operated	so	as	to	be	able	to	redistribute	the	resources	




Both	 at	 the	 rhetorical	 and	 institutional	 level	 the	 ideological	 return	 to	
“socialist	roots”	was	 inperfect.	This	was	to	be	done	via	strenghtening	the	
role	of	the	soviets	at	the	local	level	as	legislators,	administrative	organs	of	
self-government	 and	 bodies	 overseeing	 the	 local	 work	 of	 state	 organs.	
Legislative	power	was	to	be	transferred	from	the	party	structure	(which	had	
become	administrative	by	nature)	to	the	soviets	and	to	establish	relations	of	
accountability	 and	 oversight	 between	 legislative	 and	 executive	 bodies.	
Economically,	 the	 new	 purposes	 included	 more	 industrial	 democracy	
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The	 ideological	 development	 which	 Gorbachev	 initiated	 reached	 its	
peak	during	 199–1990	 in	 the	 acceptance	 of	 freer	 elections	 at	 the	 local	
level.	Ideologically	this	period	can	be	called	“the	revolution	from	below”	
(Walker	1993).	During	this	period	the	most	significant	issue	became	that	
of	 elections	 to	 supreme	 and	 local	 soviets	 and	 the	 effective	 abolition	 of	
democratic	 centralism.	 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 eventually	 the	 ideology	 of	
administrative	 change	 was	 most	 dramatic	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 political	
administration.	The	local	representative	administration	was	given	special	
attention	in	the	ideological	reform	programs.	At	the	same	time	the	party	
became	 the	 primary	 target	 of	 reforms	 because	 this	 was	 central	 for	 the	
needed	political	and	economic	changes	to	take	place.	Yet,	Gorbachev	did	
not	 address	 the	 party	 directly.	 He	 talked	 about	 the	 side-effects	 of	 the	
administrative	 market	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 economic	 and	 representative	
administrations	and	even	the	control	administration,	but	the	party	as	such	





5.2 Structural Changes: State Building Since 1986
In	 the economic administration	 perestroika	 attempted	 to	 streamline	 the	
heavy	system.	This	led	to	several	structural	rearrangements:	1)	Concentrating	
more	power	at	the	top	as	an	attempt	to	make	coordination	more	effective.	
This	 was	 mainly	 done	 by	 creating	 bodies	 which	 coordinated	 related	
ministries.	 An	 example	 was	 the	 Bureau	 for	 Machine-Building	 which	









formal	 organizational	 changes,	 but	 amounted	mainly	 to	 changing	 party	












the	Code	 of	 Labor.	This	 gave	 the	 labor	 union	 committee	 of	 enterprises,	




labor	 union	 had	 been	 exercised	 quite	 widely	 in	 the	 Brezhnev	 era.	 For	
example	between	196–190,	approximately	50.000	officials	were	relieved	
from	their	work.	In	addition,	the	right	to	propose	the	removal	of	an	official	
was	given	 to	 inspectors	of	working	 safety	and	 to	 the	prosecutor´s	office.	
(Stavtseva	&	Nikitinski	194:	2–29.)
In	 addition	 to	 possible	 criminal	 proceedings,	 the	 violation	 of	
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In	this	context	the	policy	of	speeding	up	development,	which	took	the	
form	 of	 an	 ambitious	 five-year	 plan	 for	 196–1990,	 was	 critical	 for	 the	




central	 planning.	The	most	 fundamental	 of	 all	 economic	 changes	which	
affected	the	attainment	of	plan	goals	was	the	break	up	of	the	supply	system.	
This	was	done	by	changing	the	rules	of	enterprise	planning	and	distribution	
of	 the	 output,	 and	 by	 changing	 the	 position	 of	 the	 institutions	 which	







As	a	 side-effect	of	 the	ambitious	plan,	which	 involved	 further	 long-term	
institutional	 changes	 and	 economic	 reforms	 introduced	 from	 19	 on,	
economical	dysfunctions	grew.	(Walker	1993:103.)	
The	economical	decline	was	intertwined	in	the	regional	and	local	political	





position	 in	 planning	 and	 control	 of	 enterprises.	The	 19	 Law	 on	 State	
Enterprise	 made	 the	 directors	 in	 the	 economic	 bureaucracy	 even	 more	
independent	by	making	them	elected	rather	than	appointed.	(Freinkman	
199:	19.)
Freinkman	 (199)	 has	 described	 how	 experienced	 directors	 in	 the	
economic	 administration	 could	 opportunistically	 exploit	 the	 under-
developed	 legal	 conditions	 to	 extract	 profit.	 More	 importantly,	 the	
inconsistent	 implementation	of	economic	reforms	eroded	 the	respect	 for	
authority.	Particularly	serious	for	public	image	were	the	state	quality	control,	
campaign	 against	 unearned	 income	 and	 anti-alcohol	 campaigns.	
Experiments	 which	 were	 intended	 to	 expand	 the	 independence	 of	
enterprises	were	executed	without	the	required	budget	constraints.	This	in	




As	a	 result	of	 the	 crises	 in	 the	 economy,	 lines	 and	 shortages	were	 the	
everyday	struggle	of	the	soviet	citizens.	This	meant	that	the	consumption	
sector,	vital	for	the	popular	support	of	perestroika,	was	in	serious	trouble.	
Between	 199	 and	 1990	 the	 number	 of	 goods	which	were	 not	 delivered	
according	 to	 the	 state	 plan	 increased	 four	 times	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	
many	goods	were	traded	for	others.	As	a	result,	those	areas	which	did	not	
produce	 food	 (particularly	 the	military	 ones)	 suffered	 the	most	 and	 the	
local	authorities	started	 to	pass	 their	own	actions	 in	effort	 to	protect	 the	
interests	of	their	community.	(Lane	1992:	4–50.)	
While	 glasnost	 was	 greeted	with	 enthusiasm	 and	 used	 as	 a	means	 to	
effect	 political	 changes,	 radical	 economic	 changes	 were	 not	 welcomed.	
Radical	 economic	 changed	 would	 have	 been	 accepted	 if	 an	 immediate	
improvement	 in	 life	 was	 possible.	This	 attitude	 was	 not	 changed	 by	 the	
growing	 economical	 difficulties	 of	 the	 perestroika period.	 Even	 in	 1990	
when	the	shortages	of	goods	had	dramatically	increased,	the	idea	of	freeing	




changes	 which	 created	 the	 formal	 space	 of	 local	 representational	 and	





position	 of	 local	 government	 in	 relation	 to	 municipal	 ownership.	 The	




houses	 and	 other	 communal	 property	 from	 which	 income	 could	 be	
collected.	 Relations	with	 companies	 belonging	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	
municipality	would	be	based	on	taxation	or	contracts.	Local	taxes	could	be	
decided	 by	 the	 local	 soviet.	This	meant	 that	 the	 localities	 could	 now,	 in	
principle,	make	their	own	budgets.	In	addition,	 foreign	trade	rights	were	
given	to	local	soviets.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	363–364,	Piskotin	1993:	4–9.)	





the	 affairs	 of	 the	 economic	 sector	maintained	 it	 as	 the	 director	 of	 local	
enterprises,	making	 it	 a	 powerful	 negotiator	 against	 the	 local	 soviets.	 In	




the	 localities	 did	 not	 result	 in	 their	 growing	 autonomy.	 The	 center	
remained	the	actual	decision	maker.	Not	long	after,	a	law	in	October	1990	











different	 questions.	The	party	 organizations	did	not	 change	 soviet,	 labor	
union,	 cooperative	 or	 other	 social	 organizations,	 or	 allow	 the	mixing	 of	




legality.	 Secondly	 they	 described	 the	 duties	 of	 party	 members	 to	 act	 as	







Three	 laws	 did	 however	 contribute	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 formal	
decision	making	process	and	authority	structure	in	the	Soviet	Union.	These	










which	was	 composed	 of	 2.250	 representatives	 selected	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	





Soviet	 was	 the	 following:	 165	 industrial,	 building,	 transportation	 and	










Heads	 of	 republics	 could	 take	 part	 in	 its	 work	 with	 a	 voting	 right.	The	
emphasis	 of	 the	 work	 was	 on	 the	 economic	 infrastructure	 of	 the	 state:	
unitary	financial,	credit	and	monetary	policy	 in	all	parts	of	 the	state,	 the	
making	of	the	Union	budget,	all-union	economic	programs	and	energy	and	
transport	systems.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	360.)
The	central	 sectoral	administration	went	 through	a	cultural	 change	of	
strategies	in	the	sense	that	it	was	to	be	the	main	state	wide	structure	through	
which	a	market	economy	was	to	be	introduced	in	the	Soviet	Union.	In	this	
developing	 system	 of	 state	 decision	 making,	 the	 local	 government	 was	
going	 through	 a	 revaluation	 as	 a	 result	 of	 three	 different	 developments	
which	 Vladimir	 Gelman	 has	 named	 “the	 effects	 of	 governmental	
democratization,	federalization	and	diversification”.	These	processes	started	
during	 the	 period	 which,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 allowed	 limited	 political	





of	 electoral	 accountability	 and	 subordination	 of	 local	 bodies	 of	 decision	
making	to	the	public.	(Gelman	199:.)
Along	 with	 the	 change	 away	 from	 the	 one	 mandate	 district	 election	
system,	the	laws	concerning	elections	of	people´s	representatives	brought	
other	changes	along	with	(for	 the	first	 time	since	 the	1936	Constitution)	
unitary	 time	 limits	 of	 five	 years	 for	 the	 work	 of	 higher	 and	 lower	 level	
organizations.	 In	 terms	of	development	 toward	 the	 separation	of	powers	
and	 constitutional	 control	 over	 decision	 making,	 the	 local	 soviets	 were	
given	 the	 authority	 for	 supervision	 of	 other	 state	 organs	 and	 officials	
working	 in	 them.	Thus,	persons	who	were	members	of	 the	parallel	 local	
party	 executive	 committees	 (ispolkom),	 heads	 of	 state	 agencies,	
administration	of	party	executive	committees,	judges,	arbitrators	and	so	on,	




of	 powers.	This	meant	 a	 clear	 break	with	 the	Constitution	 of	 the	 Soviet	
Union	and	 the	beginning	of	a	 separate	administration	at	all	 levels	of	 the	
government.	In	particular,	the	head	of	the	town	administration,	who	was	in	
direct	 control	 of	 all	 departments	 and	 was	 to	 be	 elected	 by	 the	 local	
population,	became	 important.	The	confusion	over	new	roles	and	power	











power	was	 that	 the	political	 administration	 retained	 its	position	 in	 local	
affairs.	It	was	in	no	way	in	the	institutional	interests	of	the	party	officials	
and	 those	 who	 held	 nomenklatura positions	 to	 alter	 the	 foundations	 of	
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The	 diversification	 of	 local	 soviet	 work	 was	 connected	 with	 the	
developments	 of	 the	 glasnost	 policy.	 Glasnost was	 important	 for	 the	













social	development	was	 the	 limited	right	of	citizens	 to	challenge	adminis-
trators	 in	 court.	 In	 the	 19	 law,	 only	 individual	 administrators	 could	 be	
taken	to	court	even	though	in	administrative	practice	most	questions	were	
decided	collectively.	A	199	law	introduced	in	1990	gave	citizens	the	right	to	
challenge	 collective	 decisions	 and	 file	 complaints	 against	 both	 individual	
administrators	and	state	organs.	(Shelley	1992:	69,	Jordan	2000:	204.)










Gorbachev´s	 reform	 of	 the	 court	 system	 aimed	 to	 make	 it	 more	
independent	 from	 the	 political	 and	 representational	 administrations.	 A	
199	“Law	on	 the	Status	of	 Judges”	extended	 the	 tenure	of	 judges	 to	 ten	
years.	It	also	made	the	regional	level	soviet	the	selection	organ	in	order	to	
make	 the	 judges	 less	 dependent	 on	 the	 local	 administrators	 on	 social	
benefits.	The	law	established	judicial	qualification	panels	whose	staff	were	







organizations	 and	 their	 staff,	 changing	 the	 party´s	 position	 in	 the	







5.3 The Administrative Culture at the End of 
Perestroika: Dysfunctions in Place of Politically 
Controlled Bureaucratic Bargaining 
Perestroika	meant	a	transition	in	which	the	administrator	simultaneously	
the	legal,	ideological	and	material	resources	of	work	while	being	forced	to	




The TransiTion oF adminisTraTive culTure, 1986–1991
221
The	 attempt	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 manifest	 and	 latent	
administrative	 cultures	 resulted	 in	 changes	 in	 the	power	 balances	 of	 the	
administrative	 market.	 Kordonskii	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 before	 the	






meant	 that	 gossip,	 hear-say	 and	 myths	 of	 state	 realities	 typical	 of	 the	
dissident	dialect	were	introduced	in	the	state	mass	media.	At	the	same	time	
the	 political	 changes	 institutionalized	 the	 dissident	 personalities.	
(Kordonskii	2000:	12.)These	started	to	have	influence	at	all	levels	of	society	
and	in	all	administrations.	
A	 result	 was	 a	 clash	 of	 power	 holders	 in	 the	 administrative	 market.	
Christopher	Williams	has	identified	three	groups	which	contributed	to	the	
structural	difficulties	of	 the	change:	 the	political	opposition	 forces	 in	 the	
upper	echelons	of	the	party,	the	bureaucratic	opposition	of	the	ministries	
which	were	losing	their	former	role,	and	the	opposition	of	the	enterprise	
directors	 dealing	 with	 shortages	 and	 other	 practical	 problems.	 These	
problems	were	not	made	easier	by	the	public´s	fear	of	unemployment	and	





The	 de-stabilization	 of	 the	 administrative	 market	 relations	 was	 an	
unintended	administrative	side-effect	of	perestroika.	A	risk	administration	
culture	 appeared	 in	 all	 of	 the	 four	 administrations.	 Kordonskii	 has	
described	this	as	a	process	in	which	the	legalizing	of	the	unofficial	groups	
and	dialects	neutered	the	meaning	the	official	classes	had	for	administrative	
work	 and	 also	 rendered	 membership	 of	 unofficial	 groups	 unnecessary.	
(Kordonskii	2000:	1.)	Structural	changes	in	state	building	which	led	to	
the	 creation	 of	 a	 risk	 administration	 culture	 can	 be	 grouped	 into	 three	
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not	 the	 original	 goal	 of	 the	 administrative	 changes,	 the	 reforms	 did	 not	
have	a	clear	institutional	direction.	




end	 of	 the	 perestroika/glasnost	 period	 brought	 about	 mostly	 structural	
legal	 changes	 which,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 gave	 formally	 wider	 political	
participation	rights	for	Soviet	citizens.	
The	executive	committees	of	the	soviets	in	the	municipalities	received	a	




























had	 been	 done	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 correct	 the	 situation	 which	 was	 evident	
everywhere	 after	 the	 local	 elections.	 The	 normative	 regulation	 of	 the	
decision	making	organs	was	practically	non-existent	and	 the	 soviets	had	
taken	over	 the	authority	of	 the	executive	organs.	The	new	 independence	
from	the	party	meant	 tense	relations	with	 the	regional	party	committees	
which	 lead	 to	 conflicts	 at	 the	 regional	 level.	 In	 this	 situation,	 the	 first	









administration	 and	 helped	 sustain	 the	 whole	 administrative	 market,	
disappeared.	 Guidance	 of	 administrative	 work	 eroded	 as	 the	 political	
language	and	methods	of	pressure	began	to	change.	New	information,	new	
legal	 and	 economical	 rights	 created	 expectations	 while	 the	 worsening	





and	 regional)	 greatly	 affected	 the	 transition	 to	 a	market	 economy	 (or	 the	
mixed	economy,	which	was	Gorbachev´s	aim)	by	segmentation	of	the	market	
and	 –	 particularly	 –	 by	 deterring	 foreign	 investment	 in	 Russia.	 Yet	 the	
independence	 of	 the	 local	 level	 created	 negative	 side-effects.	 Particularly	
harsh	was	the	challenge	faced	by	small	and	medium	sized	company	towns.	
Their	industrial	enterprises	were	typically	very	large	and	lines	of	production	
were	 concentrated.	 When	 the	 support	 from	 the	 center	 diminished,	 the	
population	was	faced	with	complex	situations.	Moving	away	was	not	possible,	
because	at	the	time	there	was	no	housing	market.	(Hanson	1993:	20–21.)	
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The	economy	of	the	local	representational	administration	was	having	
risk	 society	 (see	Beck	1996	and	Yanitsky	1999)	 characteristics.	 It	was	 a	
semi-market,	but	without	the	market	controls	or	competition.	In	addition	
guidance	for	the	system	was	only	jus	developing	in	terms	of	its	authority	
and	unclear	 to	 the	 administrators,	who	were	 situated	 in	 the	municipal	
hierarchies.	The	 economic	 changes	 were	 piece-meal	 instead	 of	 system	
wide,	which	led	to	giving	new	rights	to	institutions	and	areas	inside	the	




reality	 though,	municipal	budgets	depended	upon	 the	planning	 system	







again	used	 in	 the	reformation	of	 the	state	 instead	of	 its	normal	 role	as	a	
guarantor	of	its	institutions.	The	idea	that	the	Constitution	was	a	measure	
of	administrative	work	appeared	in	the	Gorbachev	years.	
Perestroika	meant	 a	 rupture	 in	 the	 administrative	 culture	 in	 terms	 of	
client	relationship	in	a	manner	which	had	not	been	possible	before.	Glasnost 
set	in	a	motion	the	diversification	of	the	administration´s	clientele	on	the	
basis	of	political,	 social,	 ethnic	 and	other	 characteristics	which	was	 later	
reflected	most	vividly	at	the	regional	 level	 in	the	90´s.	From	the	point	of	
view	of	 administrative	 law,	 this	 period	 encouraged	 the	use	of	 individual	
legal	consciousness,	although	 the	practical	area	 for	 its	use	was	still	 to	be	
born.	Law	became	a	tool	for	political	changes,	instead	of	being	a	conservative	
force	 in	 the	 service	 of	 the	 state	 (Shelley	 1992:	 64).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
development	after	the	191	October	Revolution	were	repeated	in	the	reverse	
order.	The	first	step	in	the	perestroika era	program	was	reminiscent	of	the	
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of	 political	 power	 in	 the	 local	 soviets	 meant	 new	 challenges	 for	 the	



















dominated	 actual	decision	making	because	 law	was	 a	weak	 tool	 and	 the	
courts	 were	 confined	 to	 working	 under	 ministerial	 supervision.	 As	 a	
consequence,	new	risks	arose	in	the	form	of	institutional	fighting	inside	the	













to	 use	 the	 structural	weaknesses	 of	 the	 system	 to	 their	 own	 benefit	 and	
independence.	(Whitefield	1993:	0–1.)
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The	 power	 of	 the	 party,	 in	 Whitefield´s	 view,	 was	 weak	 in	 terms	 of	
economical	planning,	execution	of	decisions	at	the	local	level	and	even	in	
personnel	policy.	The	main	criteria	in	the	assessment	of	one´s	achievements	
was	 reaching	 the	 targets	 which	 were	 set	 by	 the	 ministry	 led	 economic	
system.	Ministerial	inefficiency	in	developing	its	own	working	mechanisms	
became	evident	in	the	lack	of	interest	in	using	computers	at	work.	Whitefield	
states	 that	 the	 operational	 control	 of	 state	 property	 gave	 the	ministerial	
officials	the	rights	of	property	owners.	Inside	the	ministerial	departments,	




public´s	 demand	 curve.	 (Whitefield	 1993:	 2–95,	 105.)	 Whitefield´s	
assessment	is	that	these	structural	features	were	a	major	part	of	the	obstacle	
to	change.	On	top	of	making	the	party	subordinate	to	powerful	ministries,	
laws	were,	 in	the	hierarchy	of	 legal	acts,	 less	meaningful	than	ministerial	










information	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 citizens´	 rights	 from	 any	 subjective	
expression	 in	 this	 matter,	 would	 not	 have	 developed	 well.	 (Bezuglov	 &	
Kriazhkov	19:	40–41.)	Thus	two	vital	elements	of	the	transitional	process	
–	the	need	for	legal	unity	and	local	initiative	–	frustratingly	worked	against	




through	 it	 affected	 the	 implementation	of	 changes	 is	 the	 situation	of	 the	
prosecutors	in	the	perestroika	period.	While	the	prosecutors	assumed	new	
tasks	in	the	supervision	of	unity	of	the	municipal	legality,	their	frustration	
was	 increasing.	A	 survey	of	prosecutors	 in	199	 revealed	 that	many	had	
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wanted	the	KGB	and	the	party	to	also	be	under	their	supervision.	They	also	




must	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 perestroika	 period	 did	 initiate	 a	 process	 toward	














different	 ethnic,	 religious	 and	 cultural	 groups	 was	 officially	 underlined.	
Gorbachev´s	visits	to	different	part	of	the	country	and	the	popular	street	
and	work	place	meetings	of	 the	 time	underlined	 this	 effect.	The	varying	
social	problems	of	different	areas	of	the	country	could	and	were	brought	up.	
Even	if	the	clients	of	administration	were	still	only	recipients	waiting	for	the	



















connected	 with	 the	 way	 Soviet	 citizens	 viewed	 their	 life	 and	 the	 life	 of	
“others”.	 As	 a	 strategic	 policy	 it	 was	 meant	 to	 create	 a	 more	 objective	
discussion	in	which	the	leadership	would	get	information	about	society	
directly	from	the	people.	Yet	together	with	the	economical	and	political	
decisions,	 this	 situation	 produced	 a	 particularly	 powerful	 side-effect.	
Kordonskii	has	described	the	perestroika	period	as	an	transition	towards	
the	legalization	of	dissident	thinking	(Kordonskii	2000).	That	which	used	






chosen	 to	 advance	 the	 reforms	 were	 the	 earlier	 described	 anti-alcohol	
campaign	 and	 campaign	 against	 unearned	 incomes.	 (Walker	 1993:	 10.)	







culture	 such	as	drunkenness,	 laziness	and	corruption.	Ethical	 campaigns	
coincided	with	the	general	policy	of	glasnost.	
The	 perception	which	 people	 had	 about	 the	 surrounding	 society	 and	
their	 own	 personal	 well	 being	 in	 retrospect,	 constituted	 one	 of	 the	
fundamental	 factors	 which	 effected	 the	 adaptation	 of	 Soviet	 citizens	 to	
structural	changes.	Inability	to	take	this	factor	into	consideration	led	to	a	
major	 risk	 for	 the	 leadership.	 A	 type	 of	 political	 fallacy	 had	 already	
developed	in	the	perestroika	years,	which	led	to	a	feeling	for	a	major	cultural	
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Even	as	the	ideology	before	Gorbachev´s	time	had	been	eroding	through	
latent	 criticism	and	complaints	 about	daily	problems	at	work	places,	 the	
ideology	in	certain	ways	still	had	a	powerful	cultural	meaning	for	the	Soviet	





the	mass	media	made	many	Soviet	citizens	 think	 that	 the	problems	 they	
faced	were	specific	only	to	their	city	or	region.	It	was	in	fact	a	method	of	the	













as	a	 too	short	and	politically	 ineffective	 time	 to	have	changed	any	major	
part	of	the	mature	social	system	of	the	Soviet	administration.	The	practical	
components	of	its	administrative	culture	stayed	to	a	very	large	part	intact.	










between	1990–1991	until	 the	 collapse	of	 the	Soviet	Union.	 Ideologically,	
this	 period	 was	 already	 mostly	 tactical	 maneuvering	 because	 time	 was	





state.	 Also,	 it	 answered	 to	 the	 call	 by	 many	 people	 to	 have	 stronger	
government.	The	perestroika	reforms	had	shown	the	difficulty	of	establishing	
democracy	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 because	 of	 structural-political	 reasons	
(Pursiainen	2001:	6).
The	 lack	 of	 a	 new	 Constitution	 became	more	 evident	 now,	 since	 the	
authority	 relations	between	different	power	 centers	 and	decision	makers	
was	unclear.	Glasnost	 had	meant	 that	 it	was	more	difficult	 for	 the	party	
bureaucracy	to	get	away	with	clearly	illegal	activities.	The	popular	election,	







adaptation	of	 the	 local	 level	with	various	 forms	of	 tactics	previously	not	

















of	 the	people	 to	 take	a	more	active	role	 in	 the	 local	affairs.	The	practical	
program	 for	 the	 soviets	 included	 the	 activation	 of	 open	 doors	meetings	



















side-effects	 of	 this	 was	 the	 transformation	 of	 blat	 relations	 to	 a	 more	
traditional	form	of	corruption	(comp.	Ledeneva	2000).	While	the	party	was	








of	 the	 administrative	 market	 against	 each	 other.	 As	 Walker	 (1993)	 has	
pointed	out,	the	political	and	managerial	inexperience	of	the	new	deputies	




the	 Soviet	 system	 of	 party	 bureaucratization	 was	 that	 the	 economy,	
represented	by	the	ministries,	took	over	politics	all	together.	Ministerialized	
decision	making	in	this	sense	would	be	an	unwanted	consequence	of	the	
party	 losing	 its	 power	 to	 the	 administration.	Kirkow	has	 also	 concluded	
that	one	of	the	main	problems	for	the	local	party,	was	its	lack	of	influence	














difficulties	 of	 the	 transition	 (Whitefield	 1993:25).	 This	 existing	
administrative	market	meant	that	the	perestroika	period	did	not	affect	the	
changes	 in	 the	 administrative	 behavior	 because	 there	 was	 not	 enough	
structural	support	for	the	birth	of	municipal	administration	in	the	liberal-
democratic	 sense	 of	 the	 word.	 It	 did,	 however, intensify	 bureaucratic	
competition	 at	 the	 local	 level	 because	 the	 economic	possibilities	became	
unpredictable	 and	 scarce.	 The	 dysfunctions	 together	 with	 the	 right	 to	
criticize,	led	to	gradual	shifts	in	the	power	basis	at	the	local	level.	
What	 did	 change	 drastically,	 however,	 was	 the	 attitude	 toward	 state	
authority	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 rapid	 economical	 decline	 and	 the	 changing	
policies	 of	 the	 political	 leadership.	A	major	 factor	 in	 the	 risk	 producing	
cycle	of	the	perestroika years	was	the	wasting	of	the	 loyalty	of	the	Soviet	
citizens	 to	 the	 state	 as	 a	 resource	 for	 the	 reforms.	The	 structures	which	
sustained	 this	 loyalty	 were	 diminished	 or	 even	 destroyed	 which	 led	 to	
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of	 local	 level	 actor	 groups	 in	 the	 economic	 and	 representational	












6 The Transition of Administrative 
Culture Since 1991
This	 chapter	 describes	 the	 development	 of	 administrative	 thinking	 since	
1991;	 structural	 changes	 which	 created	 a	 new	 local	 level;	 and	 the	





    
 
6.1 The Political Ideology of Administrative 
Change: From Regionalism to Conservative 
Constitutionalism in Local Administration












group	 would	 include	 those	 forces	 which	 were	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 “eastern”	






about	Russia´s	 future	as	 a	 state.	Yet,	 these	discussions	were	not	 logically	
connected	 to	 the	 way	 different	 political	 groups	 viewed	 administrative	
culture.	 Individuals	 and	 political	 groups	 involved	 in	 government	 and	





groups	 have	 supported	 the	 integration	 toward	 the	 liberal-democratic	
structures	of	the	West,	 in	which	the	state	and	society	are	in	separate	and	





social	 democratic	 thinking.	 It	 has	 advocated	 changes	 from	 below,	 anti-





business	 instead	 of	 social	 welfare.	The	 administrative	 reform	 ideas	 have	




The	 third	 group	 is	 “the	 conservative	 authoritarian	 state”	 group.	They	
have	supported	gradual	and	incremental	reform	of	the	earlier	system	from	
above	with	the	help	of	a	strong	center	and	presidential	system	of	government,	




be	 allowed.	Of	 these	 coalitions,	 the	Communist	 party	 has	 remained	 the	
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only	nationally	important	force	throughout	the	1990´s.	It	had	a	ready	model	
of	 organization	 and	 programs	 which	 were	 not	 dependent	 on	 a	 singular	
figure	head.	The	ideas	of	rule	of	 law	state	and	civil	society	were	officially	










The	 fifth	 group,	 and	 the	 only	 group	which	 has	 been	 in	 constant	 flux	
compared	to	the	relative	stability	of	the	other	four,	is	what	I	would	call	“the	
legal	 reformist	 state”	 group.	 Since	 the	mid	 1990´s	 the	 conservative	 legal	
reformist	state	line	has	been	characterized	by	the	use	of	a	leading	figurehead.	





the	 internal	 political	 confusion	 of	 the	 regionalization	 period	 in	 Russia.	
President	Eltsin´s	initial	liberal	reformist	policies	led	to	a	quick	shift	toward	






constitutional	 order	 in	 all	 parts	 of	 Russia,	 paradoxically	 sometimes	 by	
bending	 some	 of	 its	 own	 rules	 when	 necessary.	The	 state´s	 role	 in	 the	
coordination	of	legal	unity	has	been	raised	as	the	main	administrative	goal.	
Social	 concerns	 have	 again	 been	 raised,	 even	 as	 the	 economic	 side	 has	
received	the	main	attention.	Tax	collection	has	become	the	main	economic	
concern.	In	terms	of	economic	reforms,	there	has	been	an	attempt	to	gain	
back	 public	 control	 of	 economic	 development,	 even	 at	 the	 expense	 of	
democratic	processes.	








What	have	these	political	 ideas	meant?	At	 least	 they	show	that	 for	the	
most	part	of	the	1990´s	there	was	not	a	politically	thought	out	modernization	
plan	 for	 the	 state	 administration.	 The	 ideas	 of	 administrative	 change	
appeared	most	of	all	as	a	result	of	the	political	and	economic	fight	and	risks	
which	 were	 produced	 in	 this	 process.	 As	 Campbell	 has	 shown,	 in	 the	
beginning	of	the	1990´s	the	main	divisive	political	issue	among	the	different	




where	 two	 major	 and	 parallel	 developments	 of	 society	 took	 place.	The	
social,	political	 and	economic	goals	were	 in	many	ways	 conflicting.	Two	
competing	 versions	 of	 social	 change	 existed:	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	 first	
Constitution	and	 the	privatization	program.	One	of	 the	 reasons	why	 the	
Constitution	project	can	be	named	as	a	political	change	program	is	that	it	
represented	 the	 only	 serious	 official	 and	 concerted	 alternative	 vision	 to	
privatization.	The	 latter	 was	 a	 foreign	 model	 in	 which	 the	 government	
would	adapt	to	the	changed	economic	conditions	of	the	society.	
But	the	choice	between	the	Constitution	and	privatization	program	has	
more	 meaning	 than	 that.	 There	 was	 a	 competition	 for	 political	 power	
between	the	government	and	the	Duma	which	were	trying	to	sort	out	the	






Privatization	 took	 off	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 political	 reorganization	 of	








basis	 of	 the	 economic	 theory	 was	 founded	 in	 the	 belief	 of	 radical-
authoritarian	change	which	has	been	opposed	by	the	competing	theories	of	
democratic-gradual	reforms.	The	privatization	program	of	Russia	was	built	









1995.)	 Explicitly,	 the	 privatization	 program	 developers	 did	 not	 want	 to	
proceed	from	the	reformation	of	the	existing	bureaucracy.	This	was	because	
even	as	they	acknowledged	the	possibility	of	the	appearance	of	effective	and	











consultants	 themselves	 seems	 to	 indicate	 that	 the	 ideal	 was	 a	 hardened	
version	 of	 the	 British	 privatization	 policies	 of	 the	 190´s.	 Deeper	
considerations	 for	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 cultural,	 social	 or	 political	





the	 new	 Constitution	 was	 sharp.	 The	 Constitution	 had	 two	 objectives:	
institution-building	and	legal	reform	(Sharlet	1999:2).	It	set	up	practical	


















Although	 the	 new	 Constitution	 laid	 down	 the	 legal	 structures	 of	 the	
state,	 constitutionalism	as	a	principle	of	administrative	guidance	did	not	
dominate	 Russian	 administration	 for	 some	 time.	 President	 Eltsin´s	
administrative	 ideology	 was	 the	 delegation	 of	 political	 and	 economic	











administration	 has	 begun	 to	 use	 its	 own	 initiative	 to	 find	 partners	 for	
projects	 which	 has	 effected	 the	 logic	 of	 work.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 “the	
dictatorship	of	law”	side	of	this	legalism	has	meant	concentration	on	control	
as	a	means	of	policy	guidance.	Regionalism	has	been	replaced	with	legalism	
which	 requires	 political	 control	 via	 the	 centralization	 of	 policy	making.	
Building	 a	 strong	 and	 effective	 sense	 of	 state	 has	 been	 reinforced	 as	 the	
central	political	purpose	of	changes.	In	this	way,	the	re-enforcement	of	the	




In	 the	 course	 of	 the	 1990´s	 changes,	 a	 new	 and	 institutionally	 very	
important	source	of	administrative	ideology	has	emerged	in	the	form	of	the	
international	treaties	which	Russia	has	joined.	The	most	important	of	these	
include	 the	 treaty	of	 the	Council	 of	Europe	 (1993)	 and	 the	Cooperation	
with	 the	 European	Union	 (199).	 Russia´s	 interest	 in	 joining	 the	World	
Trade	 Organization	 has	 also	 played	 an	 important	 part	 in	 legal	 and	








rule	 of	 law	 state	 (e.g.	 civil	 and	 human	 rights,	 separation	 of	 powers,	
independent	legal	system,	legal	protection	of	citizenry)	and	the	formation	
of	 institutional	 authority	 for	 local	 government.	 Constitutionalism	 as	 an	
ideology	and	these	goals	come	together	as	purposes	of	change.	
For	 the	 local	 administration,	 all	 the	above	mentioned	elements	 in	 the	




the	 level	of	 transitional	purposes,	change	of	administrative	culture	at	 the	
municipal	level	is	a	transformation	process	into	a	more	authoritative	legal	
actor	–	an	administration	in	its	own	right.	
6.2 Structural Changes: State Building Since 1991
State	building	 at	 the	 local	 level	 took	place	within	 three	main	 avenues	of	
development.	Firstly,	the	legislative	and	political	developments	of	the	local	













Yet	 legislative	 reforms	 of	 the	 local	 administration	 had	 already	 started	
during	the	perestroika years.	Before	the	adoption	of	the	new	Constitution,	






state	 law.	The	 law	 gave	 superior	 bodies	 (regional	 soviets	 and	 executive	
committees)	as	well	as	the	courts	the	right	to	annul	the	decisions	of	local	





days	 of	 the	 coup	 to	 the	 legal	 center	 came	 to	 be	 a	 decisive	 factor	 in	 the	
future	 selection	 of	 leaders	 and	 staff.	 Boris	 Eltsin	 decided	 to	 protect	 the	
position	 of	 his	 government	 in	 the	 provinces	with	 the	 decree	 of	August	
1991	 (no.	 5	 “Of	 Some	 Questions	 Concerning	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	




Soviet.	A	 following	 law	 installed	 the	 institution	of	 small	 councils	 in	 the	
local	soviets,	continually	working	regional	and	territorial	(oblast and	krai)	
bodies	consisting	of	1/5	of	the	deputies	corpus.	In	an	attempt	to	increase	
the	 professional	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 soviets,	 these	 new	 bodies	 assumed	
most	of	the	authority	the	soviets	had,	excluding	budget	and	staff	decisions.	
Typical	 for	 the	 practical	 relations	 of	 the	 small	 councils	 with	 the	
administration	 was	 that	 some	 of	 the	 same	 people	 were	 found	 in	 them	
(Luchterhandt	1995:	32).
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In	these	developments,	the	“revolutionary”	local	democracy	was	replaced	









and	 economically.	 These	 word	 pairs	 included	 at	 least	 the	 following:	
reformist-pluralist,	 communist-autocrat,	 democratic-liberal.	 The	 transi-
tional	developments	made	the	accurate	use	of	these	labels	difficult	mostly	
because	 the	 new	 establishment	 formed	 in	 the	 1990	 elections	 and	 in	 the	
mayoral	 elections	 afterwards,	 and	 which	 was	 officially	 democratic	 and	
reformist,	 included	 persons	 of	 different	 political	 backgrounds	 and	 soon	
advocated	strong	executive	rule	(Campbell	1992:	211–212).	
The	August	coup	of	1991	signified	a	final	 turning	point	 in	 the	center-
regional-local	relations.	In	comparison	with	other	former	socialist	countries,	
former	members	 of	 the	 party	 stayed	 in	 their	 positions,	 even	 though	 the	
formal	 organizational	 guidance	 and	 planning	 system	 was	 gone.	 In	 the	
politically	 turbulent	 times,	 the	 central	 government	 concentrated	 on	
consolidation	of	its	own	political	power	in	the	regions.	The	naming	of	the	
head	of	 administration,	 the	 institution	of	presidential	 representative	 and	
the	tight	control	of	economic	processes	served	the	same	political	purposes	
of	preventing	the	independence	of	regions	and	stopping	the	provinces	from	











executive	 committees,	 reorganize	 these	 departments	 and	 veto	 their	
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decisions.	 Yet,	 the	 representative	 was	 not	 to	 interfere	 in	 local	 decision	
making	or	issue	orders	for	a	certain	territory.	(Sakwa	1996:12.)	
In	a	 sense	and	 in	comparison	with	 the	Soviet	 system,	 the	presidential	
representative	 replaced	 the	 oblast	 level	 first	 secretary,	 although	 his	
jurisdiction	was	more	limited	and	he	did	not	take	part	in	local	level	decision	
making.	 Similarly	 the	 representative	 supplemented	 the	 authority	 of	 the	
prosecutor´s	office	which	was	to	be	less	political	in	the	future.	Yet	his	post	
was	not	only	 to	be	an	official	controller	of	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	regional	
decisions	 but	 also	 to	 see	 that	 the	 government´s	 economic	 policies	 were	
carried	 through	 in	 the	 intended	 way.	 In	 this	 capacity,	 the	 presidential	









was	 less	 traditionally	 political	 and	 more	 institutional.	This	 was	 so,	 for	
example,	in	defining	authority	limits,	economic	relations	and	the	political	
guidance	 of	 developments	 between	 institutions,	 rather	 than	 defining	 a	
clear	political	line	of	“democracy”,	“reformist	western	line”	or	other	such	
thing.	 In	 addition,	 the	 picture	 was	 confused	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 persons	
representing	 “anti-western”	 blocks	 and	more	 conservative	 views	 did,	 in	
many	cases,	oppose	 the	strong	executive	rule	 in	 favor	of	elected	organs.	
(Campbell	1992:	212.)
In	 March	 1992,	 just	 before	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 Federative	 Treaty,	 the	
parliament	accepted	a	law	concerning	“The	District,	County	Soviet	and	the	
District,	County	Administration”.	This	ordered	the	double	subordination	of	
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In	 1993	 a	 decree	 was	 passed	 on	 October	 2	 governing	 the	 election	
regulations	and	the	formations	of	legislative	bodies.	The	regions	were	given	
a	right	 to	make	decisions	on	 these	questions	at	 the	regional	 (oblast)	and	
town	 levels	 in	 line	 with	 the	 general	 regulations.	 The	 officials	 from	 the	
administration	 could	 now	 take	 part	 in	 the	 elections,	 and	 stay	 in	 their	
positions	if	elected.	(Gelman	199:	9.)
According	 to	 Vladimir	 Gelman´s	 analysis	 the	 most	 notable	 of	 these	
changes	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 administration	 were	 at	 least	 the	
following:	
•	 the	 right	 to	 combine	 the	 works	 in	 legislative	 and	 administrative	
bodies,
•	 hierarchical	subordination	of	the	executive	power	and	the	inability	













The	 early	 years	 of	 the	 1990´s	 gave	 birth	 to	 a	 local	 level	 which	 was	














of	 the	 federation.	 Of	 the	 9	 subjects	 two	 are	 cities	 (Moscow	 and	 St.	




which	 have	 been	 accepted	 by	 representative	 organs	 of	 the	 subject.	The	









government	 includes	 the	 federal	government,	 the	co-operational	or	 joint	
government	of	the	Russian	Federation	and	the	subjects	of	the	federation,	











before	 a	 court	 decision.	The	use	 of	 presidential	 decrees	 (ukazy)	 and	 the	
policy	of	“dictatorship	of	law”	show	that	this	position	is	a	cornerstone	of	the	
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present	Russian	presidency,	although	 it	 involves	aspects	which	can	be	 in	
contradiction	with	 the	 separation	 of	 powers.	The	President	 has	 his	 own	





as	 they	 were	 before	 the	 Constitution.	 Ministries	 are	 director-led	
organizations,	 of	 which	 the	 so-called	 power	 ministries	 (at	 present	 the	






became	 a	 branch	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Economic	 development	 and	 Trade.	




in	 Russia.	 The	 Supreme	 Constitutional	 Court	 decides	 whether	 the	
regulations	of	a	lower	administrative	body	or	the	ministry	are	right.	
Before	 the	2004	reforms,	 the	 federal	 level	had	a	multitude	of	different	
committees,	 commissions	 and	 federal	 agencies	 which	were	 independent	
expert	organizations	and	which	were	in	existence	during	the	Soviet	period.	






metrologii:	 Pravilo	 po	 provedeniiu	 sertifikatsii	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii,	
utverzdeni	postonovleniem	Gosstandardta	Rossii	ot	10.5.2000,	No	26.)
In	 the	 subjects	 there	 are	 central	 administration	 organs	 and	 agencies	
which	are	 extensions	of	 their	parent	organizations.	 In	 addition	 there	 are	
“joint	administration”	organizations	which,	according	to	the	Constitution,	
are	cooperative	organizations	of	the	subject	and	the	state.	An	example	is	the	
Department	of	 the	Ministry	of	 Internal	Affairs	 in	 the	St.	Petersburg	and	
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Leningrad	 area.	The	 structure	 and	 functions	 of	 these	 organizations	 are	
regulated	via	a	contract	between	the	state	and	the	subject.	











The	 public	 administrations	 of	 the	 federal	 subjects	 have	many	matters	
which	are	decided	upon	jointly	by	the	state	and	the	subjects.	The	federal	
level	enacts	the	basic	legislation	and	the	subjects	add	to	it	its	own	regulations	









and	 federal	 laws	 serve	as	 the	basis	of	 local	decision	making.	Within	 this	
level,	the	ukazes	or	decrees	of	the	President	(which	according	to	law	should	
not	contradict	the	Constitution	or	federal	laws)	form	the	third	important	
source	 of	 normative	 regulation.	 (Dimitrieva	 2000:	 6–2.)	 The	 early	
transition	 period	 in	 particular,	 up	 till	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 present	 1993	
Constitution	when	 normal	 legislative	work	was	 seriously	 disrupted,	 saw	
many	 such	 presidential	 orders	 by	 which	 major	 structural	 changes	 were	
enacted.	
The	Constitution	is	not	exhaustive	in	its	character.	It	is	specified	by	other	
federal	 laws,	of	which	 the	Civil	Code	 is	among	 the	most	 important.	The	
Civil	Code	reveals	for	instance	the	content	of	property	rights.	(Tolonen	and	
Topornin	 2001:19.)	 In	 the	 group	 of	 federal	 laws	 which	 specify	 the	
Constitution	there	are	three	types	of	legislative	acts.	Firstly	there	are	federal	






found.	Firstly,	 the	Constitutions	of	 republics	 and	charters	of	other	 lower	
level	subjects	defining	the	meaning	and	jurisdiction	of	local	self-government.	
Second,	 there	 exist	 laws	 of	 different	 levels	 of	 subjects	 concerning	 the	
organization	 of	 local	 self-government,	 which	 are	 followed	 by	 local	
regulations	 about	 the	 most	 important	 legal	 relations	 in	 municipalities.	
Finally,	there	are	the	regulations	of	different	institutions	such	as	the	decisions	





Council	 of	 the	 Federal	 Assembly	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation”.	 The	 first	




the	 President.	 Their	 relations	 changed	 from	 merely	 administrative	 to	





decision	making	 powers.	This	 power	 has	 in	 fact	 been	 put	 to	 use	 by	 the	








exerted	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 influence	 and	 direct	 decision	making	
power	over	communities	in	its	role	as	a	mediator	between	state	and	local	
interests.	At	the	local	level,	the	region	(subject)	has	represented	the	state.	











at	 their	 own	 discretion.	 The	 local	 organs	 can	 be	 given	 particular	 state	
authorities	with	material	and	financial	resources	to	accomplish	given	tasks.	








is	 separately	mentioned	 that	 the	 use	 and	 protection	 of	 land	 and	 natural	





resources,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 administrative	 legislation	 concerning	 ecology.	







has	the	right	to	enact	 its	own	local	 laws	and	rules	 in	accordance	with	its	
own	charter.	In	the	charter	the	following	issues	are	regulated:
•	 definition	 for	 local	 self-government,	 its	 territorial	 and	 legislative	
base,	including	local	constitutions









(Federal´nyi	 zakon	 ob	 obshchikh	 printsipakh	 organizatsii	 mestnogo	
samoupravleniia	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii,	12.	avgusta	1995/26.noiabraia	1996	
i	1.	marta	199.)
A	 federal	 program	 of	 state	 support	 for	 local	 self-government	 was	 also	
launched	the	same	year	with	a	governmental	decree.	Its	aim	was	to	help	the	
transition	 from	 the	 centrally	 led	 system	 to	 a	 more	 independent	 local	
government.	Attention	was	given	to	the	qualifications	of	the	administrative	
work	 force,	 the	 separation	 of	 state	 and	 local	 funds,	 the	 role	 of	 local	
communities	 in	 the	privatization	of	municipal	property	 and	 the	 right	of	
localities	 to	 allocate	 land.	 (Postonovlenie	 o	 federalnoi	 programme	




law,	 diversification	 of	 the	 formations	 and	 authorities	 of	 the	 local	 level	
appeared.	 According	 to	 the	 analysis	 made	 by	 the	 Central	 Election	
Commission	of	the	Russian	Federation,	there	were	several	points	in	which	
the	 approximately	 13.300	 (by	 1st	 of	 June	 199)	 local	 governments	 have	
differed	significantly.	These	included:
•	 The	enactment	of	the	charters	which	had	usually	been	done	by	the	
representative	 organ,	 but	 in	 the	 case	 of	 16	 subjects	 by	 way	 of	
referendum	 (for	 instance	 the	 oblast	 of	 Murmansk,Leningrad,	
Arkhangel,	Saratov	and	Sverdlovsk).
•	 The	city	district	level	in	the	bigger	towns	and	cities	of	regional	and	
federal	 significance	has	 in	 some	 cases	had	 its	 own	 legislative	 (e.g.	
Murmansk),	 and	 administrative	 organs	 and	 in	 other	 cases	 a	 city	
district	has	been	subordinated	to	the	elected	mayor.	
•	 The	 heads	 of	 administrations	 have	 either	 been	 elected	 in	 direct	
elections	 or	 chosen	 by	 the	 assembly	 among	 its	members	 (e.g.	 the	






The	 legislature	 in	 some	areas	has	 included	 in	 local	 self-government	only	
major	 cities	 and	 rural	 districts	 (for	 instance	 the	 Ulianovskaia	 and	













to	 the	 local	 level	 being	more	 acutely	 dependent	 on	 the	 regional	 head	of	











political	 culture.	 This	 has	 created	 different	 types	 of	 new	 regional	 elite	
combinations	 in	different	parts	of	 the	 country.	The	general	development	
was	toward	a	regional	identity	which	placed	the	dependency	on	the	financial,	
economic	 and	 political	 influence	 of	 the	 center.	There	was	 a	 tendency	 to	
build	elite	formations	which	were	not	based	solely	on	political	and	economic	
factors	but	also	on	ideological	and	philosophical	grounds	to	find	common	
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disproportionate	 sharing	 of	 power	 between	 the	 assembly	 and	 the	
administration,	 the	 strong	 nomenklatura	 background	 of	 the	 assembly	
which	 depended	 on	 the	 regional	 leadership,	 and	 the	 election	 of	 the	
municipal	 head	 by	 the	 assembly	 based	 on	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	
administration.	Second,	there	were	the	financial	measures	which	included	
the	continual	dependency	of	the	budget	of	the	municipal	administrations	
on	 the	 budget	 laws	 of	 higher	 levels	 of	 government.	 (Podovzhniaia	 199:	
156.)




comparatively	 weak	 council.	The	 mayor	 also	 performs	 the	 role	 of	 both	
advocate	and	 lobbyist	of	his	community	at	 the	regional	 level	where	state	
funds	have	been	allocated	to	a	large	extent	according	to	its	own	preferences	










compete	 with	 each	 other.	 In	 one	 town	 there	 can	 exist	 two	 or	 three	
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organizations	to	which	only	a	part	of	the	administrative	organs	of	the	town	





of	 local	 self-government	 and	 by	 strengthening	 the	 positions	 of	 the	
presidential	 representatives.	 Paradoxically	 it	 is	 the	 negative	 phenomena	
that	have	been	brought	to	the	regional	and	local	levels	through	democratic	




pressure	 on	 the	 opposition	 and	 so	 on,	 have	 not	 disappeared.	 (Gelman	
199:101–102.)	
The	 regionalization	 period,	 although	 essentially	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	











of	 the	 local	 administrative	market	 and	 the	 center	 were	marked	 by	 the	




former	 economic	 administration	 had	 several	 consequences	 for	 state	
building.	
The	political	and	economic	liberalization	in	the	period	1990–1992	gave	
the	 local	 level	 a	 fundamentally	 different	 role.	This	 included	 several	 new	
rights:	 municipal	 ownership,	 more	 independence	 in	 environmental	
monitoring	and	land	issues,	right	to	set	up	enterprises,	take	part	in	financial	
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relations	 and	 have	 foreign	 economic	 contacts.	 In	 addition,	 the	 local	







properties	 (1991).	 The	 law	 on	 privatization	 of	 municipal	 property	 was	
subsequently	renewed	in	2001.	(Sokolova	2003:	21,	25.)
In	 principle	 there	 existed	 the	 opportunity	 for	 purely	 local	 decision	
making	which	was	separate	from	the	state´s	collective	aim	and	structure.	
The	 actual	 developments	 of	 local	 self-government	 were	 complicated	 by	
many	 practical	 problems,	 one	 of	 which	 was	 the	 financial	 relationship	
between	 the	 local	 level	 and	 the	 regional	 level.	The	 perestroika	 era	 laws	
imposed	 restrictions	 on	 the	 way	 the	 municipal	 soviets	 of	 regionally	
important	 towns	 could	 raise	 funds.	The	 annual	 budgets	 of	 the	 regional	
bodies	 (territories	 and	 regions)	were	 drawn	by	 them	 independently	 and	
approved	by	the	appropriate	soviets,	thus	leaving	the	local	level	outside	of	
this	 decision	 making	 process	 which	 greatly	 affected	 its	 options	 in	 the	
coming	 year.	 One	 conflict	 of	 interest	 issue	 was	 the	 transfer	 of	 old	 state	
property	to	municipal	ownership	which	the	regional	level	had	the	right	to	




taxes	were	 given	 a	 low	priority	 in	 the	 shock	 therapy	period	 of	 the	 early	
1990´s.	The	 return	 to	 the	 realities	 of	 running	 a	 state	 were	 given	 more	







areas	according	 to	 their	“donor”	or	“receiver”	status.	 In	effect,	 this	 status	
depended	on	definitions	of	what	was	included	in	calculations	and	what	was	
left	out	(Sakwa	2000:	1.)	




was	 the	difference	 in	proportion	of	 tax	 revenues	which	 the	 region	could	
retain.	The	differences	have	 been	 seen	 as	 results	 of	 several	 factors.	 First,	
there	were	results	of	the	above	mentioned	negotiations	between	the	region	




The	 often	 emphasized	 negotiations	 mean	 that	 the	 outcome	 has	 been	
claimed	to	depend	on	either	the	real	need	of	the	area,	or	the	political	power	
of	the	leadership,	or	the	center´s	will	to	secure	support	in	that	area.	However,	







The	 Gaidar	 program	 of	 restructuring	 the	 economic	 market	 was,	 in	
essence,	 the	 following:	 first,	 reducing	 drastically	 the	 state	 expenses	 in	
different	 social	 services	 and	 delegating	 budgetary	 expenses	 to	 the	 lower	
levels	at	regions	and	municipalities.	In	addition,	subsiding	ineffective	state	
industry	 to	 be	 stopped	 and	 firms	 forced	 to	 find	 other	market	 solutions.	









to	 fund	 public	 expenditure	 on	 such	 important	 services	 as	 construction,	
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areas	 can	 be	 as	 high	 as	 45	%	 and	 25%	 in	 small	 towns.	The	 transitional	
economic	difficulties	faced	by	many	of	the	so	called	company	towns	(a	town	
built	mainly	around	one	major	 factory	or	 industrial	plant),	 as	well	 as	by	
agricultural	 enterprises,	 have	 greatly	 increased	 the	 burden	 of	 local	











the	presidential	 representatives	 could	not	guide	 the	developments	which	
were	largely	in	the	hands	of	regional	elites.	(Hanson	1993:	29–30.)	Moreover,	
as	 Richard	 Sakwa	 has	 noted,	 the	 economic	 reforms	 at	 the	 center	 of	 the	
transition	were	not	carried	out	particularly	successfully	by	local	authorities.	
Instead,	 the	 main	 initiatives	 came	 from	 local	 enterpreneurs	 and	 from	
Eltsin´s	 government	 in	 Moscow.	 (Sakwa	 1996:	 196.)	 Politically	 these	
conditions	 set	 the	 local	 level	 and	 the	 central	 government	 into	 opposing	
positions	and	undermined	support	for	the	transition	itself.	
According	 Beth	 Mitchneck´s	 analysis	 of	 budgetary	 reforms	 of	 local	
government	 in	 Russia	 between	 1991–1995,	 the	 local	 level	 was	 in	 a	




the	 fact	 that	 between	 1992	 and	 1993	members	 of	 the	 elected	 assemblies	
reviewed	 the	 planned	 budgets	 and	 often	made	meaningful	 changes	 to	 it	
when	they	did	not	consider	the	budgets	to	meet	the	local	needs.	The	crisis	
of	 1993	 meant,	 however,	 that	 fiscal	 accountability	 was	 lost.	 When	 the	
assemblies	returned	to	work	after	the	elections,	the	culture	of	public	review	
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to	slash	the	wages	of	federal	budgetary	workers	and	close	down	industry	
units	which	 could	 not	 be	 expected	 to	 produce	 profits	 for	 some	 time.	 In	
addition,	 state	 property	 was	 often	 sold	 at	 a	 low	 price	 in	 legally	 unclear	





In	 essence	 elite	 bargaining	 meant	 replacing	 formal	 institutions	 and	
bureaucratic	 mechanism	 in	 favor	 of	 negotiations	 between	 agents	 of	 the	
central	government	and	a	new	forming	financial	elite.	In	the	administrative	
market,	 new	mechanisms	 appeared	 in	 the	 negotiations	 of	 the	 economic	
elite:	insider	trading,	debt-swapping	and	short-term	credits.	These	method	





obligations	 to	 the	 central	 authorities	 were	 reduced.	 Some	 regions	 were	
exempt	 from	 paying	 federal	 taxes	 all	 together	 for	 some	 years	 (such	 as	






from	 local	 companies	 has	 sometimes	 been	 considerable,	 for	 instance	 in	






regions	 it	 was	 politically	 important	 to	 have	 good	 connections	 with	 the	
changing	 prime	 ministers	 of	 the	 time	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 more	 federal	
financing.	In	the	economic	sector	beyond	the	state	budget,	new	economic	
and	 politically	 influential	 elites	 emerged.	 These	 included	 managers	 of	
former	 state	 owned	 enterprises,	 new	 businessmen,	 small	 and	 medium	
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unofficial	network	 traditions,	needed	 to	be	 replaced	with	new	structures	
which	were	only	in	the	making.	Meanwhile,	some	of	the	major	administrative	






process	 in	 the	 administrative	 culture	 which	 was	 going	 through	 a	major	
transition.	Alena	Ledeneva	has	concluded	that:	“	The	formal	structures	not	
only	 restrict	 but	 also	 enable	 informal	practices,	while	 informal	practices	
not	 only	 subvert	 but	 also	 function	 to	 support	 and	 sustain	 the	 formal	






What	has	blat/corruption	meant	 in	the	 latest	 transition?	At	 the	macro	
level,	 contacts	 and	 their	 unofficial	 (extralegal)	 use	 has	 meant	 creating	
opportunities	 to	 invest.	 Access	 to	 administrative	 decision	 making	 and	
information	is	used	to	provide	a	basis	for	business	and	trading.	Unofficial,	













world	 of	 unofficial	 practices.	 As	 a	 result,	 what	 used	 to	 be	 a	 matter	 of	
unofficial	 arrangements	 and	 debts	 of	 gratitude,	 became	 direct	 bribery.	
Bribery	 has	 often	 taken	 the	 form	 of	 expensive	 presents	 or	 business/
professional	 opportunities.	 Particularly	 at	 the	macro	 level,	 an	 important	
development	of	corruption	has	been	the	merger	of	state	and	market	sectors	
in	the	so	called	nomenklatura	business	in	which	officials	receive	access	to	
private	 resources.	 At	 the	 local	 and	 regional	 administrative	 levels,	 the	
arrangements	 led	 to	 the	 spread	 of	 barter,	 anti-bankruptcy	 alliances,	
“authorised”	 business	 structures	 and	 “problem	 solving”	 services	 through	
informal	channels	in	the	local	and	regional	authorities,	tax	inspection	and	
coercive	institutions.	Informal	arrangements	have	been	made	at	the	local	




















income	 of	 the	 municipalities	 includes	 sales	 profit	 from	 the	 municipal	
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without	 the	status	of	a	 legal	person,	a	part	of	 the	 income	 tax	of	physical	
persons	 and	 a	 part	 of	 the	 value	 added	 tax	 of	 domestic	 production.	
(Federal´nyi	zakon	o	financovykh	osnovakh	mestnogo	samoupravleniia	v	
Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	199.)	
Local	 income	 also	 includes	 federal	 and	 regional	 taxes	 and	 payments	




factors	 such	as	 the	 share	of	 school	 age	 children	and	pensioners,	 and	 the	
geographical	 size	 of	 the	 municipality.	 (Federal´nyi	 zakon	 o	 financovih	
osnovah	mestnogo	samoupravleniia	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	199.)	A	large	
part	of	 the	municipal	 tasks	are,	 in	practice,	state	functions	which	receive	










In	 the	 regional-local	 relations	 a	multitude	 of	 side-effects	 of	 the	 fiscal	
crises	and	break	up	of	institutional	practices	were	felt.	One	result	was	the	
reluctance	of	the	regional	level	to	trust	to	the	local	level	financing	services	
because	 of	 control	 problems.	 The	 financial	 situation	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
internalized	norms	of	good	governance	lead	to	the	strengthening	of	existing	
nepotism	and	corruption	as	means	to	desired	ends.	(Gribanova	2001.)
By	 199,	 the	 debt-swapping	 practice	 was	 forbidden	 by	 a	 presidential	
decree.	As	a	reaction	to	the	continuing	risks	felt	in	the	budgetary	sphere	of	
the	state	and	side-effects	of	the	fiscal	irregularities,	a	Temporary	Emergency	
Committee	 on	 Tax	 and	 Budgetary	 Discipline	 was	 organized	 by	 the	
government.	 Its	 task	was	 to	demand	 immediate	 tax	payment	 from	firms	
and	encourage	citizens	to	duly	pay	their	income	taxes.	(Easter	2000:	310.)
The	 former	 administrative	 market	 went	 through	 a	 great	 structural	
transition	in	the	following	changes	to	the	authority	of	local	organs.	In	the	
background	 to	 the	 changes	 in	municipalities,	 the	 economic	 bureaucracy	






fighting	 for	 economic	 power	 which	 took	 place	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 society.	
Institutionally	at	stake	was	the	future	political	decision	making	power	 in	
Russia.	 (Sutela	 199.)	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 administrative	 market	 was	
restructuring	itself	while	its	different	levels	received	new	authority	positions	








in	 ecological	 questions	 involving	 the	 sale	 of	 natural	 resources	 or	 the	
prevention	of	pollution.	The	same	problem	concerns	the	areas	of	social	and	
educational	services,	which	in	every	case	are	locally	administered.	
Even	 as	 the	 economic	 transition	 has	 been	 implemented	 slowly	 at	 the	
local	level	and	the	re-centralization	to	the	federal	and	regional	level	have	
reduced	 the	 impact	of	 the	 taken	measures,	new	 instruments	 in	 the	fiscal	
policies	 of	 the	 local	 level	 can	 be	 found.	 There	 was	 increased	 local	
responsibility	for	general	tax	policy	and	tax	collection.	The	right	of	the	local	
level	 to	 levy	minor	 taxes	and	 fees	going	directly	 into	 its	own	budget	has	





enterprises	 and	 all	 government	 levels	 were	 increasing.	This	 led	 in	 turn	
towards	 re-centralization	by	 the	 cities,	who	unified	district	budgets	with	
their	own,	and	the	federal	level	also	trying	to	tighten	control	to	reduce	its	
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and	production	 levels	were	dropping.	The	cost	of	 living	 increased	 twelve	
times	 from	March	1991	 to	March	1992.	The	result	of	 this	picture	can	be	
seen	 in	 the	 first	 elections	 after	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 in	 1993.	 (Williams	
1996:11.)
At	the	same	time,	in	the	last	part	of	the	90´s,	the	regionalist	developments	





the	 competence	 and	 duties	 of	 federal	 and	 regional	 powers.	This	 did	 not	
necessarily	 create	 more	 local	 democracy	 but	 helped	 the	 formations	 of	
regional	 elites	who	used	 the	 legislative	 and	administrative	powers	of	 the	
regions	to	install	political	and	informational	monopolies	and	to	financially	
bind	the	local	self-government.	(Abdurakhimov	199:	149–150.)
A	 culturally	 negative	 impact	 has	 influenced	 which	 different	 group	
interests	 have	had	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 regions.	Their	 interests	 have	 in	 some	
cases	had	a	criminal	or	at	least	a	legally	uncertain	and	unorganized	nature	






different	 actors	 at	 that	 local	 level.	There	 was	 a	 great	 uncertainty	 of	 the	
practical	decision	makers	as	to	what	the	limits	of	power	at	the	local	level	
were.	 (Komitet	 gosudarstvennoi	 dumi	 po	 voprosam	 mestnogo	 samou-
pravleniia,	Vestnik	1996.)
The	 Federative	 Treaty	 of	 March	 31	 1992	 was	 a	 significant	 legislative	
turning	point	in	the	development	of	regional	authority.	It	gave	the	status	of	
“subject	of	the	federation”	not	only	to	the	republics	themselves	but	to	lower	
level	 areas	 such	 as	 territories,	 regions	 and	 areas,	which	had	 earlier	 been	
ordinary	 administrative-territorial	 units	 of	 local	 bodies.	This	 also	meant	
that	 the	 self-government	 of	 these	 geographical	 areas	 was	 in	 the	 joint	
competence	of	 them	and	 the	 state	of	 the	Russian	Federation.	This	was	 a	
change	from	the	Russian	Law	of	July	1991	which	did	not	add	anything	new	
to	 the	 powers	 of	 regions.	 (Piskotin	 1993:	 3–4.)	 The	 treaty	 favored	
economically	the	ethnic	republics.	These	obtained	the	right	to	master	and	
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sell	 the	mineral	 resources	 of	 their	 areas.	They	 also	 received	 the	 right	 of	










of	 a	 weak	 legal	 basis,	 unclear	 hierarchy	 of	 decision	making	 and	 lack	 of	
qualified	staff	to	work	in	the	rapidly	changing	environment,	among	other	
things,	led	to	a	situation	where	different	subjects	tried	to	consolidate	their	
authority	 by	 alternative	 routes	 which	 were	 sometimes	 vague	 in	 their	
constitutional	character.	An	example	was	the	mutual	contracts	between	the	
center	and	a	region.	(Adukhov	1996:	113–114.)	These	contracts	which	have	





The	 right	 for	 the	 regional	 and	 local	 levels	 to	 form	 their	 own	 charters	
(ustav)	which	determine	their	authority	and	mutual	relations	with	the	center	
created	 many	 side-effects.	 Over	 half	 of	 the	 9	 charters	 contradicted	 the	
federal	 Constitution.	 Some	 subject	 constitutions	 claimed	 rights	 which	
breached	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 between	 subjects.	 (Sakwa	 2000:16.)	 In	
practice	the	process	of	approval	of	these	papers	was	stopped	at	the	central	
level	where	it	was	the	Ministry	of	Justice´s	task	to	go	through	them.	One	of	




At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 remained	 weak	 points	 which	 slowed	 down	 the	
turning	of	this	procedural	freedom	into	a	reliable	system	of	democratic	and	
independent	decision	making.	One	of	 these	 is	 the	process	of	developing	
regional	legislation	about	local	self-government	which	has	not	progressed	
particularly	rapidly	or	easily.	By	199,	the	fragmentation	of	legal	space	had	






local	 self-government.	 In	 some	 regions	 the	 local	 self-government	 had	
been	 transferred	 to	 the	 local	 state	 administration	 –	 in	 violation	 of	 the	
Constitution	(for	instance	Tatarstan,	Yakutia,	Bashkortostan	and	others).	
Based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Justice,	 there	 were	 only	 four	
subjects	 (of	 a	 total	 6)	 whose	 regional	 legislation	 about	 local	 self-
government	 was	 strictly	 consistent	 with	 the	 Constitution.	 Typical	
violations	 of	 local	 self-government	 were	 the	 effort	 to	 form	 the	 whole	
structure	 and	organization	of	 activity	 of	 local	 government	 from	 the	 top,	
violation	of	the	rules	of	elections,	and	the	poor	level	of	public	organization	
of	the	local	government.	Understandably,	the	problems	were	bigger	in	small	





of	 the	 President,	 the	 latter	 of	 which	 dominated	 legislative	 work	 in	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 90´s.	 Institutional	 administrative	 instructions	 and	
regulations	form	an	important	way	of	communication	inside	organizations.	
Federal	 laws	 have	 remained	 general	 in	 nature	 and	 thus	 their	 actual	
implementation	has	been	guided	with	sectoral	rules	(i.e.	a	ministry´s	own	
legal	acts)	and	administrative	acts	of	the	implementing	organization.	




institution,	 new	 courts	 have	 been	 established,	 courts	 have	 the	 power	 of	
judicial	review	which	did	not	exist	in	the	Soviet	period	(Jordan	2000:194)	
and	 legal	 consciousness	 has	 gained	 the	 importance	 it	 has	 in	 the	 liberal-
democratic	model.
The	Constitution	and	the	federal	law	“On	the	Constitutional	Court”	in	
1994	 made	 the	 court	 a	 19	 member	 organ	 which	 is	 nominated	 by	 the	
Federation	Council.	Its	task	is	to	review	legislative	acts,	including	orders	of	
the	President,	federal	 laws,	republican	Constitutions,	and	treaties	of	both	
national	 and	 subject	 levels.	The	 court	 could	 not	 initiate	 a	 review	 of	 the	
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constitutionality	 of	 the	 government´s	 actions	 in	 implementation.	This	 is	
the	task	of	courts	in	general	jurisdiction	which	the	Supreme	Court	heads.	




The	Constitutional	Court	 is	 important	 from	the	point	of	view	of	 local	
officials	 because	 in	 certain	 areas	 of	 Russian	 law,	 for	 instance	 that	which	
concerns	the	freedom	of	movement,	the	Court	has	often	ruled	against	the	
local	organs.	An	example	is	the	residence	permit	(propiska)	which	has	been	
demanded	 by	Moscow	 city	 to	 prevent	 uncontrollable	migration	 into	 the	
city.	Yet,	 the	problem	of	 the	90´s	which	 still	 continues	 is	 the	 inability	 to	
secure	 enforcement	 of	 decisions.	 (Jordan	 2000:	 19.)	 The	 Constitution	
court	 has	 also	 proved	 its	 usefulness	 in	 the	 protection	 of	 constitutional	







has	 favored	 a	 diffusion	 of	 constitutional	 control	 by	 directing	 the	 lower	











foreign	 companies),	 cases	 involving	 decisions	 by	 authorities.	 The	
consolidation	 of	 the	 arbitration	 court	 system	 as	 an	 independent	 body	
started	 in	1991.	This	was	with	a	 resolution	by	 the	Supreme	Soviet	of	 the	
Russian	 Federation	 which	 abolished	 all	 previous	 arbitration	 bodies	 and	
similar	 systems	 in	 the	government.	 Judicial	proceedings	about	economic	















the	 prosecutor	 worked	 in	 the	 self-conflictual	 role	 of	 being	 the	 general	
controller	of	legality,	while	at	the	same	time	that	of	the	criminal	investigator	
and	court	prosecutor.	At	the	time	of	the	drafting	of	the	new	Constitution,	
two	main	positions	 existed	 concerning	 the	 future	 role	of	 the	prosecutor.	
The	first	wanted	to	keep	the	office	strong	and	centralized	with	many	official	
tasks.	The	second	wanted	 to	 scale	down	 its	authority	and	strengthen	 the	
courts.	The	 prosecutor´s	 office	 itself	 saw	 the	 courts	 as	 having	 too	 little	








the	 court	 serves	 as	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 organizational	 learning	 in	
administrative	 transition.	 In	1992	 “Law	on	 the	Status	of	 Judges”	and	 the	
Constitution	 itself	 defined	 the	 role	 and	 authority	 of	 judges.	 Higher	













one	 administrative	 law	 which	 would	 dictate	 the	 procedural	 behavior	 of	
officials,	 different	 laws	 need	 to	 be	 looked	 at	 together.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	
Constitution,	 the	Civil	 Code	 (Grazhdanskii kodeks	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii	




The	 rulings	 of	 the	Constitutional	Court	 can	 be	 included	 as	 legal	 acts	
which	are	a	part	of	the	legal	basis	of	local	level	decision	making.	Presently,	
this	 legal	 basis	 also	 includes	 the	Constitution	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	
federal	 laws,	 special	 laws	 on	 local	 self-government	 and	 federal	 decrees.	
(Sokolova	2003:	6–9.)	
The	 Civil	 Code	 has	 been	 complemented	 by	 the	 Federal	 Law	 about	






obzhalovanii	 v	 sud	 deistvii	 i	 reshenii	 narushaiushchikh	 prava	 i	 svobody	
grazhdan,	No	466–1,	2.	aprelia,	1995.)
The	experiences	of	the	1990´s	has	shown	that	judges	have	generally	been	
disposed	 to	 ruling	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 plaintiffs	 when	 a	 citizen	 has	 filed	 a	
complaint	 against	 an	 official	 or	 administrative	 organ.	 The	 number	 of	






have	 concisely	 gathered	 together	 the	 procedural	 principles	 of	 good	
administrative	work.	The	Law	on	Administrative	misconduct	 from	194	
has	been	the	basis	of	rules	on	behavior.	A	new	Federal	Law	on	Administrative	
Misconduct	 from	 2001	 (Kodeks	 administrativnikh	 pravonarusheniiakh	
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2001)	forms	a	type	of	administrative	guide	for	good	procedure.	Yet	it	can	
best	be	described	as	 a	 separate	 section	of	 criminal	 law	which	deals	with	
misconduct	 somehow	 related	 to	 administration.	 Its	 object	 is	 both	 the	
officials	and	the	citizenry.	An	important	group	of	sanctions	concern	private	
enterprises.	
Legally	 and	 economically	 the	 municipal	 administration	 serves	 two	
masters.	Its	own	space	has	been	strengthened	and	tools	for	its	daily	work	
have	 been	 developed.	 The	 period	 of	 regionalization,	 privatization	 and	
reformation	of	the	administrative	market	have	been	closing	down	since	the	
end	of	1990´s.	The	risks	involved	in	these	processes	from	the	point	of	view	






of	 “dictatorship	 of	 law”	 and	 political	 control	 of	 the	 regions.	At	 first,	 the	








rules	of	 the	game	 in	all	parts	of	 the	country	and	 to	make	 the	center	 the	
primary	decision	maker	in	economic	policy.	





but	 emerges	 out	 of	 political	 struggle	 itself.	 […]	 The	 imposition	 or	
importation	 of	 practices	 of	 good	 governance	would	 probably	 be	 fragile,	
whereas	 a	 political	 order	 hammered	 out	 in	 conflict	 and	 compromises	
between	the	actors	themselves	would	in	all	likelihood	prove	more	durable.”	
(Sakwa	 2000:	 25.)	The	matrix	 of	 scenarios	 by	 Vladimir	 Gelman	 further	
more	clarifies	the	situation	which	Putin	faces	in	the	political	guidance	of	
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administrative	 reform.	 It	would	 seem	 that	Vladimir	Putin	has	 sought	 to	
move	 from	 the	 “elite	 settlement”	 scenario	 to	 the	 “struggle	 according	 to	
rules”	stage	where	formal	institutions	are	used	as	a	weapon	against	others	in	
the	 struggle	 for	 survival.	 (Comp.	 Gelman	 2000:	 234.)	 Formal	 rules	 are	
important	in	this	scenario	but	their	politically	wise	use	is	the	tactic	which	
makes	a	winner.	
The	 elite	 settlement	 approach	 which	 President	 Eltsin	 used	 can,	 in	
hindsight,	 be	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 risk	 producing	 strategies	 in	
administrative	change.	Such	a	situation	did	not	give	enough	legally	protected	
room	 for	 long	 term	 planning	 and	 institution	 building.	 Guidance	 was	
reacting	 to	 seeming	 side-effects	 and	 deterring	 political	 risks.	 Main	









From	 the	 local	 perspective,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 Putin	 regime	 has	
opted	for	a	strategy	of	 forced	 legalism	by	using	 institutions	 formally	and	
opponents´	 institutional	weakness	 informally.	The	main	 tactic	 is	 gaining	
economic	 control	 of	 Russia´s	 regions	 and	 strengthening	 legality	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 democratic	 practices.	 The	 legitimation	 seems	 to	 be	 that	






administrative	 federal	 areas	 which	 formalized	 the	 unity	 of	 political	 and	













law,	 land	 law	 and	 administrative	 law.	The	 former	went	 through	 a	major	
modernization	in	2001	when	a	new	version	of	 the	former	federal	 law	on	
administrative	 offences	was	 revised.	The	 Federal	 Law	 on	Administrative	
Misconduct	(Kodeks	administrativnykh	pravonarusheniiakh	2001)	can	be	
called	“an	administrative	fine	law”	because	it	sanctions	different	fines	for	
different	 types	 of	 actors.	The	 administrative	 duties	 of	 civil	 servants	 are	
united	 with	 different	 categories	 of	 fines	 which	 are	 used	 as	 a	 negative	
guidance	tool.	A	second	important	quality	is	the	requirement	for	 legality	
which	seeks	to	eradicate	the	most	obvious	violations	of	human	rights	from	








made	by	 the	party	bureaucracy.	The	 local	 administration	has	been	 faced	
with	 the	dilemma	of	 becoming	 a	 genuine	 separate	 legal	 and	operational	
entity	responsible	for	the	sustainable	development	of	state	programs.
6.3 The New Administrative Culture Since 1991: 
Building Practices of Discretion
This	 chapter	 is	 based	 on	 the	 interview	 data	which	was	 obtained	 for	 the	
research	in	the	October	city	district	administration	in	Murmansk	in	1993	
and	 2000.	 The	 interviewees	 were	 city	 district	 employees,	 altogether	 36	
persons.	 The	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 by	 the	 author,	 transcribed	 in	
Russian	and	then	translated	by	the	author	 into	English.	Interview	quotes	
are	numbered	 to	help	 the	 reader	find	a	 specific	quote	 in	 the	 text.	Quote	
numbers	do	not	represent	different	respondents.	
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away	Imperial	post	 in	the	North	whose	economic	growth	was	 in	the	 last	
part	of	the	19th	century	based	on	forestry.	The	growth	of	the	population	in	




the	 Arctic	 Ocean.	The	 city	 is	 the	 capital	 of	 Murmansk	 oblast	 in	 which	
metallurgy	 has	 been	 the	main	 industrial	 base	 in	 the	 1990´s	 (Universitet	
Laplandii-Kolskii	Nauchnyi	Tsentr	2000:	Murmanskaia	oblast	v	90	godoh).	


















The	 oblast charter	 (ustav)	 defines	 the	 municipal	 government	 as	 an	
independent	legal	entity	which	does	not	belong	to	the	state	administrative	
structures.	The	municipal	charter	and	the	structure	of	local	government	are	
decided	by	 the	 inhabitants	of	 the	municipalities.	Municipal	 elections	are	
held	according	to	the	oblast	law	on	elections.	Locally	elected	representatives	
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have	a	right	to	take	part	in	the	initiation	of	legislative	acts	in	the	regional	
duma.	 Motions	 and	 official	 requests	 of	 administrators	 in	 the	 local	











speaker	of	 the	 soviet.	The	work	of	 the	mayor	 includes	heading	 the	 local	
administration	on	the	basis	of	a	structure	which	the	soviet	has	accepted,	




departments,	 committees	 or	 administrations	 and	 which	 receive	 their	
funding	 from	 the	 city	 budget.The	 city	 is	 yet	 further	 divided	 into	 four	
administrative	 areas,	 each	of	which	 is	headed	by	 a	deputy	mayor	within	
whose	 jurisdiction	 have	 a	 right	 to	 give	 orders	 and	 instructions.	 Each	






























divided	 into	 districts	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 1939.	The	 following	 year	 the	
studied	 district	 was	 organized	 into	 10	 departments,	 including	 the	
department	of	social	services	and	housing.	Nine	years	later,	the	district	was	




the	 October	 district	 executive	 committee	 (N	 100,	 2.3.1992)	 ended	 the	
district	soviet.	The	same	year,	a	new	structure	of	district	administration	was	
formed.	 Finally,	 in	 1994	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 head	 of	 October	 district	
administration	changed	the	earlier	district	department	of	social	protection	
into	 the	 Administration	 for	 social	 protection.	 (Historical	 information	
collected	 from	 the	October	 city	 district	 administration	 during	 a	 visit	 in	
2000.)













assistance	 or	 legal	 entitlements.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 work	 involves	 a	
certain	amount	of	evaluation	of	the	needs	of	citizen	groups	and	taking	care	








(Universitet	 Laplandii-Kolskii	 Nauchnyi	 Tsentr	 2000.)	 In	 1996	 the	 city	
administration	 reacted	 to	 the	 financial	 challenges	 by	 establishing	 a	
Coordination	 council	 for	 different	 administrative	 organs	 involved	 in	 the	
collection	of	income.	Included	in	this	new	organs	have	been	representatives	
of	the	Tax	inspection,	Tax	police	and	municipal	funds.	The	main	task	was	to	
individually	 see	which	organizations	 and	 enterprises	owed	 the	 city	 taxes	






the	 providers	 of	 communal	 services	 and	 the	 oblast	 budget.	 In	 the	
arrangements	 social	 assistance	 payments	 due	 were	 substituted	 with	
exemption	from	rents	and	other	communal	payments.	In	the	year	2000,	the	
city	had	made	205	contracts	with	local	enterprises	for	these	to	provide	free	
material	 support	 and	 food	 stuffs	 for	 inhabitants	 eligible	 for	 assistance.	
(Administratsiia	goroda-geroia	Murmanska	2000:	2,	11.)
In	practice	the	services	largely	included	concrete	material	help.	Between	
1996	 and	2000,	 the	 studied	organization	gave	humanitarian	 aid	 to	.026	
persons,	concrete	material	aid	to	2.196	persons,	free	meals	at	the	sum	of	
103.100	rubles.	Subsidized	medication	was	provided	for	12.65	persons.	In	
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addition	small	numbers	of	people	received	free	newspapers	and	journals,	
trips	 to	 sanatoriums	 and	 had	 their	 travel	 to	 a	 holiday	 place	 paid.	
(Administratsiia	goroda-geroia	Murmanska	2000:	45.)




pensions	changed	 four	 times	a	year,	which	made	 taking	care	of	even	 the	
routine	calculations	burdensome.	At	the	same	time,	the	clients´	situation	
worsened	rapidly.	There	was	a	sense	of	diffusion	of	power	in	the	sphere	of	
economy.	 Keeping	 one´s	 head	 above	 water	 by	 trying	 to	 manage	 the	
obligatory	tasks	in	one	way	or	another	dominated	in	1993.	
Along	 with	 the	 braking	 up	 of	 the	 economic	 bureaucracy,	 the	 drastic	
organizational	 changes	 in	 political	 guidance	 and	 authority	 relations	
challenged	the	practices	of	the	administration.	All	through	the	1990´s	there	
was	no	strong	correlation	between	“self-government”	and	the	place	of	local	
level	 legislative	 and	 executive	 decision	making	within	 the	 system	 of	 the	
Russian	 state	 (Gribanova	 2001). In	 the	 studied	 organization	 this	 meant	
both	 opportunities	 and	 risks	 in	 the	 form	 of	 unclear	 jurisdictions	 as	 the	
following	quotes	from	interviews	reveal:	
1. “The [earlier Soviet time] budget was more stable, because we for instance 
in October approved the budget in the session and we in the course of a year 
knew how much and where our expenses went. Now the index is such that 
with our unstable situation, of course it is very difficult to make a prognosis. 
[…] The ´93 budget is more or less unstable, and we consider this budget 
unrealistic because we approved it in May and now it is October and there has	
already been	inflation twice. […] Earlier it was not like this. The earlier budget 
was approved and the whole year we worked peacefully, without any changes.” 
(1993)
2.	Now this question is open because we don´t have any delegates, and the 
budget was approved by the session. […] The session decided if we distributed 
finances in the right way.  It was they who approved the budget.  For us it was 
the law […] I do not know what will happen	 in 1994. Probably we will 
ourselves make and execute the budget.” (1993)
3. “There is no socioeconomic development plan. I do not know how the 
budget will be formed for the next year. It is hard to say what becomes of 
building and financing. I don´t know. The State Duma will be elected on the 
12th, if there are elections. But then, how is the State Duma going to plan 
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because soon it	will be the year of ´94. How is the budget [going to turn out] 
or does the matter just go to the executive powers. In other words, we receive 
some control number and within these “borders” we will work. Like that.” 
(1993)
4. “If all would be normal financially, actually not even financially but 
politically somehow peaceful, then we would be able to arrange everything, 
make a	prognosis, plan and peacefully decide all our financial questions. We 
could think in terms of the	future. Now we practically do not do such things.” 
(1993)
Seven	 years	 later	 in	 2000	 the	 economy	 was	 stabilized.	 Although	 the	
budget	limits	were	felt	in	every	day	work,	other	things	had	become	more	
important	in	the	development	of	work.	Even	though	the	client´s	situation	




5. “We can decide. But again we don´t have the financial means.”	( 2000)
6.3.1.2 Authority in the Administrative Market




years	 old	 and	had	worked	 in	 the	 organization	 for	 an	 average	of	 	 years.	






the	 professional	 titles	 of	 administrators	 had	 changed,	 although	 the	 job	
descriptions	had	stayed	basically	the	same.	The	organization´s	work	was	a	
state	delegated	task.	
Those	 interviewed	 in	 1993	 still	 had	 fresh	 experience	 from	 the	
administrative	work	 during	 the	 Soviet	 period.	 Interviews	 from	 this	 year	
provide	 evidence	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 political	
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administration	 had	 immediately	 changed	 the	 practices	 in	 terms	 of	
organizational	limits	and	the	restructuring	of	tasks.	
6. “Earlier, for instance, we	had a plan. We subordinate the administration, 
as a rule, salary, methods, explanations of laws and everything else	 comes 
from the regional administration. If earlier the law was written in ´56, it had 
practically not changed in any way, and all possible extra explanations, plans, 
orders, all came from above. Whether we want it or not, whether we considered 
it necessary or not, we were required to implement it. Today everything is 
different. […] Purely in an organizational manner there is more independence. 
I can today, for instance, by	myself arrange the structure of the department, as 
I see it. We can change things.	But again by showing [plans] to the head of the 
administration. Earlier this was not possible.” (1993)
7. “Now the structure is completely different. I feel it is more democratic. 
First of all earlier we absolutely had to, I know it was the Regional committee 
of the party, but we always	presented	the	fulfillment of the plan, looked at the 
results, the fulfillment of the socialist building, [and] drew conclusions. Now 
we don´t have any of this. Now it is simpler. I work only with people. Higher 
questions – well, generally no one interferes.” (1993)
8. “Structure changed, it changed, how would I say it, it became complicated 
for my work. Earlier in the Regional executive	committee, they worked with 
a variety of questions. Now, abolished are the organizational department, 
general department, only one supervisor stayed. […] For me it became 
harder to manage all my duties. I am being alienated by this situation….”	
(1993)
9. “There is a new department of “socioeconomic development” the whole 
structure. Bookkeeping was not at all a part of administration, it was in the 
city administration. […] “General management”, we didn´t have that kind of 
a department. It was all decided by the Secretary. The staff	has now grown in 
the administration and more departments have appeared.” (1993)
The	 local	 city	 district	 level	 depends	 on	 the	 decisions	made	 by	 higher	
organs,	but	at	a	slightly	different	level	than	before.	Along	with	the	political	
freedom	 received	 after	 the	 end	 of	Communist	 party	 double	 control,	 the	
administrators	 felt	 less	direct	 control	 from	 the	 center	 and	 in	 connection	
with	the	regional	higher	administrative	organs.	Tellingly,	In	1993,	the	oblast	
level	was	seen	as	representing	the	state.	
10. “Without a doubt we depend on the city administration, and on the 
oblast administration. Earlier we	depended on the party organ, it was very 
rough. There is dependence, but the structure is such that you cannot escape 
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it. We are not autonomous in the city, we always say that the master in the city 
is the city administration. We are masters in our districts. Inside the district 
we are almost full masters, but because we are the central district of the city 
we sometimes. … We find out who is going to decide a particular question. 
[…] Now the federal level comes down to the oblast level. We practically do 
not feel its control, because it does not control us in an immediate manner. 
This [control] comes probably from the federation. We don´t always think 
about where it comes from. (1993)
11. “No Gosplan, planning does not come from above. […] Generally we 
don´t work on any programs now at the level of a district. In other words, if I 








Most	 interviewees	 testified	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 actual	 decision	 making	
power	and	control	of	the	work,	while	reminding	that	total	autonomy	was	
not	 realistic.	 In	 2000,	 not	 a	 single	 individual	 admitted	 to	 feeling	 any	
particular	pressure	 from	any	higher	organ	 in	 their	daily	routines.	 In	 this	
sense	they	described	the	organization	to	be	quite	free	in	its	daily	routines	
from	the	controlling	of	little	details	by	higher	organs.	
12. So, of course	earlier, before deciding some question it was necessary to 
have it approved, particularly because we are the lower level, and above us is 
enough observation. But now we can practically decide ourselves any question 
which lies in our competence and	then talk with the city administration. In 







Too	 wide	 authority	 was	 seen	 as	 producing	 risks	 for	 work.	 The	 city	
administration	 was	 the	 receiver	 who	 executes	 federal	 and	 regional	
decisions.
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13. “The only thing is that now we have more freedom. In other words 
earlier we had to consult the city with many questions, but now we can decide 
many of them ourselves. […] I would like to limit our decision making rights. 
[…] If we knew that this issue does not belong to us we would not start to work 
on it.” (1993)
14. “… I feel that in the direct meaning of the word we don´t have 
independence. We have double subordination. We subordinate to the 
department in the city administration and in the oblast administration as 
higher organizations. But I want to say that the department still is on its own, 
work is	independent and self-sufficient. We don´t feel from any side any kind 
of [influence] on ourselves. (1993)
In	general,	the	period	of	regionalism	did	not	help	the	Russian	local	level	
in	uncertain	situations	to	decide	which	of	the	two	powers	[state	or	region]	
is	more	 important	 for	 it,	 and	where	 it	 could	find	 its	 rights.	 (Sherbakova	
199:	163.)	The	unclear	jurisdictions	of	different	levels	of	government	were	
also	 challenges	 for	 the	 Murmansk	 administration.	 Instability	 and	
ineffectiveness	 of	 the	 state	 structures,	 insufficient	 legal	 background	 to	
support	the	local	level,	the	absence	of	minimal	federal	social	standards	and	
the	principles	of	work	in	the	social	questions,	the	unclear	budget	relations	







15. “Administrative independence will never work out. He who makes	the 
budget, – we don´t plan it ourselves. We are given everything from above. 
Then we will have independence when we ourselves build the budget and by 
ourselves implement it. But now we are given control numbers from above 
and we just implement them. And we don´t always agree with them. […] This 
will never change because the tax system is such. If tax collection changes a 
little bit, then maybe. Maybe the State Duma will change the new way of tax 
collection, maybe, I don´t know. But independence. I feel that we cannot get 
rid of the [central] government. All the same somehow there is a separation in 
the federal budget.	And it will stay that way. How else can we keep up this 
army and so on? In other words it makes no difference. But it would be good	
if we ourselves would plan and would make our numbers.”	(1993)
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In	 2000	 it	 was	 explicitly	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 local	 city	 district	 level	
performs	state	tasks at	the	local	level.	Localism	in	this	issue	is	reached	by	












the	 needs	 of	 the	 citizens	 in	 new	 ways,	 such	 as	 with	 the	 help	 of	 non-
governmental	organizations,	was	welcomed	with	a	mixed	feeling.	
The	work	of	 the	 soviet	delegates	did	not	have	a	 clear	 role	 for	 the	 line	
workers.	In	the	new	local	self-government	structure,	the	soviet	had	standing	
commissions	which	took	care	of	sectoral	issues.	The	job	of	the	commissions	
was	 to	 prepare	 normative	 acts,	 initiative	 on	 policy	 issues	 and	 look	 into	
appeals	of	citizens.	The	social	sector	was	handled	by	the	standing	commission	
on	 socioeconomic	 development,	 privatization	 and	 the	management	 and	
distribution	of	municipal	property.	This	commission	made	decisions	on	the	





16. “Now delegates […] only [for] purely material help, only with purely 
these kinds of technical questions they turn [to us] […] Yes, if I earlier worked 
with delegates, knew all that they worked with from the beginning to the end, 
so now these questions were taken away from the supervisor. These questions 
do not concern me.	I work for the head of administration. I execute his orders. 
I do everything in order for his machinery to work normally.	And the soviet 
works on its own and with its own questions. […] If anyone comes to me 
directly, it is only the chairman of the soviet and only for purely technical 
questions. For example, to influence the politics of the district he can only [do 
so] through the head of administration, he does not come directly to me. If he 
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came to me, I would send him to the head. I am commanded by the head of 
administration.” (1993)
17. “I would like that the delegates would come, in case they have questions 
about the law, showed interest, asked questions. But they understand their 
task a little bit differently. A particular person comes to them and they come 
with this person to me behaving quite strangely. At least as far as I have been 
in contact with the delegates, they all behave the same way. “We have to decide 
this voter´s question.” But they don´t for some reason want to explain to the 
voter why the question cannot be decided in a certain way. […] They explain 
to their constituent that “the political executive board does not want to decide 
your question, we cannot do anything.” I would like them to study the situation 
and to explain it to the person. […] They put us in opposing positions with the 
constituent.” (1993)
18. “The disconnection of the work of the speaker of the	soviet and the head 
of administration was, in my view, not very reasonable, because it created a 
static in the sense that when the speaker and the head were one and the same 
person, the speaker knew how he was going to implement decisions in the 
administration. But now we have a situation where the soviet makes decisions 
and they are not interested in how we will carry them out, and in this sense 
rose misunderstandings.”	(1993)
19. “… Now of course there is more freedom in activities, because earlier we 
were completely dependent on the work of the party organs and they came to 
the Executive political committee and dictated their terms to the committee. 
Now the head of administration himself makes practically all decisions but 
has to approve them with the soviet and higher administrative organs in the 
city administration. He has double subordination.” (1993)
20. “First of all, our delegates were not very competent people, unfortunately. 
They were good people as people, well meaning, – good person, orderly, but 
here you should also be a professional. One	should at least know the basics of 
law to know whether it is possible to deal with the situation or not. A person 
must be explained to immediately. Unfortunately, this is not so. Here, you 
know, things are always decided at an emotional level. […] I felt that the 
professionals did not work with their constituents. They met with them from 
time to time when they had an appointment, but further than that… Now I 
do understand, they may not have very much time for that, but	we either 
agree to do this work or we should refuse it.” (1993)
21. “… There were no special contacts with the delegates. They came only 
for their constituents´ questions, if they were retired persons. […] They come 
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with the same questions to somehow help someone. To sort out retirement 
questions.” (1993)




in	 the	 hierarchy.	 Unanimously	 the	 interviewees	 in	 the	 2000	 sample	
acknowledged	their	ability	to	influence	planning	and	practical	work	in	their	
own	department,	thanks	again	to	the	immediate	leadership.
22. “We give our points of	view	there upstairs, about what the retirees want, 
what kinds of problems they have. We help, maybe, the leadership to work on 
the policy which they are supposed to have. Of course from our discourse with 
people we gather a lot of information, of what should be done and how it 
should be done. ” (2000)
23. “Earlier you were not asked. Nobody was interested.”(2000)
24. “… In other words, what	concerns changes of a local nature, in other 
words the city, we write to the city [as	to] how things have	to be done, this has 
to be done that way, – and we are heard in some places and in some others 
not, but we have a direct connection. […] We in a sense	 have a double 
subordination, a set of local questions the city decides, and if the questions are 
federal, then we as a matter of fact don´t have a general center of coordination, 
we instead go straight to the oblast level. […] In all of this, we have it easier 
with questions of local self-government. Things move from the bottom upstairs 
easier. The connection is better. But what concerns the connection through the 
subject of Federation, in federal questions, it is more difficult.	In this connection 
it is more just executing decisions of higher organs. And our initiatives play a 
lesser role. It is more a matter of correcting already made documents. In 
practice we start to implement them and we see that they don´t work, then we 
start to write how they work and what should be changed, if indeed changes 
will be done, if they are considered needed … if it is seen that something does 
not work here, then we write to the oblast committee.	There are of course 
points of collision.	There are questions which are not decided.	 I can´t say 
about it more directly because I don´t work with these questions, but one feels. 
Because, for instance in our work, when there are two masters of the house, as 
a result nothing works out. That is why a sharp separation is better, just one 
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[decision maker], and the other does not touch the question. We have this 









25. “If I have been given a task, I will myself decided it. I am not dependent 
on anyone. I look at the financial situation in the district. And that is why no-
one can influence me because I can personally decide certain questions. Earlier 
all came from the center.	 There was the center, only the center	 decided 
everything. And now the questions are here in the district. We don´t even 
have to go to the city but we can decide questions here. […] We became more 




the	practical	 conditions	had	 improved	 significantly	 since	 computers	had	






26. “We have a shortage of work space. I think that we don´t even have the 
elementary conditions for an inspector´s work, because generally in one room 
four people hold consulting hours. Four people ask questions and four people 
answer. Eight people speak at the same time.	It is not possible to work in such 
conditions.	Maybe in time, we will be helped. We were promised computers, 
calculators which work on the light not electricity. In other words we have 
many problems. Especially our department. They involve technical questions 
and the staff. We have a problem with the staff, people do not wish this kind of 
[working condition]. We have a big shortage of staff. On top of this I would to 
say that we endure on enthusiasm. If they were offered something better, I 
think that many would leave our department.” (1993)
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Computerization	 had	 been	 the	major	 change	 in	 the	 90´s.	This	 had	 a	
significant	effect	on	the	way	each	citizen´s	affairs	could	be	managed.	The	
administrators	 could	 instantly	 control	 the	 situation	 of	 each	 client	 by	
checking	 his/her	 information	 and	 by	 calculating	 the	 possible	 needs	 for	
changes.	This	obviously	decreased	the	possibility	for	error	as	well	 for	the	
misplacement	of	paper	documentation.	At	the	same	time	it	made	keeping	
records	 easier.	The	 effect	 that	 these	 routine	 issues	 had	 for	 the	 sense	 of	
efficiency	and	client	service	was	worthy	of	note.	
27. “The most important thing is computerization. I am convinced of this 
because one of the first who started to work with computers was our 
department.” (1993)
28. “Here is our problem. People cannot ask questions. Also, all kinds of 
letters	come. Even if you would like to answer, you don´t know what is the 
concrete point of interest, what is needed.” (2000)
29.	“I would like that we would have, – that we would not collect papers, 
but would have computers. […] At least now it is very difficult, even with the 
Tax inspection we cannot make this connection with computers, so that we 
would have a uniform system. […] Even though in the finance department we 
all have computers, but information is not such as we would like to have.” 
(1993)
30. “Work became more productive. First of all, earlier we had a lot of hand 
work. […] But now we have computers in out rooms. In other words, 











In	 the	 studied	 organization,	 openness	 in	 information	 giving	 was	
unproblematic.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 directly	 correlate	 with	 active	
administration.	Clients	were	still	expected	to	initiate	processes	and	be	active	
in	 their	own	cases.	They	could	get	 service	but	 the	quality	of	 the	process	
depended	also	on	the	specific	client.


















31. “We decided things in a collegial manner earlier. The chairman of the 
Political Executive committee was here and the committee decided everything. 
Now almost all decisions, maybe since ´93, since ´92 when we became an 
administration, – in a collegial manner are decided	very difficult questions,	
the collegiate is founded along the administration- and generally the head of 
administration can decide small questions himself.” (1993)
32. “… With the appearance of administration, we began to execute the 
politics which the head of the administrations guides, in other words we 
execute the will of one person, who stands on top of our administration. All 
departments are for that and exist so that we can bring to life his politics. 
Earlier, when there was the Regional political executive committee, we 
executed the will, – in other words the highest was named the Executive 
committee of the Regional Soviet of delegates	–, in other words we executed 
the will of delegates. Here is the difference.” (1993)
In	 2000,	 the	 leadership´s	 role	 was	 drawn	 from	 a	 distinctly	 different	
corner.	His	role	as	a	model	for	good	a	administrator,	organizer	and	controller	
of	work	was	emphasized.	He	was	seen	as	a	person	who	shaped	the	spirit	of	
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immediate	 leadership	 in	 the	 department	 was	 stressed.	 Against	 this	






place	on	 the	personal	 authority	of	 the	 interviewed	administrators	which	







the	hierarchy	 of	 relations.	Yet,	 this	was	not	 regarded	 solely	 as	 a	 positive	
matter,	since	it	also	created	new	practical	problems.	Control	of	everyone´s	
personal	 performance	 was	 ensured	 by	 way	 of	 withdrawing	 a	 wrongly	
calculated	sum	of	money	from	the	administrator´s	salary. This,	along	with	
citizen´s	 complaints	 to	 the	 immediate	 leadership,	 were	 enough	 to	make	
everybody	keen	on	not	openly	making	mistakes.	Control	 in	general	was	
now	 coming	 more	 from	 those	 parts	 of	 the	 population	 which	 the	










felt	 more	 authoritative	 in	 their	 respective	 roles.	They	 had	 in	 this	 sense	
acquired	“faces”.	
33. “Disturbing impression. Very disturbing. When you came to a higher 
ranking person in the administration, earlier it was called obkom, – he did not 
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see you. Can you imagine, it was a terrifying impression when you stood 
before him and he did not see you. Now I don´t feel such things anymore. I 
don´t know why. Thanks to perestroika, I don´t know.	But now I don´t feel 
that anymore.	They see me. They don´t always listen to me, but at least they 
see! They see that I stand before them.” (2000)
34. “Rights, generally speaking they don´t solve anything. Our supervisor is 
such that – she is democratic. You can always say your opinion. There are 
demands. Of course, if you are not right, you can be told about it – but only 
by the leadership.	Otherwise, suit yourself.	It is normal pressure. […] I observe 
a certain distance, distance in official relationships, not in the sphere of human 
rights. This distance, it has not shrunk or grown, it has become more 
democratic. […] The head of administration values our work. Understands 
what it is, that it is very hard to work with people. […] Questions concerning 
the organization of work, we as far as I know, decide together. Our director, 
she collects all the interested parties and	together everybody decided what to 
do and how to do it best.	Because of this, there is talk that October district 
wants to do everything. That this district tries to do things which others do 
not. This is the way we decide. ” (2000)
At	the	same	time	personal	independence	had	become	important	for	the	
administrators.	The	official	 roles	had	 grown	and	 the	work	had	 thus	 also	
become	more	demanding.	They	did	not	need	to	ask	for	permission	from	the	
higher	authorities	 in	matters	which	were	within	their	 legal	discretion,	or	
indeed	 wait	 for	 general	 administrative	 directions	 in	 all	 details.	 The	
organization	itself	had	become	the	general	manager	in	its	daily	practices.	
Laws	were	the	primary	limitation	to	what	decisions	to	make.	
35. “You don´t feel any pressure. Here are your duties and here are your 
rights. […] You feel freer here. You breath more freely. But, along with this, 
you know, that you breath freely only thanks to your sense of responsibility. If 








was	 done	 with	 a	 pencil	 and	 paper	 which	meant	 a	 physical	 build	 up	 of	
documentation.	Even	the	privacy	of	clients	was	questionable	when	in	some	
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cases	there	were	four	inspectors	working	in	the	same	room.	Computerization	
began	 in	 the	 organization	 in	 1995.	The	 continuously	 changing	 pensions	
made	calculating	the	amounts	people	were	supposed	to	receive	burdensome.	




increasingly	 demanding	 work	 had	 to	 be	 completed	 was	 all	 the	 more	





by	 their	 director	 and	 appointed	 by	 the	 mayor.	 (Ustav	 goroda-geroia	
Murmansk	1995:	glava	VI:34.) The	recruitment	practices	had	principally	
stayed	the	same	in	the	90´s.	This	meant	a	situation	of	usually	knowing	about	
vacant	 positions	 through	 personal	 contacts	 and	 then	 getting	 to	 be	









36. “Work is work. Under which flag it takes place makes no difference.” 
(1993)
The	interviewed	persons	had	different	educational	backgrounds.	That	is	
why	many	 of	 them	 had	 learned	 about	 administrative	 processes	 and	 the	







on	 their	 own	 in	 different	 types	 of	 educational	 institutions	 of	 which	 the	
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37. “… The most important thing is professionalism. So that specialist 
would work here.	Not just anyone, but for instance and inspector should be 
correspondingly educated in law. He should know the law. He should not work 
just for one day. He should have a job contract for some time, in other words 
he should be a professional in his work. Today it is still very, – of 29 people 
there are maybe 6 professionals. The rest are new, just again coming to work 
without the corresponding education. As a rule in the Soviet Union there were 
only 6 colleges for our area. Now it is almost not possible to find the ideal 
specialist who could come and work. Maybe in the future there will be support 
for this. Maybe the government pays attention to it. Of course retired persons 
need specialists.” (1993)
38. “Yes! The thing is that from ´85 on and especially since ´86 when 
perestroika started. Earlier our department was named “social security”, and 
the task was very narrow. In other words it was decisions on pensions, state 
payments and somehow distribute travelling tickets [for trips to sanatoriums], 
this kind of one time help, very small. But in today´s life our functions of course 
are expanded very much, we have an extra acute service “social help” […] We 
started to invest more support materially, our workload grew much. (1993)
39. “Autumn arrives. And then you will of course work longer, and at home 
too. I	had to sit at home till late night, I took work home, because one must. 
[…] With all these new government decisions, in addition to that we in the 
administration work with all kinds of	other questions, all kinds of humanitarian 
assistance, which take your work time. And all the rest we are supposed to do, 
to do within	time limits, time limits … You know, it is a habit! A habit, and 
still I love my work. I would not change it.” (2000)
40. “I fear getting older.	Not that I will be unemployed. But that I will 
become worse. […]	One is ashamed to become worse. Earlier this was not the 
case. But now it is.	Because I started to notice how people lose their work skills 
as they get older. […] For the future´s sake one has to study. And I really don´t 
want to study.	I really don´t want to.	It is not the studying itself, but … first of 
all education is not free, and I have a daughter. It is	 problematic.	And 
secondly, our director takes this issue very seriously.	I don´t particularly wish 
to discuss this theme with him.” ( 2000)




41. “People themselves I suppose changed. Earlier there was a different 
climate, demands were different. Here you have to think about every case 
separately.	But its not just that, I mean that you cannot discuss with a retiree 
the way you would at home or in the street. You talk with him as an official. 
You cannot bring anything unnecessary into the situation. […]Do you know 
the type of demands we had earlier: to do things fast. We had to perform our 
tasks fast, with quality, but – the main thing was speed. Now things are already 
a little bit different.	You are supposed to perform your tasks not only fast, not 
just with quality, but you are supposed to take responsibility, think,	you know, 
the main thing is to think. Earlier it was : do, do, do. Here it is not. We started 
to have more responsibility.”	(2000)
The	only	visible	distinction	which	had	remained	was	that	in	spite	of	the	
staff	being	nearly	100%	female,	the	top	leadership	of	the	house	was	male.	At	
the	 city	 level,	 though,	 the	mayor	 did	 have	 female	 deputies.	The	 issue	 of	




reach	 the	 top	 in	 the	organization	was	proportionally	many	 times	greater	
than	for	a	woman.	
42. “Sometimes I think it is our men, the directors are used to seeing men 
in leading positions and women they think need to be freed from workloads. 
Maybe it is on one hand good but if you take a look, in our government sits 
only one [woman] minister, Panfilova. There are no others. This is telling. We 
have one woman at the city administration, deputy head of the administration. 
But at the county level there are no woman deputies. […] That´s how I feel. 
Women should not take on their shoulders any responsibility. (1993)
The	 composition	 of	 men	 and	 women	 in	 decision	 making	 positions	
seemed	to	show	that	the	old	culture	of	male	leadership	was	quite	firmly	in	
place.	The	development	of	equal	advancement	opportunities	for	women	in	
Russian	 administrative	 organizations	 can	 be	 linked	 with	 the	 general	
strengthening	of	 formal,	 legal	and	 impersonal	 institutional	channels.	For	
instance	in	Friedgut´s	193	study	one	conclusion	was	that	informal	work	
related	 communication	networks	which	 supplement	 the	 formal	 channels	
are	most	useful	 to	male	workers.	 In	other	words,	 there	has	been	“a	male	
bias”	 in	 the	 informal	 networks	 in	 the	 Soviet	 local	 administration	which	
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6.3.1.6 Citizens and Non-governmental Organizations
The	client	service	was	described	as	requiring	good	psychological	skills	from	
the	administrators	because	the	people	who	came	to	the	organization	were	


















Many	described	 their	 clients	 as	very	demanding	which	made	 their	work	
both	more	interesting	and	stressful	at	 the	same	time.The	clients	followed	




the	 district	 administration.	 Of	 these,	 seven	 were	 ruled	 in	 favor	 of	 the	
plaintiff.	In	comparison,	during	the	same	time	period	the	administration	
took	to	court	6	cases	of	which	32	were	ruled	in	its	favor	and	36	were	still	
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made	 taking	 care	 of	 their	 matters	 sometimes	 confusing	 for	 the	 line	
workers.
43. “… Earlier we received [people] one day in a week, now we practically 
receive [them] at any time, but officially two days a week, Monday and 
Wednesday.” (1993)
44. “Personally my working became harder. I already told you about how 
people have become less good willed in their relation to us civil servants, even 
though in principle in my work and in my relationship to people nothing has 
changed.” (1993)
45. “Generally I don´t have problems. People turn to me usually with 
questions about social security. They are usually retired persons. So … Of course 
it is mostly material means. Surely we don´t have enough of material means, 
and that is why we have very many people who need welfare. If we had more 
material means we could help people of our district more. […] The door is open 
at any time and people come and consult me with questions of interest to them. 
Generally the door is always open, any time of the day …” (1993)
46. “Goodwill from my part and attention. This is from my part. For the 
part of the clients, – we have had a problem which is even hard to formulate 
–, it is anger. People come to us very angry. […] Earlier we first of all had 
“ranks”. It was not always possible to express your negativity –	 this is first. 
People have become freer- they express themselves. Maybe our life changed 
somewhat. In some ways	it has become worse, because of prices, salary (you 
understand this perfectly) – this is secondly.	And thirdly – maybe the negative 
reaction from the part of the mass media. You know, “civil servant- bribe 
taker” and so on. This is one reason. And of course the general low level of 
culture –	people are not very cultivated.	I suppose that these	are the problems. 
And then, naturally, when people come to us to the department, the government 
cannot give an apartment to us. Never in principle could, but it did advertise 
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this possibility. Now it doesn´t advertise it. […] I have everything in order as 
far as contacts are concerned. Because this is a department which works with 
people all the time. Who ever	comes here, we talk with them.” (1993)
47. “Pressure? I don´t feel pressure. Demands grow. And how? They don´t 
grow to benefit for instance me but to benefit those who we serve.	I don´t even 
think that it is always good, because sometimes you feel ashamed to have to 
protect for instance some alcoholic, some mother who has deserted seven 
children, and I for some reason should take her from outside the line and give 
her material assistance, or in some way console her with words, and I know 
that she is an alcoholic woman who has deserted seven children.	But I have to!	
This outrages me.	It is the only pressure I have.	Otherwise nothing. There are 
demands, yes. But I consider that it is necessary. I am not against it.	Maybe I 
don´t like it.	Maybe it takes extra time from me. Extra physical energy. But I 
understand that it is necessary.” (2000)
48. “For me sharp changes have taken place. Although they came as 
planned. There was no shock therapy, but sharp changes in every case.	How I 
used to view my work and how I do it now, they are two different things. In 
other words, sense of responsibility grew a lot. […] You know, you handle 
consulting hours quite differently.	You understand that you for example, – 
when I worked in the center of pensions, yes, I could “relax”.	I could allow 
myself to talk to the retirees in a way that I can´t today, then it was a different 
style. In general, nobody asked about this.	Here I have a different attitude, 
totally different. “Paws up.” ( 2000)
49. “We are forced to work all our free days to do to them what they [clients] 
ask. (2000)
50. “We are worse off, but you know, I want to say that in my own work 
even 10 years ago I more often met people who said: “Oy, I wish I would die 
soon! ” These were old people. Now this happens rarely. It does take place. 
Because there have always been pessimistic people, and always will be.	But 
more rarely.	With all these difficulties, life became more interesting. Yes. More 
interesting.” (2000)
The	 situation	 in	 1993	 was	 at	 the	 cross	 roads	 of	 old	 and	 new	 in	 the	










assessed	 as	 highly	 meaningful.	 It	 seemed	 that	 the	 more	 vulnerable	 and	
marginalized	the	clients´	situation	was	at	the	time	of	the	interviews	(such	as	
for	 instance	 children	 living	 in	 orphanages),	 the	 more	 the	 interviewed	
persons	working	with	that	group	of	clients	appreciated	outside	help.
51. “You know, social organizations practically do not work with my 
department, especially so because they have no influence on my work. They do 
not give any help, they only turn to us with questions. Frankly speaking I 
would like that before they [the social organizations] turn to us, they would	
carefully look at what it possible. […] I would like that when they turn to us, 
they would have studied the situation before coming to us. […] Then of course 
it	would be easier to work. […] I have a commission in the department, social 
commission, where representatives	of organizations come and we work with 
them. Only, we do not meet often and [then]we deal with concrete questions 
of distributing living quarters.” (1993)
52. “To have time to find these people. It has only began here, we just started 
a service “Urgent social assistance” and we try to [provide it] from all of these 
social organizations	and clinics and such services which are essentially joined 
with our area, with retired person and invalids. So that we would ourselves 
find these people. So that they would not come to us as today but we would go 
to them, to give help or what ever.” (1993)
53. “They of course influence us a great deal, because these organization 
are unions of our people. “The organization of invalids”, they meet and some 
piece of this work they do themselves through	their own contacts, people don´t 
feel forgotten. (…) “Red cross” has a very tight contact with us. Foundations 
for children, we work with them. So they help us in a wonderful way and we 
try to help them.” (1993)
55. “Now, how can they [social organizations] influence? They by nature do 
not influence. They try to show us some help … The Association of Veterans, 
which is joined in work with the administration, it helped us. We had to collect 
documentation from many. They organized the collection of documentations 
beginning early March till May. If a signal comes that somewhere someone 
lives badly, some retired person, they help us to go to the place, follow how that 
person lives.” (1993)
The	 regional	 administration	 had	 passed	 a	 decree	 on	 the	 cooperation	
between	 executive	 organs	 and	 non-governmental	 organizations	 in	 1996	
according	to	which	administration	and	the	organizations	could	enter	into	
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contracts	to	realize	federal	and	regional	social	programs.	For	these	purposes	
the	 regional	 government	 offers	 grants	 over	 which	 it	 makes	 decisions.	
(Postonovleniia,	 administratsiia	Murmanskoi	 oblast´i,	 ot	 2.11.1996,	No	
42.)	In	this	way,	the	third	sector	had	been	incorporated	into	the	official	
policy	execution	hierarchy.	









not	 seen	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 administrative	 structure.	 Mostly	 it	 was	
viewed	as	a	necessary	helper.	Relying	on	the	help	of	the	third	sector	also,	to	
an	extent,	indicated	“failure”	by	the	official	structures.	There	was	not	yet	an	
expressed	 transition	 toward,	 for	 instance,	 the	American	 type	a	 system	of	
local	government.	
By	 the	 year	 2000,	 the	 situation	 had	 stabilized	 itself	 to	 a	 degree	 and	






what	 types	 of	 person´s	 are	 suited	 to	 this	 work.	 The	 organization	 had	
acquired	a	sense	of	a	common	working	style.	
55. “We have a remarkable work collective. We, 50% of our collective, 
worked together already for 20 years. In other words, you understand, in 
Russia to work 20 years together means one family. ”(2000)
56. “I think that the most important quality for a worker is the will to work 
right here. Because the work is hard. We are in contact with such a category of 
people, grandmothers and grandfathers, with them the level has to be such 
that they understand, one has to help, just talk with them, maybe feel sorry for 
them even so that they … as people. Then of course knowledge is necessary, 
ability to work with computers. […] The social culture should be	a certain 
kind. […] Respect towards people, work discipline.” (2000)
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was	 stressed	 as	 the	 main	 indicator	 of	 success	 in	 the	 timely	 delivery	 of	
payments	and	regulated	material	assistance.	The	level	of	financial	assistance	
or	the	direction	of	social	services	in	general	was	not	discussed.	











57. “… It is as if we were guilty of everything, you know. And of course we 
have delays, because the law making is not very calculated. We all waited for 
the law on	pensions but it didn´t turn out quite the way we expected. We work 
with the old laws and the new ones. […] I feel that earlier people came to	
appointments less frequently. It was only in some particular cases. The 
workload has grown but you cannot make much sense out of it. […] Maybe 
there were always some kinds of problems. But really now the conditions of life 
have changed, the problems with which we work have changed.” (1993)
58. “ They could come and say that they will send you to the party organs 
or some other place, they wrote to newspapers. This they could. But, first of all, 
it would have been a great exception. Why? […] People woke up. Back then, 
ne in a hundred did not sleep. In other words one in a hundred was active. 
And for a person to come with a law, he should have first of all found it 
somewhere. Well, yes. He could have come, could have. But maybe he wouldn´t 
have been listened to. Or maybe they would have listened to him only because 
he was such a wonder. Why did he come?! Then it was a wonder. How on 
earth? …	How can there be such an educated person?! Where did he find the 
law?!	Now things are different.” (2000)
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59. “Earlier documents, instructions or laws came more quickly.Now they 
are delayed somewhere on the road, one can say to the residents	 that	 they 
come delayed. And we, as all citizens, read about the laws in the newspapers.” 
(1993)
60. “And of course we have delays	because law making is not very calculated. 
We all waited for the law on	pensions but it didn´t turn out quite the way we 
expected. We work with the old laws and the new ones.” (1993)
61. “Today we have the peak, because as you have probably seen the 
retirement law changed, it changes practically every quarter of the year. But 
the laws in question have not come here yet, many are already published and 
therefore we, for instance, do not know how many of these should be 
implemented in today´s situation. And people may already know about this 
law but its implementation mechanism is not specified. This is why we try to 
do something, order something, but we cannot just pay what they should by 
law receive. […] So far it is worse. So far this conflicting problem is pointed.” 
(1993)
62. “Once in three months this year already. This is of course a big weight. 
… Stressful? I don´t even know … the same situation. If there weren´t these 
recalculations, everything would be normal.” (2000)
63. “You know, now they tell me about laws. They started to read papers, a 
lot. Earlier we had only one newspaper, The Poliarnaia Pravda. […] Now we 
have many papers. They come to me with newspapers. They tell about what 
kinds of laws they have read and what I am supposed to do for them according 
to that law.	In other words, it is they who are teaching me.	You know, now we 
have new law about a raise in pensions in August. This law only came out and 
they already during the second day call, after they have completely calculated 
their pensions. Can you imagine! I still do not know how to calculate it, but 
they already know. […] Just as new laws come out, they already run here.	[…] 
In other words, now they have become very well versed. They watch television 
…. They sit in the waiting room line and all discuss new laws.	Imagine. They 
read newspapers outloud while they sit in the line. Earlier they didn´t need 
anything. You know, they … they didn´t need anything. Absolutely. This is not 
just because I myself was young.	What would they have needed?! There were 
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disappeared	and	the	work	collective	was	concentrated	on	the	planning	of	
weekly	 and	 monthly	 tasks.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 pronounced	 feeling	 of	
appreciation	of	 the	changes.	Even	as	 the	economic	situation	was	difficult	
and	sureness	of	future	was	gone,	the	work	itself	was	considered	much	more	




The	 period	 between	 fall	 1993	 and	 summer	 2000	 had	 changed	 the	
organization	in	terms	of	clarification	of	priorities.	The	stabilization	of	legal	
interpretation	 and	 the	 changing	 of	 major	 legislation	 had	 begun	 to	 take	
effect.	If	in	the	fall	of	1993	the	political,	legal	and	economic	situation	in	the	
country	 was	 so	 confusing	 that	 any	 type	 of	 long	 term	 goal	 setting	 and	
guidance	policy	would	have	seemed	futile	dreaming,	by	2000	it	was	already	
a	natural	part	of	the	agenda.	The	difference	in	attitude	was	also	quite	clear.	
Professionalism	 in	 customer	 service	 and	 getting	 results	 in	 helping	 the	
clients	was	mentioned	in	both	sample	periods	but	with	more	unity	in	the	




In	 2000	 short	 term	 work-task	 goals	 had	 become	 routine	 and	
professionalism	was	raised	by	both	the	leadership	and	the	line	workers	as	
the	number	one	goal.	Merely	being	able	to	pay	more	money	to	people	was	
not	 raised	 as	 a	primary	purpose	of	 the	work.	 Instead	 the	general	moral,	
psychological	and	professional	assistance	of	clients	was	seen	as	the	officially	
most	important	tasks.	A	shift	in	the	clarity	of	norms	had	emerged	compared	
to	 the	 situation	 in	 1993	 during	 which	 people´s	 orientations	 were	 still	
uncertain.	There	was	a	great	deal	of	a	sense	of	loss	which	was	reflected	in	“it	
makes	no	difference	anymore”	type	of	reactions	to	questions.	The	sense	of	
guidance	 vacuum	was	 not	 present	 in	 2000,	when	 people	 had	 a	 sense	 of	
commonly	accepted	orientation	towards	work	and	goals.
6.3.2 The New Local Administration Culture
The	 crumbling	 of	 the	 administrative	market	was	 felt	 in	 a	 very	 dramatic	
manner	in	1993.	Representational	and	economical	administrations	were	in	
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upheaval.	By	the	year	2000,	enough	stabilization	had	taken	place	that	the	








64. “Responsibility grew.	 Responsibility, both materially and morally. 
Because, first of all, you feel that you want to – the face of administration- you 
want to … You want to support the reputation of the collective. Because we 
have the best collective in the city.	Because of this, of course, you feel a huge 
responsibility.	Our supervisor is such that you always wish to support her. You 
know, making mistakes, in the work, – you don´t want to hit her in the face … 
Things changed, of course they changed a	lot. Earlier you came to work and 
just mechanically performed your duties. Now you already fundamentally feel 
that on	the basis of that work depend, not only for example, the retirees, but 
your colleagues. […] And knowledge grew.	I don´t think that we only suffer 
from the situation which we have in our country …	that there is something 
that people don´t receive, because in any case, there is progress.	There is 
progress both in the head and in the work, naturally.	 In practice a lot has 
changed with the influx of information. Earlier, things were different.	You see, 
you know more, you try to understand more.	Here in the administration we 
study, you get to know all the laws[…]	you yourself start to grow. Because of 
this, I see only positive things.” (2000)




the	 joint-government	 system	 of	 subjects	 and	 the	 state.	 This	 means	
decentralization	in	the	sense	that	the	“battleground”	is	closer	to	home,	but	
on	 the	 other	 hand	 it	means	 the	 continual	 difficulty	 of	 unified	 economic	
policy	 for	 the	central	government	which	 forms	 the	financial	basis	of	 the	
municipal	services.	For	the	consolidation	of	administrative	practices,	all	of	
this	results	in	delayed	attention	to	actual	policy	implementation.	
The	 present	 local	 administration	 culture	 can	 be	 viewed	 from	 three	
different	 perspectives.	 Firstly	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 local	 administration	 as	
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“good public administration”	 in	which	 the	 principles	 of	 rule	 of	 law	 have	
materialized	in	client-oriented	service	culture.	In	the	last	one	the	focus	is	
on	 the	 actual	 daily	 contact	with	 the	 population	who	 have	 certain	 rights	
(equality	 and	 trust	 in	 the	 predictability	 of	 the	 service).	 (Terms	 in	 italics	
from	Mäenpää	2001.)	
The	political	leadership	in	the	transitional	Russia	has	already	used	several	
administrative	 strategies	 for	 change.	 President	 Eltsin´s	 period	 could	 be	
said	 to	 have	 emphasized	 the	 governance	 side	 by	 giving	 the	 regions	 and	
localities	the	decision	making	power	but	also	the	responsibility	in	sorting	
out	 transitional	 problems.	 President	 Putin´s	 period	 seems	 to	 have	
underlined	 management	 of	 the	 economy	 through	 legal	 control.	 Good	
government	has	been	developing	along	side	but	its	development	has	suffered	
from	economic	 and	political	 setbacks.	This	has	 created	a	paradox	where	
talk	about	the	unity	of	the	state	and	the	underlining	of	law	as	the	guarantor	
of	order,	safety	and	equality	–	although	basically	constitutional	requirements	
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The	Murmansk	city	administration	case	would	seem	to	indicate	that	the	





In	 the	 193	 study	 conducted	 by	 Sternheimer	 the	 interviewed	 ex-
administrators	placed	a	low	value	on	the	educative-socialization	function	
of	information.	Customer	complaints,	social	survey	data,	research	in	general	















do	 not	 have	 clearly	 separate	 areas	 in	 society.	 Yet	 at	 the	 same	 time,	
constitutionalism	has	gained	importance	in	the	administrative	practices	both	
through	the	activeness	of	ordinary	citizens	and	the	learning	of	officials.	
In	 the	 1990´s,	 the	 administrative	 work	 has	 been	 influenced	 by	 two	
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most	 common	 complaint	 was	 that	 the	 state	 officials	 function	 for	 their	





The	 local	 level	 served	 as	 the	 laboratory	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 both	 radical	
economic	restructuring	and	administrative-political	decentralization	which	
took	place	in	the	beginning	of	the	1990´s.	Neither	of	the	theories	of	society	
(privatization	 and	 constitutionalism)	 took	 effect	 completely	 or	 in	 the	
manner	 intended	 in	 the	 original	 texts.	 The	 privatization	 program	 in	
particular	was	 chosen	and	put	 to	 effect	 in	 the	first	place	 as	 a	method	of	
political	competition	for	power	which	came	to	influence	its	acceptance.	The	
lack	of	 legal	rules	and	institutions	willing	and	capable	of	enforcing	them	
soon	 created	 wide	 spread	 mistrust	 in	 the	 way	 privatization	 transferred	









sign	 of	 development.	 Yet,	 it	 cannot	 be	 said	 that	 active	 administration	
(Heusala-Pushnov	 2003)	 would	 still	 be	 firmly	 institutionalized	 in	 the	
practices.	There	 is	not	 even	 federal	 legislation	which	would	 require	 this.	
Currently,	administrative	 law	 in	Russia	means	mostly	a	 list	of	prohibited	
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At	the	work	collective	level	the	Russian	administration	may	have	–	again,	
paradoxically	 –	 been	 more	 ready	 for	 the	 changes	 than	 was	 previously	




dimension	 to	 make	 the	 organization	 work	 more	 efficiently	 (Aarrevaara	
1999:	55).
Municipal	 administration	 leadership	 has	 acquired	 a	 more	 prominent	
role	 as	 the	 executive	 line	 has	 been	 strengthened	 and	 the	 administrative	
market	 reorganized.	The	 line	workers	 had	 lost	 their	 double	 role	 as	 both	
party	members	and	administrators	and	in	this	sense	their	professionalism	






The	 experiences	 of	 the	 example	 case	 organization	 show	 that	 since	 the	
separation	 of	 administration	 from	 the	 soviet,	 political	 governance	 has	
become	 a	 separate	 sphere	which	does	not	 touch	upon	 the	daily	work	of	







effect	 of	 legalism	 and	 educational	 awareness	 of	 the	 administrators.	The	
personal	 responsibility	 of	 officials	 has	 grown	 along	 with	 demands	 on	
commitment.	The	example	case	showed	that	the	Russian	local	administration	
organ	 can	 possess	 considerable	 initiative	 in	 the	 organization	 of	 its	 own	




lines	 had	 some	 of	 their	 initial	 thoughts	 (such	 as	 citizen´s	 right	 to	 sue,	
separation	of	powers	and	so	on)	materializing.	These	groups	have	dominated	
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private	 economy.	 The	 roles	 which	 actors,	 including	 the	 local	 level	
administration	have	in	this	new	situation	are	much	more	clearly	defined.	
The	 political	 has	 evolved	 into	 a	 new	 meaning,	 truly	 political,	 and	 the	
administration	into	a	management	of	state	administrative	affairs.	
Socially	 the	 state	 and	 the	market	 economy	now	preside	over	different	
realities.	In	the	former,	the	position	of	people	who	were	“functionaries”	or	
“bourgeois”	 in	the	Soviet	system	have	been	dominant.	 (Kordonskii	2000:	





re-education	 and	 personnel	 policy.	 In	 every	 case,	 the	 local	 level	 line	
administrator	 had	 acquired	 a	 social	 space	 which	 was	 wider	 and	 a	 legal	
status	which	was	stronger	than	the	one	in	the	Soviet	Union.	
The	 ongoing	 serious	 conflicts	 in	 the	 Russian	 society	 (polarization	 of	
wealth,	 poverty,	 weak	 services	 and	 war)	 have	 continued	 to	 affect	 the	
development	of	 administrative	 thinking	 through	political	 instability.	The	
reaction	 to	 these	 risks	 has	 been	 to	 use	 legal	 reasons	 as	 purposes	 and	
security	organs	as	a	method	 to	 tighten	 the	administrative	control	 from	
the	 center.	 As	 a	 side-effect,	 casualties	 in	 this	 struggle	 have	 appeared.	
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centralization	and	authoritarian	 tendencies.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	use	of	










first	 time	 in	 Russian	 history	 (shown	 in	 annex	 E).	 A	 place	 for	 local	
administration	exists	where	administrators	can	develop	the	use	of	discretion.	
The	use	of	information	seems	to	have	assumed	a	“revolutionary”	role.	Work	




This	 study	 has	 looked	 at	 the	 transition	 of	 administrative	 culture	 in	 the	
municipal	administration	of	Russia	in	four	different	historical	time	periods.	
I	 have	 described	 how	 new	 structures	 based	 on	 a	 new	 ideology	 of	
administrative	 change	 and	 the	 old	 culture	 converged	 in	 the	 transition	
processes	to	produce	cultures	different	from	the	original	political	purposes	
of	 those	 transitions.	Here	 I	wish	 to	 return	 to	 the	 theoretical	 framework	
described	at	 the	beginning	of	 this	work	and	draw	on	the	main	empirical	
findings	 to	 answer	 a	 number	 of	 questions	 concerning	 the	 transitions	 of	
local	administration	culture	in	Russia.	Each	question	forms	a	sub-heading	
to	the	subsequent	sections	of	this	concluding	chapter.	
7.1 How Can One Define Local Administration in 
the Russian Context? 
I	 defined	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 work	 to	 be	 the	 executive	 functions	 of	 local	
government,	 jointly	administered	 functions	of	 the	 local	and	state	 levels	
and	 state	 organs	 in	municipalities.	The	 reason	 for	 this	 wide	 definition	
which	includes	different	internal	variations	of	administration	at	the	local	
level,	 is	practical.	From	a	historical	perspective,	 the	cultural	 realities	of	
local	self-government	have	been	administratively	less	important	in	Russia	










the	 territorial	 designs	 and	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 decision	 making	 which	
followed	held	a	significant	meaning	in	the	creation	of	local	administrative	
culture.	
Historically,	 a	 more	 difficult	 task	 is	 to	 decide	 what	 is	 considered	
“administration”	 in	 general.	 Is	 there	 a	difference	between	governing	 and	
administration?	Is	it	the	goal	of	modernization	to	make	governing	into	a	
professional	administration?	 In	 this	 study	administration	was	defined	by	
reference	 to	 three	 key	 aspects:	 the	 publicness	 of	 its	 decision	making,	 its	
relationship	 with	 citizenry	 and	 the	 organizational	 frame	 in	 which	
professionalism	 developed.	 I	 argued	 that	 all	 these	 aspects	 are	 important	
when	we	try	to	see	what	administrative	culture	is	like.
In	 the	 19th	 century	 the	 Russian	 provincial	 development	 also	 served	
territorial	control.	Regional	and	local	levels	were	connected	with	the	need	
to	strengthen	the	political	rule	of	the	Tsar	and	his	court.	Peter	the	Great´s	
reforms	meant	 an	 attempt	 to	 professionalize	 the	 bureaucratic	 structures	
through	 civil	 service	 reforms.	His	 reforms	were	 indeed	 a	 perestroika of	
turning	governing	into	a	more	professional	administration.	The	transition	
was	only	partial,	most	of	all	because	of	the	political	restraints	which	enabled	
the	 law	 from	 becoming	 a	 genuine	 independent	 instrument	 of	 the	
administration.	 In	 the	 transitions	 of	 the	 160´s	 and	 10´s,	 the	 local	
political	 freedoms	 were	 extended	 to	 manage	 the	 population´s	 social,	
educational,	 legal	 and	other	needs	better.	The	political	discussions	about	
the	 local	 level	 stressed	 most	 of	 all	 the	 governing	 aspect	 of	 the	 local	
administration.	The	Bolshevik	government	tried	to	unite	both	professional	
expertise	 and	 political	 participation	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 In	 the	 transition	
process,	 the	 Soviet	 local	 level	 became	 a	 market	 of	 different	 sectoral	
administrative	organizations	under	the	political	umbrella	of	 the	party.	In	




transition	 has	 also	 meant	 a	 period	 of	 fluctuating	 development.	 On	 one	
hand,	 there	was	 a	 possibility	 to	 develop	 local	 executive	 functions	 into	 a	
separate	 administration.	 And	 this	 indeed	 took	 place	 after	 1991.	 On	 the	
other	 hand,	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 instability	 and	 the	 regional	
developments	 have	 slowed	 down	 the	 professional	 modernization	 of	 the	
local	level.	The	centralization	which	has	been	used	by	President	Putin	as	a	














It	 is	 too	 early	 to	 say	what	 the	 present	 transition	 really	means	 for	 the	
development	of	 local	 administration.	A	new	 federal	 law	“On	 the	general	
principles	of	Local	Government”	(Federalnyi	zakon	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	ot	





been	 as	 open	 as	 it	 is	 now.	 Information	 and	 technology	particularly	 help	
organizational	 learning	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 Legality	 as	 an	 ideology	 of	
administration	in	the	present	constitutional	context	would	seem	to	offer	a	
chance	 for	 institutional	 modernization.	 Economic	 independence	 of	 the	


























pleasure	 of	 pattern	 recognition	 for	 the	 genuine	 pleasure	 of	 causal	
explanation”.	 Holmes	 suggests	 that	 instead	 of	 reaching	 for	 the	 past,	 we	
should	 look	 at	 the	 present	 in	 order	 to	 find	 reasons	 for	 reform	 slowness	
(Holmes	1996:	2,	49).
Holmes	argues	that	“the	reform-inhibiting	baggage	that	Russians	carry	
with	 them	 is	 more	 situational	 than	 psychological.	 Russians	 are	
psychologically	 prepared	 to	 obey	 the	 law,	 provided	 the	 law	 is	 enforced”.	










Using	 Holmes´arguments	 as	 a	 starting	 point,	 I	 ask	 the	 following	
questions:	1)	How	much	can	we	understand	of	the	present	by	knowing	what	
past	cultures	have	been	like?	2)	Does	analyzing	the	present	administrative	
culture	 help	 to	 see	 what	 is	 ahead	 after	 10	 or	 20	 years?	 3)	What	 is	 the	
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connection	 of	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	 state	 and	 its	 administrative	
culture?
Administrative	 types	 show	 the	 dominant	 qualities	 of	 administrative	




periods.	 Reform	 attempts	 which	 have	 been	 looked	 at	 as	 processes	 of	




This	 same	 view	 is	 expressed	 also	 by	Matti	Mälkiä,	 for	 instance,	 who	
categorizes	 different	 approaches	 to	 studying	 the	 history	 of	 public	
administration	 (Mälkiä	 1995).	 Particularly	 policy-analytic	 studies	 which	
consider	 the	 tasks	 and	 goals,	 and	 their	 attainment	 involve	 studying	 that	
which	 lies	 behind	 a	 certain	 culture.	 Similarly,	 administrative-historical	
























changes.	 Transitions	 have	 been	 long	 and	 costly	 both	 humanly	 and	
economically.	














7.3 The Specificity of Russian Administration
The	 cultural	 elements	 studied	 in	 this	work	 and	 the	 changes	which	 took	




used	 in	 this	 study	 (economy,	 authority,	 laws	 and	 rules,	 organization,	
information	and	language,	leadership,	personnel,	clients	and	citizens)	and	
maps	 the	 shifts	 in	 their	 local	 interpretation	 and	 application	 across	 four	
identifiable	administrative	time	periods	in	contrast	to	the	liberal	democratic	
ideal	type.
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Table 1: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by economy 
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central planning 
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Table 2: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
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authority
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a loss of control 
and gaining new 
authority
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Table 3: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by laws 
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Table 4: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
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Table 5: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
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Table 6: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
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Table 7 : Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
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Table 8 : Analysis of changes in local administration culture by clients 
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The	 specificity	 of	 Russian	 administration	 refers	 to	 the	 unique	 historical	





































state	 subsidies	 for	 fulfilling	 local	 tasks	has	 reduced	 the	meaning	of	 local	
decision	making	from	the	point	of	view	of	 the	executive	side.	Today,	 the	
citizen´s	voice	can	most	effectively	be	heard	in	local	activism	of	different	
sorts.	 The	 Murmansk	 case	 study	 shows	 an	 example	 of	 Russian	 local	
administration	which	has	 for	 the	most	part	 had	 an	 active	 and	 informed	
clientele,	often	demanding	the	service	which	it	is	entitled	to.	
In	 comparison,	 the	 post-revolutionary	 Stalinist	 local	 government	
suffocated	 free	 competition	 and	 local	 activism.	The	 leadership	 thought	
that	 political	 control	 of	 local	 developments	 and	 the	 mobilization	 of	







result,	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 there	 were	 many	 locally	 organized	 state	
organizations	 which	 performed	 social	 and	 cultural	 functions	 and	 now	
have	 to	 be	 managed	 by	 local	 governments,	 non-governmental	 organi-
zations	or	private	enterprises.	
The	 information	 revolution	 started	 in	 the	 perestroika	 period.	 The	
relaxation	 of	 censorship	 and	 the	 possibility	 to	 receive	 information	 from	
around	 the	world	 changed	Russian	 localities	more	 than	 anything	 else.	 It	
also	 changed	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 local	 administration	 and	 its	
clientele	which	became	divided	into	new	social	and	ethnic	groups	which	
had	no	official	meaning	in	the	Soviet	Union.	Because	of	information,	the	





which	 were	 interviewed	 in	 the	Murmansk	 case	 study	 could	 in	 this	 way	
moderate	the	difficulties	faced	by	the	organization	in	the	transition	period.	






the	 administration´s	 internal	 power	 struggles.	 The	 collective	 is	 also	
important	in	terms	of	introducing	new	methods	of	working	style.	
The	 tsarist	 administrative	 culture	 was	 characterized	 by	 the	 formal	









Russia,	 professional	 standards	 were	 most	 effectively	 introduced	 by	
independent	 non-governmental	 organizations,	 such	 as	 the	 lawyers´	 and	
teachers´professional	 associations.	 In	 the	 pre-1905	 class	 based	 adminis-
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local	 administration	 both	 serve	 as	 examples	 of	 time	 periods	 when	
experiments	 in	 the	delegation	of	power	and	subsequent	centralization	of	
political	power	have	followed	each	other.	In	both	periods,	local	professional	




The	 Stalinist	 local	 administration	 was	 geared	 most	 of	 all	 toward	 the	
division	 of	 power	 territorially	 and	 functionally	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	






controlled	 the	 latter.	 In	 the	 administrative	 culture,	 the	 professional	
knowledge	of	the	these	groups	was	subordinated	to	the	task	of	executing	
decisions	 which	 were	 politically	 based	 bureaucratic	 directives	 from	 the	
ministry.	In	cases	of	resources,	the	executive	committee	of	the	local	soviet	
was	one	player	in	the	local	decision	making	market	politically	coordinated	





way	 of	 socializing	 the	 work	 force	 and	 reproducing	 the	 state´s	 authority	
base.	 Executive	 power	 was	 shifted	 to	 the	 administration	 in	 which	 the	









disinclined	 to	 pay	 great	 attention	 to	 party	 resolutions	 concerning	 their	
activity	 in	 the	Soviet	period.	Economic	power	which	 the	ministries	had,	
“took	over	and	dominated	the	political	sphere	to	the	extent	that	the	latter	
was	itself	economized,	or	ministerialized.	[…]	The	power	of	the	ministerial	
apparatus,	 through	 its	 control	 over	material	 resources,	 allowed	 them	 to	
determine	 the	 success	 or	 otherwise	 of	 those	who	were	nominally	 in	 the	










of	my	 study	 was	 not	 purely	 structural,	 but	 political.	The	 administrative	



















be	 seen	 as	having	 failed	because	of	 the	 administrative	market	 itself.	The	
party	could	not	dictate	structural	changes,	because	it	had	given	up	repressive	
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methods	of	the	kind	which	were	used	in	the	revolution.	The	mature	Soviet	
administrative	 market	 had	 created	 rather	 safe	 enclaves	 for	 different	
participants	 which	 could	 not	 be	 broken	 or	 easily	 changed.	 In	 a	 society	
where	unemployment	 could	not	 exist,	 the	 question	 is	 also	what	was	 the	
actual	 meaning	 of	 party	 resolutions?	 Was	 the	 meaning	 to	 execute	 the	
modernization	 of	 whole	 structures	 or	most	 of	 all	 show	 concern	 for	 the	
society´s	 development	 and	 perform	 a	 rhetorical	 role	 in	 the	 public	
discussion?	
In	 the	 perestroika	 administration	 professionalism	was	 looked	 at	 from	
the	point	of	view	of	work	ethics.	Symptoms	of	the	lack	of	motivation	and	
the	 dysfunctional	 features	 of	 the	 administrative	 market	 needed	 to	 be	
corrected.	 Professionalism	 was	 underlined	 in	 the	 work	 environment	
campaigns	 concerning	 alcoholism	 and	 unearned	 incomes.	 Yet,	 the	





state	 servants	or	 local	 government	 administrative	workers.	This	 time,	 the	
need	has	been	to	create	a	work	force	able	to	make	delegated	decisions	in	a	
constantly	changing	 legal	environment	and	demanding	pressure	 from	the	
public.	 In	 the	 case	 study,	 the	 Murmansk	 administrators	 underlined	 the	






















































requires	 extra	 attention	 from	 the	 administration	 –	 but	 it	 is	 vital	 for	 the	
existence	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Russia.
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and	 structural	 levels	 (administrative	 and	 economic	 hierarchies,	 center-





inside	 the	 civil	 service	 (central-regional-local,	 regional	 heads	 of	
municipalities	and	so	on).	In	the	light	of	history,	territoriality	has	been	a	
major	cultural	element	in	administration.	






reforms	 of	 the	 160´s	 and	 10´s	 it	 acquired	 a	 new	 social	 and	 political	
meaning	as	the	zemstvo	and	town	governments	were	given	responsibility	
over	 local	matters.	But	again,	as	Russian	statehood	began	 to	emerge,	 the	
local	 level	 became	 officially	 subordinated	 to	 the	 state´s	 administrative	
needs.	 In	 terms	 of	 practices,	 the	 changes	 in	 ideology	meant	 alternating	


























the	 administrative	market.	The	double	 administrative	 structure,	 in	 itself,	
meant	 that	 in	 the	 political	 administration	 the	 higher	 party	 organ	 could	
always	influence	the	lower	level	decision	making.	The	administrative	organs	
in	general	acted	as	extra-constitutional	arbitrators	in	the	market.	The	fact	
that	 the	higher	 level	has	retained	 the	final	 say	 in	administrative	decision	
making	in	Russian	history	has	itself	been	connected	with	the	problems	of	
geographic	 governance	 and	 the	 coexistence	 of	 unofficial	 networks	 along	
formal	channels.	
Territoriality	is	present	in	the	formation	of	administrative	culture	at	the	
local	 level	 today	because	 the	 separation	of	 state	 administration	 from	 the	
economic	 administration	 (Kordonskii	 2000)	has	made	 the	 lines	between	
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7.5 Is the Liberal-Democratic Ideal Type Useful in 
Understanding Other Types?
This	work	attempted	 to	describe	 and	understand	 the	Russian	and	Soviet	
local	administration	cultures	with	a	set	of	elements	derived	from	the	liberal-
democratic	ideal	type.	The	purpose	was	to	see	how	the	present	transition	


















type,	 is	 of	 course,	 that	 they	 do	 not	 cover	 all	 types	 and	 are	 particularly	
difficult	 to	 apply	when	 transitional	 regimes/states	 are	 concerned.	This	 is	
why	 I	 have	 included	 other	 considerations	 in	 the	 examination	 of	 the	
transition	in	which	the	administrative	culture	develops.	For	instance,	ideas	
from	Fred	Riggs´classic	“Prismatic	Society”	model	have	been	borrowed	in	
the	 analysis	 of	 former	 socialist	 societies	 in	 transition,	 although	 it	 was	
originally	created	for	the	analysis	of	so	called	developing	nations.	In	this	
work,	 Riggs´	 ideas	 are	 used	 in	 the	 description	 of	 the	 ecology	 of	













mechanistic	 requirements	 for	 each	 element.	 For	 instance	 “transparency”	
could	be	studied	by	looking	at	how	many	institutional	actors	can	take	part	
in	 decision	 making	 and	 at	 what	 moment	 the	 general	 public	 has	 been	
informed	about	a	forthcoming	decision	making	process.	





as	 “culture”.	 In	 this	 work,	 differences	 have	 been	 looked	 as	 qualities	 of	
elements	 of	 administrative	 culture.	 Administrative	 elements	 have	 been	








discard	 a	 concept	 related	 with	 liberal-democratic	 tradition,	 it	 is	 more	
fruitful	to	see	what	its	meaning	has	been	in	other	contexts.	As	the	Russian/








how	 things	 have	 happened	 in	 the	 transitions	 of	 chosen	 elements	 of	
administrative	 culture.	 Summing	 up	 the	 main	 changes	 and	 the	 new	
dominant	 elements	 of	 local	 administrative	 culture	 has	 shown	 the	












was	 also	 instituted	 which	 involved	 a	 larger	 group	 of	 people	 into	 the	
administration.	
In	comparison	to	the	ideal	type	of	liberal-democratic	government,	the	
tsarist	 town	 administration	 culture	had	 a	 limited	non-political	 authority	
base.	This	authority	was	mediated	by	the	decision	making	procedures	which	
underpinned	the	autocratic	character	of	the	state.	Local	actors	could,	within	
their	 own	 restricted	 sphere	 (particularly	 professional),	 effect	 changes.	
However,	 the	 weakness	 of	 the	 administrative	 authority	 (both	 the	



















compared	 to	 the	 tsarist	 system.	This	 meant	 that:	 1)	 final	 authority	 was	
conclusions
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Glasnost	 encouraged	 discussion	 about	 the	 administration.	 Political	
repression	was	no	longer	a	weapon	against	the	opposition	inside	the	party.	
“Socialist	 rule	 of	 law”	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	 incorporate	 liberal-democratic	
ideals	of	good	government	into	the	system	of	democratic	centralism.	The	
contradiction	was	impossible	to	overcome	and	its	failure	was	all	the	more	
disappointing	 because	 of	 the	 other	 great	 problems	 of	 the	 perestroika 
period.	
In	comparison	to	the	ideal	type	of	liberal-democratic	government,	the	







according	 to	 the	 requirements	 which	 the	 Constitution	 and	 federal	 laws	
based	on	it	have	set.	The	present	administrative	law	in	Russia,	although	still	
partially	in	the	making,	does	build	the	legislative	base	–	for	the	first	time	in	
Russian	history	–	 for	a	 rule	of	 law	administration.	 In	comparison	 to	 the	
ideal	 type	 of	 liberal-democratic	 government,	 the	 “good	 government”	
principles	in	the	work	of	Russian	local	administration	have	suffered	from	
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of	 political	 decisions	 made	 in	 situations	 where	 planning	 is	 difficult	 or	
impossible.	The	connection	between	decisions,	 side-effects	 and	 risks	 can	
help	show	why	cultural	change	is	such	a	long	term	process.	Cultural	change	





Russian	 experience	 since	 the	 1990´s,	 the	 administratively	 problematic	
starting	point	was	 the	 lack	of	 institutional	consideration.	Too	many	vital	
questions	were	left	out	of	the	plan	because	it	was	hoped	that	society	itself	
would	eventually	 replace	most	 state	 services,	 and	 that	 law	and	hierarchy	
relations	 in	the	political	system	would	develop	in	time.	The	risks	created	
were	 both	 economic	 and	 political.	The	 development	 from	 then	 on	 has	
followed	the	text	book	description	of	risk	administration.	
Political	and	economic	changes	effect	administrations	directly,	but	not	
always	 in	 the	 intended	 way.	 In	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 Steven	








assume	 a	 powerful	 role	 in	 the	 whole	 social	 system,	 a	 social	 need	 for	


















2.	 ineffective	 planning	 as	 a	 result	 of	 structural	 changes	 (perestroika	
administration,	present	time)
3.	 quasi-market	of	 the	 economy	 (revolution	of	 191	 and	 the	present	
time)
4.	 non-coherent	state	system	(all	administrations)






.	 client	relations	are	complicated	by	 the	attempts	 to	enforce	 the	 law	
(all	administrations).	
The	use	 of	 security	 organs	 by	 the	 tsarist	 administration	 and	 the	 present	






In	 the	present	 transition,	 the	 centralization	has	 paradoxically	 served	 the	
strengthening	of	the	legal	position	of	the	local	level	at	the	expense	of	the	
regions	which	were	given	very	wide	power	in	the	beginning.	Regionalization	
resulted	 in	 a	 non-coherent	 state	 system	 and	 administrators	 acting	 as	
politicians.	The	developing	market	economy	was	often	abused	by	a	small	
elite	at	the	central	and	regional	levels.	The	response	has	been	the	setting	of	
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in	 the	 centralization	 of	 political	 power	 and	 its	 bureaucratization	 in	 the	
administration.
The	perestroika	 period	 in	 comparison	meant	 this	 development	 in	 the	
reverse	 order.	The	 centralization	 was	 dismantled	 with	 the	 help	 of	 tight	
policy	 rules	 (the	 anti-alcohol	 campaign,	 campaign	 against	 unearned	
incomes	and	so	on).	Political	pressure	 led	 to	complicated	client	relations	





would	mean	 choosing	 a	 political	 course	 instead	 of	 the	 “rational”	 choice	
which	 would	 consider	 “practical”	 realities	 (financial,	 organizational	





and	unwritten,	 “historical”)	 become	more	 severe	 because	 administrators	
need	to	be	forced	to	understand	the	changes.	It	could	be	said	for	instance,	
that	 President	 Putin	 has	 employed	 a	managerial	 style	 which	 underlines	
unity	of	decision	making	and	the	use	of	legal	grounds	for	strategic	choices.	
The	legislation	passed	during	Putin´s	regime	has	at	the	same	time	demanded	
the	 centralization	 of	 economic	 and	 foreign	 policy,	 and	 strengthened	 the	










chances	 for	 developing	 rule	 of	 law	 practices.	This	 is	 the	 paradox	 of	 the	
present	transition.
7.7 How Can Local Administration Cultures Be 
Viewed in Terms of Pluralist vs. Totalitarian and 
Integration vs. Political Process Theories of 
Government?
The	Russian/Soviet	administration	can	be	understood	both	as	a	totalitarian/
highly	 authoritarian	 regime	 and	 as	 an	 administratively	 pluralistic	
government.	Both	ways	of	looking	at	the	administration	concentrate	on	the	
central	government	and	see	 the	 local	 level	mostly	as	an	extension	of	 the	
central	culture.	
The	first	view	emphasizes	the	ruler	at	the	top	of	the	hierarchy	as	the	sole	




decision	 making	 power	 among	 different	 constituents.	 This	 was	 mainly	





all	 parts	 of	 the	 vast	 land	 into	 one	 structure	 which	 leads	 to	 him.	 The	










instance	Hammer	 1993).	According	 to	 this	 view,	 the	 Soviet	 government	
after	Stalin	was	not	ruled	by	a	single	dictator	but	by	the	most	 influential	
members	of	the	ruling	elite.	This	group	shared	the	same	prestige,	by	and	
large	 the	 same	 potential	 for	 leadership	 and	 a	 wide	 constituency	 in	 the	
structures	 of	 the	 country.	 No	 one	 person,	 in	 spite	 of	 his	 institutional	
position,	could	alone	decide	anything.	The	solidarity	of	all	members	of	the	
ruling	group	was	in	fact	needed	for	policy	decisions.	According	to	this	view,	
the	 decision	making	 at	 the	 top	was	 indeed	 a	 type	 of	 a	 political	 process,	
although	within	the	approved	version	of	the	communist	ideology.	
For	 the	 local	 level,	 however,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 it	 is	 less	 significant	
whether	the	top	consisted	of	one	or	10	people	if	the	authoritarian	culture	
demanded	unquestionable	obedience.	The	question	then	becomes:	did	the	
local	 level	 possess	 similar	 strong	 actors	 who	 reached	 a	 consensus	 in	 a	
bargaining	process?	The	pluralist	view	would	answer	this	question	positively.	
It	sees	the	local	level	as	a	battle	field	for	different	interests	who	could	gain	or	


































could	 adapt	 both	 their	 own	 behavior	 and	 affect	 the	 system.	 The	 local	
administrators	 had	 also	 possessed	 different	 channels	 of	 influence	 in	 the	
pre-perestroika	period.	It	had	been	possible	to	achieve	change	within	the	
political	 limitations	 of	 the	 system.The	 elite´s	 privileged	 position	 had	



















towns	 presented	 the	 town	 administration	 with	 legal	 and	 economic	
challenges.	 The	 authoritarian	 practices	 and	 ways	 of	 thought	 required	
officials	to	develop	a	set	of	administrative	skills	in	order	to	either	maximize	
their	influence	through	social	networks	or	retain	their	position.	Essential	to	






The	 smallness	 (both	 geographically	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 personnel)	 of	 the	
administration	itself	presented	a	problem.	There	were	not	genuinely	separate	
institutional	powers	at	the	local	level.	






purges	were	 specifically	 aimed	 at	 creating	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 institutional	
insecurity.	 Since	 the	 ruler	was	beyond	 law,	 and	 interpretation	of	 law	was	
dependent	on	his	political	calculations,	there	was	really	nothing	which	the	






The	 totalitarian	 view	 has	 emphasized	 that	 the	 resulting	 Soviet	
administration	was	one	of	total	control.	I	would	see	the	Soviet	administrative	
culture	as	one	which	did	succeed	in	creating	a	total	economic	bureaucracy	















is	because	all	 the	 institutional	actors	as	well	 as	 individuals	had	 the	 same	
political	 identity.	 For	 this	 to	 be	 certain,	 there	 was	 enough	 direct	 legal	
control.	Yet,	as	Darrell	Hammer	has	pointed	out,	 this	did	not	mean	 that	
conflict	 could	 not	 arise	 between	 the	 dominating	 party	 and	 the	 other	
institutional	 actors.	This	was	 in	 fact	 a	 continuous	 situation	which	was	 a	
result	 of	 their	 different	 functions	 (and	 cultural	 roles)	 in	 the	 planning	
structures.	All	actors	in	the	local	level	had	a	need	to	retain	their	positions	

















Since	 1991,	 the	 administrative	 market	 has	 been	 dominated	 by	 the	
executive	side	of	the	representational	administration	while	the	political	has	
disappeared	and	the	economic	administration	has	been	divided	into	state	
and	 private	 sectors.	 Tax	 collection	 has	 become	 the	 main	 purpose	 of	
administrative	change	in	the	formation	of	administrative	market	relations.	




sustains	 democracy.	 So	 far,	 this	 view	 has	 by	 and	 large	 been	 accepted,	
particularly	after	the	side-effects	and	risks	which	the	delegation	of	power	to	
regional	 level	effected	in	the	early	1990´s.	The	majority	of	Russian	voters	
have	 supported	 a	 view	 that	 intense	political	 fight	which	 affects	 the	 local	
administration	is	not	desirable.	Bureaucratic	politics	in	today´s	Russia	are	
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directed	 not	 just	 toward	 resources,	 but	 indeed	 toward	 the	 choosing	 of	
policies	 inside	 individual	 organizations.	 This,	 together	 with	 the	 legally	
stronger	position	of	officials,	makes	it	possible	for	them	the	have	the	kind	of	
institutional	power	that	has	not	existed	before.	It	is	too	early	to	predict	what	
the	 change	 will	 bring	 as	 a	 side-effect.	 That	 is,	 whether	 the	 political	
centralization	will	lead	to	more	control	of	the	economic	side	and	eventual	
liberalization	of	 administration,	or	 fail	 and	 lead	 to	more	dependency	on	
security	control,	or	something	else	entirely.
7.8 What Is the Meaning of Ideologies and 








on	making	 sense	 of	 experience	 long	 after	 the	myth	 itself	 has	 ceased	 to	
correspond	 to	 observed	 facts,	 because	 they	 are	 a	 vital	 part	 of	 the	 social	
relationships	through	which	men	conduct	themselves.”	(Yaney	193:	13.)
I	 would	 separate	 three	 types	 of	 myths	 with	 regard	 to	 transitions	 of	
administrative	culture:	political	 ideologies	as	 texts,	 laws	 in	 state	building	
and	finally	traditions/rituals	which	sustain	a	belief	in	the	justification	of	the	
transition.	Political	 ideologies	serve	as	 the	starting	point	 from	which	 the	
enthusiasm	 for	 the	 change	 is	 drawn.	They	 are	 idealistic	 but	 yet	 contain	
enough	practical	suggestion	and	plans	to	have	significance	for	law	makers	
who	execute	the	actual	planning	of	ideologies.	This	is	why	laws	are	systems	



























Mikhail	Gorbachev´s	perestroika	 reforms	are	 the	most	 recent	Russian	
example	 of	 an	 attempt	 to	 materialize	 myths.	 Kordonskii	 (2000)	 has	
concluded	that	the	result	was	the	legitimization	of	the	dissident	language.	
The	 19th	 century	 reforms	 and	 Vladimir	 Putin´s	 presidency	 have	 been	
somewhat	more	 pragmatic	 in	 rhetoric.	The	main	 concern	 has	 been	 the	
strengthening	of	governability	at	all	levels	of	the	state.	Yet	this	purpose	has	
been	 legitimized	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 “restoration	 of	 Russian	 greatness”	 to	
motivate	changes	and	obedience	to	law.	
Myths	become	interesting	in	the	state	building	process.	Laws	are	fickle	
tools	which	 can	 both	 build	 harmony	 and	 security,	 or	 create	 inequalities	
which	affect	generations	to	come.	No	dictator	is	needed	for	the	latter	to	take	
place.	 Nor	 are	 all	 harmful	 laws	 evil	 from	 the	 outset.	 The	 study	 of	
administrative	culture	shows	that	inaction	is	one	of	the	most	effective	long	
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Russian	 law	 was	 most	 of	 all	 a	 punishing	 and	 demanding	 tool	 for	 the	
authorities	 which	 sustained	 order	 in	 the	 society	 or	 collected	 taxes.	The	
developing	 legal	 protection	 and	 sense	 of	 citizen´s	 rights	 did	 not	 have	
enough	 time	 to	make	 deep	 roots	 before	 the	 revolution.	 Stalinism	 in	 the	
Soviet	Union	on	the	other	hand	strived	to	make	law	a	tool	of	both	irregular	
political	 coercion	 and	 systematic	 administrative	 non-policy	 routines.	 In	
this	a	“non-systematic”	administrative	society	was	created	from	the	point	of	
view	of	legal	trust	in	which	dependency	was	attached	to	a	person	of	authority	
(comp.Yaney	 193:	 15).	 Feedback	 from	 the	 population	 through	
representational	organs	was	limited	and	replaced	by	intelligence	which	was	
extended	territorially	for	use	in	planning.	Other	types	of	control	systems	
evolved	 inside	organizations	and	 in	 society	at	 large	which	 supplemented	
the	 lack	 of	 legal	 consciousness	 in	 social	 relations.	 The	 administrative	
market,	 which	 has	 been	 discussed	 previously	 in	 this	 work,	 is	 a	 major	
example.	









are	 most	 of	 all	 a	 reaction	 to	 the	 past.	 They	 are	 usually	 meant	 to	 stop	




































require	 taking	 the	public	 sector	as	 the	 starting	point	of	 changes.	Careful	
consideration	 needs	 to	 be	 given	 to	 that	 which	 needs	 to	 be	 public.	The	
authority	of	different	institutions	needs	to	be	clarified	and	supported	with	
strong	 economic	 policies	 to	 avoid	 power	 vacuums	 and	 anarchic	
reorganization	 of	 power	 relations	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 law.	 The	 Russian	
transitions	 show	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 authority	 is	 a	 strong	 risk	 factor	 for	









disrupted	 by	 side-effects	 of	 the	 social	 system	 which	 returns	 them	 as	
dysfunctions.	In	many	cases	the	dysfunctions	become	institutionalized	and	
it	 is	 difficult	 to	 separate	 them	 from	 the	 formal	 system.	 An	 important	
example	of	such	a	dysfunction	is	the blat	 in	the	Soviet	system	(Ledeneva	
2000).	Blat	as	a	system	of	mutual	assistance	was	used	as	an	informal	daily	




the	 outcome	 of	 intervention.	 The	 success	 of	 transition	 is	 naturally	 the	
correspondence	of	the	outcome	with	the	original	purposes	of	administrative	
change.	But	in	actuality,	the	side-effects	which	easily	take	over	the	process,	
demand	 alterations	 and	modifications	 to	 the	 original	 purposes.	 In	 some	
cases,	side-effects	produce	positive	consequences.	
In	recent	times,	the	activity	of	Russian	citizens	at	the	grass	roots	level	has	





The	 outcome	 of	 the	 191	 revolution	 in	 the	 longer	 term	was	 a	 bit	more	
successful	in	terms	of	the	original	purposes	which	Lenin	formulated.	The	
evaluation	 problem	 here	 is	 more	 the	 romanticization	 of	 Lenin´s	
revolutionary	 thinking,	 followed	 by	 the	 idea	 that	 “the	 new	 culture”	 –	
ideology	in	this	case	–	failed.	
There	 is	 a	 rather	 cynical	 and	 surrendering	 idea	 that	major	 economic	
changes	necessarily	produce	“casualties”,	even	 in	 the	 form	of	 loss	of	 lives	
and	destroyed	 futures,	which	pass	 in	 a	 generation´s	 time	and	 eventually	
result	in	a	better	life	for	everyone.	This	idea	is	often	seen	as	the	only	realistic	
choice,	sad	but	unavoidable.	Looking	at	Russian	transitions,	it	is	possible	to	








rational	 manner	 which	 considered	 avoiding	 power	 vacuums	 in	 state	
building	as	the	main	priority	of	political	changes.	This	has	never	been	done.	
Other	 forms	of	revolutions	have	 taken	place	with	a	high	cost	and	mixed	
results,	 which	 have	 then	 required	 remedies	 for	 long	 periods	 of	 time.	
Permanent	 administrative	 dysfunctions	 have	 been	 created	 as	 a	 result	 of	
revolutionary	changes.	
In	 the	 evaluation	 of	 transitions,	 dysfunctions	 present	 a	 challenge.	
Dysfunctions	which	are	permanent	dominant	features	of	the	old	culture	are	
often	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 obstacles	 in	 the	 development	 of	 new	
administrative	practices.	Yet	 still,	historical	experiences	which	have	been	
examined	 in	 this	 study	 also	 point	 to	 another	 explanation.	 Ideologies	 of	
administrative	 change	which	do	not	understand	or	 consider	 the	 cultural	
meaning	of	dysfunctions	(such	as	blat)	within	the	old	culture	and	use	these	
mechanisms	in	the	building	of	new	practices,	can	lead	to	failure	or	cycle	of	
risk	 decision	 making.	 One	 result	 of	 this	 is	 that	 instead	 of	 wiping	 the	
dysfunction	 away,	 the	 administrative	 culture	 recycles	 it	 in	 a	 new	 form.	





individuals	 are	 given	 encouragement	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	between	old	 and	
new.	 In	 reality	 though,	 the	 result	 has	 usually	 been	 the	 isolation	of	 these	
example	individuals	while	the	majority	has	not	moved	at	all,	sometimes	due	
to	lack	of	good	leaders.	(Yaney	193:	3.)






Stephan	 Holmes	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 state	
depends	on	 its	ability	 to	elicit	voluntary	cooperation.	This	 takes	place	 in	
liberalized	structures	which	rebuild	 the	nation´s	 infrastructure	and	push	
the	illegal	elements	to	their	“normal”	sphere.	Civil	society	also	requires	a	
stable	 government	 which	 does	 not	 change	 legal	 rules	 too	 often.	 As	 a	
conclusion	 to	his	analyses	of	 the	 success	 factors	he	makes	 the	point	 that	









an	 effective	 chain	 of	 command,	 not	 merely	 building	 judicially	 tended	













is	 that	 weak	 administrative	 structures,	 whether	 as	 a	 result	 of	 politics	 or	
economics,	cannot	maximize	the	benefit	from	organizational	learning.
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Annex A: Zemstvos in the main structures of the Russian government 
after 1864  (from chapter 3)
CENTRAL LEVEL
TSAR
Supreme organs:    
(Verkhovnye organy)
1.SENATE (Supreme Court) 
2.STATE COUNCIL
3.COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
4.His Majesty´s Imperial Chancellery
5.Council of Ministers
the Military  Council, the Admiralty 
Council,the  Finance Committee, 
the Guard ship Council
6.Imperial Office of Petitions
Ministerial system:
MINISTRIES
Ministry of Interior: The Central




Imperial  Secret Police (1883)
        
REGIONAL or TERRITORIAL LEVEL (GUBERNIIA)
Governor (named by Senate)
heading the regional board:
general bureau and chancellery
Estates
Ministries and their departments in the 
region
Prosecutors     Courts
Administration of zemstvo and town 
affairs (1870-1917): supervision of 
legality and jurisdistion of local 
government and police
Provincial bureau of zemstvo affairs 
(1890)
LOCAL LEVEL OF THE GUBERNIIA
Provincial sub-level
Estates
Local agencies of the central 
government, for instance police 
(subordinated to the Ministry of Interior 
in 1880)
Prosecutors     Courts
Zemstvos (1864): assembly (sobranie) and adminisration (board), headed by a chairman 
(predsedatel zemskogo uprava)
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Annex B: Town administration in the main structures of the Russian 
government after 1870 (from chapter 3)
CENTRAL LEVEL
TSAR





3. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
4. His Majesty´s Imperial Chancellery
5.Council of Ministers
the Military  Council, the Admiralty 
Council,the  Finance Committee, 
the Guard ship Council
6.Imperial Office of Petitions
Ministerial system:
MINISTRIES
Ministry of Interior: The Central







REGIONAL or TERRITORIAL LEVEL (GUBERNIIA)
Governor (named by Senate)
who headed the regional (or provincial) 
board: general bureau and chancellery
Estates
Ministries and their departments in the 
region
Prosecutors    Courts
Administration of zemstvo and town 
affairs (1870-1917):
supervision of legality and jurisdistion 
of local government and police
LOCAL LEVEL OF THE GUBERNIIA
Provincial sub-level
Estates
Local agencies of the central
government, for instance police 
(subordinated to the Ministry of Interior 
in 1880)
Prosecutors    Courts
Provincial town Dumas and executive boards, headed by mayors
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Annex C: The main structures of the Soviet government in 1930´s 
(from chapter 4)
Control Representational Political Economic
STATE LEVEL
Congress of Soviets: 
Federal Soviet
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Annex D: The main structures of the Soviet government, 1986-1990 
(from chapter 5)








Congress of People´s 
representatives of USSR
Supreme





























































1. Duma 2. Upper House
(450)                (150)
















THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AREA LEVEL 
(7 AREAS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
Headed by a presidential representative who 
is assisted by a staff
SUBJECT LEVEL (Regional level)
AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY
AN ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS 
LED BY A GOVERNOR
Courts
THE REGIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS OF
MINISTRIES AND CENTRAL 
ADMINISTRATIONS (SERVICES)




Local courts  
Prosecutors
Locally elected
reprentative body CITY ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS LED
BY AN ELECTED MAYOR
STATE ADMINISTRATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL:
 a) State administration carried out by the 
local executive organ such as pensions and 
social services.
 b)Locally functioning state administration 
bodies such the militia.





Anckar,	Dag	(194),	A	Definition	of	Democracy.	-	-	Essays on democratic 
Theory.	Ilmajoki.
Anckar,	 Dag	 (194),	 Responsiveness and Information: On Preference Inventories.	
Ilmajoki.	
Argyris,	Chris	(19),	Organizational learning: a theory of action perspective.	Reading,	
Massachusetts.	
Beck,	 Ulrich	 (1996),	 The Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. Wiltshire:	 Sage	
Publications.
Bendix,	Reinhardt	(19),	Nation-building and citizenship. Studies of our changing social 
order. Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press.
Bergelson,	Mira	 B.	 (2005),	Context of Intercultural Communication: A Case Study of 
Russian-Western Interaction.	A	course	in	the	Aleksanteri-Institute,	the	University	of	
Helsinki,	31.1–4.2.2005.	
Brenner,	 Michael	 &	 Brown,	 Jennifer	 &	 Canter,	 David	 (eds.)	 (195),	 The research 
interview: uses and approaches.	London:	Academic	Press.
Brown,	Andrew	(1995),	Organizational Culture.	London,	Pitman	Publishing.	
Clark,	Gordon	L.	&	Dear,	Michael	(194),	State Apparatus, Structures and Language of 
Legitimacy.	Chatham:	Allen&	Unwin	Inc.
Denhardt,	Kathryn.G	(1994),	Organizational	Structure	as	a	Context	for	Administrative	
Ethics.	 -	 - Handbook of Administrative Ethics, Public Administration and Public 
Policy/52.	Ed.Terry	L.	Cooper.	




Franklin,	Jane	(ed.)	(199),	The Politics of Risk Society.	Cornwall,	Great	Britain.
Gagliardi,	 Pasquale	 (196),The	 Creation	 and	 Change	 of	 Organizational	 Cultures:	 A	
Conceptual	Framework.	--	Organizational Studies	196	/2.







Grosenick,	 Leigh	 E.	 (1994),	 Governmental	 Ethics	 and	 Organizational	 Culture.	 -	 -	
Handbook of Administrative Ethics, Public Administration and Public Policy/52.	Ed.
Terry	L.	Cooper.
Hammer,	Darrell	P.	(196), The USSR. The Politics of Oligarchy.	Colorado.
Heady,	Ferrel	(1996),	Public	Administration:	a	comparative	perspective.	USA.
Hogwood,	Brian	W.	&	Peters,	B.Guy	(195),	The Pathology of Public Policy.	New	York,	
Oxford	University	Press.
Hollis,	Guy	&	Plokker,	Karin	(1995), Towards democratic decentralization: transforming 
regional and local government in the new Europe. Brussels:	European	Commission.
Kiviniemi,	Markku	(1994),	Perspectives on Structure, Culture and Action.	Studies	in	the	
Public	 Administration	 of	 the	Welfare	 State,	 Administrative	Development	Agency.	
Helsinki.
Kiviniemi,	Markku	 (19), Structural Changes and the Differentiation of Bureaucratic 
Cultures.	Julkishallinnon	julkaisusarja	A,	N:o	1/19.
Kivivuori,	 Antti	 (194),	 Virkatyön	 eettisiä	 näkökulmia.	 -	 -	 Näkemyksiä hyvästä 
virkamiehestä ja virkamiesmoraalista.	 Artikkelikokoelma.	 Julkaisusarja	 B,	 nro	 32,	
194.Valtion	koulutuskeskus-valtion	painatuskeskus.
Larjavaara,	Ilmari	(2001), The Institutional Foundations of Administrative Development 
in Russia.	Aleksanteri	Papers	2:	2001.
Kordonskii,	Simon	(2000),	Rynki vlasti: Administrativnye rynki SSSR i Rossii.	Moskva:	
OGI.
Makarenko,	Viktor	Pavlovich	(199), Biurokratiia i stalinism.	Izdatelstvo	Rostovskovo	
universiteta,	Rostov-na-Don.
Martin,	Joanne	(1992),	Cultures in Organizations: three perspectives.	Oxford	University	
Press.
Moilanen,	Timo	(1999), Hallinto muuttuu, muuttuuko virkamiesetiikka? Valtionhallinnon 
virkamiesetiikka julkisen keskustelun, hallinnon kehittämisen ja kansainvälisen 







Mälkiä,	 Matti	 (1995),	 Hallintohistoria,	 hallintotiede,	 julkishallintotiede	 in	 Julkinen 
hallinto menneisyyden puristuksessa.	 -	 -	 toim.	 Stenvall,	 Jari	 ja	 Tiihonen,	 Seppo,	
Tampereen	yliopisto,	Hallintotiede	1995	A4.
Nahavandi,	 Afsaneh	 &	 Malekzadeh,	 Ali	 R	 (19),	 Acculturation	 in	 Mergers	 and	
Acquisitions.	-	-	Academy of Management Review 19,	vol.13,	no.1.
Nikkilä,	Juhani	(1992),	Hallintotyön ympäristö. Kohti tuloksellista ja palvelevaa hallintoa.	
Valtionhallinnon	kehittämiskeskus.	Helsinki:Vapk-kustannus.
Peters,	B.	Guy	(194),	The Politics of Bureaucracy.	New	York.
Riggs,	 Fred	 Warren	 (1964),	 Administration in Developing Countries. The Theory of 
Prismatic Society. Boston:	Houghton	Mifflin	Company.
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
354
Rousseau,	Denise	M.(1990),	Assessing	Organizational	Culture:	The	Case	for	Multiple	
Methods.	-	-	Organizational Climate and Culture.	Ed.	Benjamin	Schneider.	 Jossey-
Bass.
Rowney,	Ron	K.(199),	Transition to Techonology. The Structural Origins of the Soviet 
Administrative State.	Cornel	University	Press.




Salminen,	 Ari	 &	 Lehtinen,	 Sini	 (192),	 Hallintotiede ja vertaileva tutkimus.	 Vaasan	
korkeakoulun	julkaisuja,	tutkimuksia	No	6,	hallintotiede	1,	Vaasa.
Salminen	 Ari	 &	 Temmes,	 Markku	 (2000),	 Transitioteoriaa etsimässä. Kikimora	
Publications,	Series	B:10,	Saarijärvi.
Sigma	 Papers:	 no.2	 (1999), European principles for public administration.	 CCNM/
SIGMA/PUMA	(99)44/REV1.
Sharlet,	Robert	(1999),	Constitutional	Implementation	and	State-Building.	Progress	and	
Problems	of	Law	Reform	in	Russia.	-	-	State-Building in Russia. The Yel’tsin Legacy 
and the Challenge of the Future.	 Ed.Gordon	 B.	 Smith.	 Armonk,	 New	 York:	
M.E.Sharpe.
Silverman,	 David	 (195),	 Qualitative methodoly and Sociology: describing the Social 
World.	Aldershot	Gower.	




Handbook of Administrative Ethics, Public Administration and Public Policy/52.	Ed.Terry	
L.	Cooper.
Susiluoto,	Ilmari	(19),	Yhteiskunnan ohjaus ja hallinto.	Hermeneuttinen ja termino-
loginen selvitys venäjän kielen valtiota ja hallintoa tarkoittavasta “upravlenije” termistä.	
Helsingin	yliopiston	yleisen	valtio-opin	laitoksen	tutkimuksia,	Series	C:	Sosialististen	
järjestelmien	tutkimuksia,	Helsinki.
Temmes,	 Markku	 (1991),	 Johtaminen.	 Valtionhallinnon	 kehittämiskeskus,	 Helsinki:
Vapk-kustannus.
Thomson	 &	 Luthans,	 F.(1990),	 Organizational	 Culture:	 A	 Behavioral	 Perspective.	 --	
Organizational Climate and Culture.	Ed.Benjamin	Schneider,	San	Fransisco:	Jossey-
Bass	Inc.	Publishers.
Tiihonen,	 Seppo	 (1995),	 Ajallisesti	 rajatun	 hallinnon	 ongelman	 tutkimuksesta.	 -	 -	
Julkinen hallinto menneisyyden puristuksessa.	Toim.	Stenvall	Jari	and	Tiihonen	Seppo,	
Tampereen	yliopisto,	Hallintotiede	1995	A4.
Tilev,	Kukka-Maaria	 (1994),	Organisaation kulttuuriarvostusten ja sisäisen viestinnän 
arvostusten mittaaminen.	Helsingin	yliopiston	viestinnän	laitos,	Helsinki.
Tuomi,	 Jouni	 &	 Sarajärvi,	 Anneli	 (2004),	 Laadullinen tutkimus ja sisällönanalyysi. 
Tammi:	Jyväskylä.	










Yanitsky,	Oleg	(1999),	Russia	as	a	society	of	all-encompassing	risk.	-	-	Russia Today, a 
Sociological Outlook. Russian	Society	of	Sociologist,	Moscow.	
Yin,	Robert	(194), Case Study Research, Design and Methods. Applied	social	research	
methods	series,	vol.5.	Beverly	Hills:Sage.
The Transition of Administrative culture, 
1870–1916
Aarrevaara,	Timo	(1999), Restructuring Civil Service in Russian Public Administration.	
Ministry	of	Finance	Finland,	Helsinki.	
Abramov,	 Vitalii	 F.	 (199),	 Stanovleniia	mestnovo	 samoupravleniia	 v	 Rossii.	 Teoriia	




istorik, istoriia. Sbornik nauchih rabot,	 vypusk	 1.	 Evropeiskii	 Universitet,	 Sankt-
Peterburg.
Bowring,	Bill	 (2000),	Politics,	 the	Rule	 of	Law	 and	 the	 Judiciary.	 -	 -	 Institutions and 
Political Change in Russia.	Ed.	Neil	Robinson.	Great	Britain.	
Brower,	Daniel	R.(196),	Urban	Revolution	in	the	Late	Russian	Empire.	-	-	The city in 
the late imperial Russia,	ed.	Michael	Hamm,	Bloomington	Indiana.
Burbank,	Jane	(199),	Legal	Culture,	Citizenship,	and	Peasant	Jurisprudence:	Perspectives	
from	the	Early	Twentieth	Century.	-	-	Reforming Justice in Russia 1864–1996. Culture 




in Russia. An experiment in local self-government.	Ed.	Terrance	Emmons	and	Wayne	
S.	Vucinich.,	Cambridge.
Florinsky,	Michael	T.	(1969),	Russia: A short history.	London:	MacMillan.
Giltsenko,	L.V(1996),	Iz	istorii	stanovleniia	samoupravleniia	v	Rossii.	- -Gosudarstvo i 
pravo 2:1996.	RAN,	Institut	gosudarstva	i	prava,	Moskva.
Vchislo,	 F.	 (1992),	 Otnosheniia	 mezhdu	 pravitelstvom	 i	 mestnoi	 vlastiu.	 Stolipin	 i	
treteihonskaia	monarhiia.	-	-	Reformy ili revoliutsiia? Rossiia 1861–1917.	Rossiiskaia	
Akademiia	Nauk,	Sankt-Peterburg.
Hosking,	Geoffrey	A.	(193),	The Russian Constitutional Experiment, Government and 
Duma 1907–1914.	Cambridge:	University	Press.
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
356
Jonhson,	Robert.E	(192),	Liberal	professionals	and	professional	liberals	:	the	zemstvo	
statisticians	 and	 their	work.	 -	 -	The zemstvo in Russia. An expriment in local self-
government.	Ed.	Terrance	Emmons	and	Wayne	S.	Vucinich.	Cambridge.	
Kazantsev,	Sergei	M.(199),	The	Judicial	Reform	of	164	and	the	Procuracy	in	Russia.	
	-	-	Reforming Justice in Russia 1864–1996. Culture and Limits of Legal Order.	Ed.	Peter	
H.	Solomon	Jr.,	New	York.
Kimbell,	Elan	(1992),	Russkoe	grazhdanskoe	obshchestvo	i	politicheskii	krizis	v	epokhu	
velikikh	reform	159–163.	-	-Velikie reformy v Rossii.	Red.	Larissa	Zakharova,	Ben	
Eklof,	Jonh	Bushnell.	Moskva:	Izdatelstvo	Moskovskovo	universiteta.
Koivisto,	Mauno	(2001),	Venäjän idea (Russkaja ideja).	Jyväskylä:	Tammi.
Levin-Stankevich,	Brian	 (1996),	The	Transfer	 of	 Legal	Technology	 and	Culture:	 Law	
Professionals	 in	Tsarist	Russia.	 -	 -	Russia´s missing middle class. The professions in 
Russian history.	Ed.	Harley	Balzer.	Armonk,	New	York:	M.E.Sharpe.Inc.
Mamut,	 L.	 S.	 (red.)	 (1995), Instituty samoupravleniia: istoriko-pravovoe issledovanie.	
RAN,	Moskva:	“Nauka”.
Manifesto 17 October 1905.	File://R:\The	October	Manifesto	of	1905.htm
McDaniel,	Tim	(1996),	The Agony of the Russian Idea.	New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	
Press.
McKenzie	 Kermit	 (192),	 Zemstvo	 organization	 and	 role	 within	 the	 administrative	
structure.-	 -	 The zemstvo in Russia. An experiment in local self-government.	 Ed.	
Terrance	Emmons	and	Wayne	s.	Vucinich.	Cambridge.
Mezentsev,	 E.V.	 (1996),	 -	 -	 Gosudarstvennost´ Rossii, slovar´-spravochnik (kniga 1). 
Gosudarstvennie, tserkovie utzreshsdeniia, soslovnie organy mestnogo samoupravleniia, 
edinnitsy administrativno-territorialnovo, tserkovnovo i vedomstvennovo deleniia, 




Mustonen	 Peter	 (199),	 Sobstvennaia ego imperatorskogo velichestva kantseliariia.	
Saarijärvi:	Kikimora	Publications.
Nardova,	V.A.	 (1992),	Gorodskoe	 samoupravlenie	 v	Rossii	 posle	 reformy	10	 g.	 -	 -	
Velikie reformy v Rossii 1856–1879.	 Red.	 L.G.Zaharova,	 Ben	Eklof,	 Jonh	Bushnell,	
Moskva:	Moscow	University	Press.
Pearson,	 Thomas	 (19),	 Russian Officialdom in crisis. Autocracy and Local Self-
government 1861–1900.	New	York:	Press	Syndicate	of	the	University	of	Cambridge.	
Peterson,	Claes	(199),	Peter the Great´s Administrative and Judicial Reforms. Swedish 
Antecedents and the Process of Reception.	Lund.
Prosiankina,	 T.	 J.	 (1996),	 -	 -	Gosudarstvennost´ Rossii, slovar´-spravochnik (kniga 1). 
Gosudarstvennye, tserkonvye uchrezhdenia, soslovnye organy mestnogo samoupravleniia, 
edinitsy administrativno-territorialnogo, tserkovnogo i vedomstvennogo deleniia, 
konets XV veka - - fevral 1917 goda.	Vserossiiskii	nauchno-issledovatelskii	 institut	
dokumentovedeniia	i	arhivnogo	dela,	Moskva.




Raeff,	Marc	(1966),	Plans for Political Reform in Imperial Russia, 1730–1905.	Englewood	
Cliffs,	New	Jersey.
Raeff,	Marc	(194), Understanding imperial Russia, state and society in the Old Regime.	
New	York.	
Robbins,	Richard	G.	Jr	(1996),	The	Limits	of	Professionalization:	Russian	Governors	at	
the	beginning	of	the	Twentieth	Century.	Russia´s missing middle class. The professions 
in Russian history.	Ed.	Harley	Balzer.	Armonk,	New	York:	M.E.Sharpe.Inc.
Russian Fundamental Law of April 1906.	 File://R:\The	 Russian	 Fundamental	 Law	 of	
1906.htm
Seregny,	Scott	J.	(1996),	Professional	Activism	and	Association	Among	Russian	Teachers,	
164–1905.	-	-	Russia´s missing middle class. The professions in Russian history.	Ed.	
Harley	Balzer.	Armonk,	New	York:	M.E.Sharpe.Inc.
Shapiro,	Leonard	(196), Russian Studies.	Cornwall.
Shepelev,	L.E	(1999),	Chinovnyi mir Rossii XVII- nachalo XX veka.	Sankt-Peterburg.
Shlemin,	 P.I	 &	 Fadeev,	 V.I.	 (red.)	 (1993),	Mestnoe samoupravlenie Rossiiskii variant.	
RAN,	Institut	nauchnoi	informatsii	po	obshsestvennym	naukam,	Moskva.
Solomon,	Peter	H.	Jr.	(ed.)	(199), Reforming Justice in Russia 1864–1996. Power, Culture 
and the Limits of Legal Order.	New	York.
Taranovskii,	Teodor	(1992),	Sudebnaia	reforma	i	razvitie	politicheskoi	kul´tury	tsarskoi	
Rossii.	-	-	Velikie reformy v Rossii	1856–1879.	Red.	L.G.	Zaharova,	Ben	Eklof,	Jonh	
Bushnell,	Moskva:	Moscow	University	Press.
Tiihonen,	Seppo	(1994),	Herruus II.	Helsinki:	Hallintohistoriakomitea.	
Vorobieva	 J.S	 (1996),	 -	 -	 Gosudarstvennost´ Rossii, slovar´-spravochnik (kniga 1). 
Gosudarstvennye, tserkovnye uchrezhdeniia, soslovnye organy mestnogo samou-
pravleniia, edinnitsy administrativno-territorialnogo, tserkovnogo i vedomstvennogo 




Weissman,	 Neil	 B.	 (191), Reform in tsarist Russia, the state bureaucracy and local 
government, 1900–1914.	New	Brunswick,	New	Jersey:	Rutgers	University	Press.
Yaney,	George	L.	 (193),	Social Evolution in the Domestic Administration of Imperial 
Russia, 1711–1905.	Urbana,	Illinois:	University	of	Illinois	Press.
The Transition of Administrative Culture, 
1917–1938 
Berman,	 Harold	 J.	 (1963),	 Justice in the USSR.	An Interpretation of Soviet Law.	The	
Russian	Research	Center	Studies;	3,	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press.
Bowring,	Bill	 (2000),	Politics,	 the	Rule	 of	Law	 and	 the	 Judiciary.	 -	 -	 Institutions and 
Political Change in Russia.	Ed.	Neil	Robinson.	Great	Britain.	
Carrère	d´Encausse,	Helen	(190),	Confiscated Power, How Soviet Russia Really Works.	
New	York:	Harper	&	Row,	Publishers.	




Gill,	Graeme	(1990),	The	Origins	of	 the	Stalinist	political	 system.	 -	 -	Soviet and East 
European Studies - - 74,	Cambridge.




Migration´s	Ebb	and	Flow,	191–1932.	-	-	Selected papers from the	World Congress of 
Central and East Europe Studies.	Ed.	Judith	Pallot,	Chippenham,	Wiltshire:	Macmillan	
Press	Ltd.
Kivinen,	Markku	(19), Valtion käsitteellisen tutkimisen ongelmista.	Helsingin	yliopisto:	
Helsinki.
Korzhikhina,	 Tat´jana	 Petrovna	 (1995),	 Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i ego utsrezhdeniia, 
noiabr´ 1917- dekabr´ 1991.	 Moskva:	 Rossiiskii	 gosudarstevennii	 gumanitarnii	
universitet.	
Lane,	 David	 (1996),	The Rise and Fall of State Socialism. Industrial Society and the 
Socialist State.UK. 
Lenin,	Vladimir	I.	(196), Kootut teokset neljässä osassa.	Moskova.
Lenin,	V.	I	 (1964),	Polnoe sobranie sotsinenii. Tom 45, mart 1922- mart 1923,	 Institut	
marksizma-leninisma	pri	ZK	KPSS,	Moskva:	Izdatelstvo	polititseskoi	literatury.	
Makarenko,	Viktor	Pavlovich	(199), Biurokratiia i stalinizm.	Rostov-na-Don:	Izdatelstvo	
Rostovskogo	universiteta.
McCauley,	Martin	(ed.)	(195),	The Russian Revolution and The Soviet State 1917–1921. 
London.
Nove,	Alec	(199),	An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.	London:	Penguin	Books.	
Orlovsky,	 Daniel	 T.	 (199),	 Reform	 during	 Revolution:	 Governing	 the	 Provinces	 in	
191.	-	-	Reform in Russia and the USSR. Past and Prospects.	Ed.	Robert	O.	Crummey,	
Illinois.
Pashukanis,	 Jevgeni	 (195),	 Valittuja teoksia yleisen oikeus- ja valtioteorian alalta.	
Moskova:	Kustannusliike	Progress.	
Rowney,	Ron	K.(199),	Transition to Techonology. The Structural Origins of the Soviet 
Administrative State.	Cornell	University	Press.
Sakwa,	Richard	(19),	Soviet Communists in Power. A study of Moscow during the Civil 
War 1918–1921.	Hong	Kong:	The	MacMillan	Press	Ltd.	





Smith,	Gordon	B.(199),	The	Struggle	over	the	Procuracy.	-	-	Reforming Justice in Russia 
1864–1996. Power, Culture and the Limits of Legal Order.	Ed.	Peter	H.	Solomon.	New	
York.
Solomon,	Peter	H.	Jr	(ed.)	(199), Reforming Justice in Russia 1864–1996, Power, Culture 
and the Limits of Legal Order.	New	York.
liTeraTure
359
“Sovershenno sekretno”: Liubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1934 gg.),	tom	1,	
chasti	1–2,	Moskva	2001.
Stalin,	J.V.	(1951),	Teokset, 11 osa, 1928- maaliskuu 1929.	Petroskoi:	Karjalais-suomalaisen	
SNT:n	valtion	kustannusliike.





Sungurov,	Aleksandr	(199),	Funktsii politicheskoi sistemy: ot zastoia k postperestroike.	
Sankt-Petersgburskii	 gumanitarnyi	 i	 politologicheskii	 tsentr	 “Strategiia”,	 Sankt-
Peterburg.
Susiluoto,	 Ilmari	 (199),	 Aasialaisesta tuotantotavasta sosialismiin: byrokratia, 
vallankumoustrategia ja hallinnon rationalisointi Marxista ensimmäiseen viisivuotis-
suunnitelmaan.	 Helsingin	 yliopiston	 valtio-opin	 laitoksen	 tutkimuksia,	 Sarja	 C,	
Sosialistisen	järjestelmän	tutkimuksia	4,	199.
Susiluoto,	 Ilmari	 (194),	 Hallinnon ja hallinnon teorian vuorovaikutuksesta: Leninin 
hallinnollisten toimintaohjeiden muotoutumisesta.	Turun	yliopiston	valtio-opin	laitos.	
Tutkimuksia	-sarja	C,	no	2.
The 1918 Constitution of the RSFSR.	 File://R:\1936	 Constitution	 of	 the	 USSR,	 part	
I.htm
The 1924 Constitution of RSFSR.	File://R:\The	Soviet	Constitution	fo	1924	an	Invitation	
to	World	Federalism.htm
The 1936 Constitution of the USSR.	File://R:\1936	Constitution	of	the	USSR,	TOC.htm
Tolonen,	 Juha	 (196),	 Neuvostoliiton talousjärjestelmä ja sen oikeudelliset perusteet.	
Tampereen	 yliopisto,	 yhteiskuntatieteellinen	 tutkimuslaitos.	 Tampere:	 Tampereen	
yliopiston	keskusmonistamo.
Vucinich,	Alexander	(1960),The	State	and	the	Local	Community.	-	-	The Transformation 
of Russian Society.	Ed.	Cyril	E.	Black,	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	 191–
209.
The Transition of Administrative Culture, 
1986–1991
Afanas´ev,	B.	(191),	The Scientific Management of Society,	USSR.
Arvidsson,	Claes	(1992),	Misslyckandets mekanismer: Den administrative kulturen och 
perestroijkans fall.	 Arbetsrapporter/	 Working	 Papers:13,	 Uppsala	 University,	
Department	of	Soviet	and	East	European	Studies.	
van	den	Berg,	Ger	P.	(1992),	Executive	Power	and	the	Concept	of	Pravovoe	Gosudarstvo.	
-	-	Toward the “rule of law” in Russia? Political and legal reform in the transition period.	
Ed.	Donald	D.	Barry,	New	York.
Bezuglov	A.A	&	Kriazhkov	V.A	 (19),	Glasnost raboty sovetov. Moskva:	 Izdatelstvo	
“Iuridicheskaia	literatura”.




-	Administrative Studies 4/1992, the special issue of intergovernmental relations.
Chiesa,	Giulietto	(1995),	Perestroika:	a	revival	of	Krushchevian	reform	or	a	new	idea	of	
socialist	 society?	 -	 -	 Reform in modern Russian history,	 ed.	Theodor	 Taranovski,	
USA.
Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1977.	http://
www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/cons04.html
Ellman,	Michael	&	Kontorovich,	Vladimir	(eds.)	(199),	The Destruction of the Soviet 
Economic System, An Insider´s History.	New	York.
Entin,	Vladimir	 (1992),	 Lawmaking	Under	Gorbachev	 Judged	by	 the	 Standards	 of	 a	
Law-Based	Society.	--	“Toward the Rule of Law in Russia”. Political and legal reform in 
the transition period.	Ed.	Barry,	Donald	D.,	New	York.	
Eydelman,	Moisei	(199),Monopolized	Statistics	Under	a	Totalitarian	Regime.	-	-	The 
Destruction of the Soviet Economic System. An Insider´s History.	Ed.	Michael	Ellman	
and	Vladimir	Kontorovich,	New	York.
Freinkman,	Lev	(199),	Politics	and	Enterprise	Behavior.	-	-	The Destruction of the Soviet 
Economic System. An Insiders´History.	Ed.	Michael	Ellman	and	Vladimir	Kontorovich,	
New	York.
Friedgut,	Theodore	H.	(193),	The	Soviet	Citizen´s	Perception	of	Local	Government.	-	-	
Soviet Local Politics and Government.	Ed.	Everett	M.	Jacobs,	Guildford:	George,	Allen	
&	Unwin.
Hammer,	 Darrell	 P.	 (196),	The USSR. The Politics of Oligarchy.	 Boulder,	 Colorado:	
Westview	Press.	
Hanson,	 Philip	 (1993),	Local Power and Market Reform in the former Soviet Union.	
Washington	D.C:	RFE/RL	Research	Institute.	
Hazard,	Jonh	N.	(1960),	Settling disputes in Soviet Society.	Studies	of	the	Russian	Institute,	
Columbia	University,	New	York.	
Hill,	 Ronald	 J.	 (193),	The	Development	 of	 Soviet	 Local	 Government	 since	 Stalin´s	
Death.	 -	 -	Soviet Local Politics and Government.	Ed.	Everett	M.	 Jacobs,	Guildford:	
George,	Allen	&	Unwin.
Hough,	Jerry	(1990),	Russia and the West - Gorbachev and the Politics of reform. New	
York:	Simon	&	Schuster	Inc.
Huskey,	Eugene	(1992),	From	Legal	Nihilism	to	Pravovoe	Gosudarstvo.	-	-	Toward “the 
Rule of Law” in	Russia? Political and Legal Reform in the Transition Period.	Ed.	Donald	
D.	Barry,	New	York.
Jordan,	 Pamela	 (2000),	 Russian	Courts:	 Enforcing	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law?	 -	 -	Building the 
Russian State, Institutional crisis and the quest for democratic governance.	Ed.	Valerie	
Sperling,	Boulder,	Colorado:	Westview	Press.	
Kirkow,	 Peter	 (199),	 Russia´s provinces, Authoritarian Transformation versus Local 
Autonomy?	Great	Britain.
Kivinen,	 Markku	 (199),	 Sosiologia	 ja	 Venäjä.	 Hanki	 ja	 jää	 -sarja.	 Hämeenlinna:
Tammi.	




Korzhikhina,	 Tat´iana	 Petrovna	 (1995),	 Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i ego uchrezhdeniia, 
nojabr´ 1917- dekabr´ 1991.	Moskva.
Kositsin,	A.P.	&	Vlasova,	A.V.(red.)	(19),	Sovetskaia militsiia: istoriia i sovremennost 
1917/1987.	Moskva:	Iuriditseskaia	literatura.	
Koval,	V.I	(red.)	(1991), Rossiia segodnia, politicheskii portret v dokumentakh 1985–1991.	
Moskva:	Mezhdunarodnye	otnosheniia.
Kuznetsov,	Juri	(199),	Local	Party	Organs	and	the	Economy	During	Perestroika.	-	-	The 
Destruction of the Soviet Economic System, An Insider´s History.	Ed.	Michael	Ellman	
and	Vladimir	Kontorovich,	New	York.
Lane,	 David	 (1992),	 Soviet Society under perestroika.	 Guildford	 and	 King´s	 Lynn:	
Routledge.
Lewin,	Moshe(1995),	Russia/USSR/Russia, the drive and drift of a superstate.	New	York.
Materialy	XXVII S´ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (196).	Moskva:	
Izdatel´stvo	politicheskoi	literatury.	
Nystén-Haarala,	 Soili	 (2001), Russian Law in Transition,	 Saarijärvi:	 Kikimora	
Publications	Series	B:21.
Petro,	Nicolai	(1992),	Informal	Politics	and	the	Rule	of	Law.	-	-	“Toward the Rule of Law 
in Russia”, political and legal reform in the transition period.	Ed.	Barry,	Donald	D.	New	
York.	
Pietiläinen,	 Jukka	 (1994),	 Leninistä	 liberalismiin. Lehdistöteoreettisten käsitysten 
muuttuminen Neuvostoliitossa ja Venäjällä 1988–1994.	 Tampereen	 yliopisto,	
Tiedotusopin	laitos,	Julkaisuja	B.
Postanovlenie	 XXVII	 S´ezda	 KPCC	 ob	 izmeneniiakh	 v	 ustave	 Kommunisticheskoi	
Partii	 Sovetskogo	 Soiuza	 1	 marta,	 196	 g.	 -	 -	 Materialy	 XXVII S´jezda Kommu-
nisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (196).	 Moskva:	 Izdatelstvo	 polititseskoi	
literatury.
Pursiainen,	Christer	(2001),	Venäjän idea, utopia ja missio.	Ulkopoliittisen	instituutin	
julkaisuja.	Gaudeamus:	Helsinki.
Rigby,	T.H	(199),	Lenin´s Government Sovnarkom 1917–1922.	Bristol.
Sakwa,	Richard	(1990),	Soviet Politics.	Kent.	
Sakwa,	 Richard	 (1999), The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union 1917–1991.	 London:	
Routledge.
Shelley,	Louise	I.	(1991),	Legal	consciousness	and	the	pravovoe	gosudarstvo.	-	-	Toward 
the Rule of Law in Russia? Political and legal reform in the transition period.	Ed.	Donald	
D.	Barry,	New	York.
Shlapentokh,	Vladimir	 (199),	 -	 -	The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System. An 
Insiders´History.	Ed.	Michael	Ellman	and	Vladimir	Kontorovich,	New	York.
Sokolov,	N.V	(1995),	Biurokraticheskaia	kommunikatsiia	v	totalitarnom	obshchestve.	-	
-	Administrativye reformy i parlamentskie protsessy v Rossii i SNG,	Sankt-Peterburg	
Solomon,	Peter	H.	Jr.(199),	Reforming Justice in Russia 1864–1996, Power, Culture and 
the Limits of Legal Order.	Armonk,	New	York:	Sharpe.
Sternheimer,	Stephen	(193),	Communications	and	Power	in	Soviet	Urban	Politics.	-	-	
Soviet Local Politics and Government.	Ed.	Everett	M.	Jacobs,	Guildford:	George,	Allen	
&	Unwin.
Sternheimer,	 Stephen	 (190),	 Running	 Soviet	 Cities:	 Bureaucratic	 degeneration,	
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
362
bureaucratic	politics,	or	urban	management?	-	-	Public policy and administration in 
the Soviet Union. Ed.	by	Gordon	Smith.	New	York:	Praeger	Publishers.	
Sutela,	Pekka	(193),	Neuvostotalouden periaatteet.	Porvoo:WSOY.
Taubman,	 William(193),	 Governing Soviet Cities.	 Bureaucratic Politics and Urban 
Development in the USSR.	New	York:	Preager	Publishers.	
Walker,	Rachel	(1993), Six years that shook the world - Perestroika, the impossible project.	
Glasgow.
Whitefield,	 Stephen	 (1993),	 Industrialization and the Soviet state. New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press.
Zinoviev,	 Aleksandr	 (1991), Gomo Sovietikus. Moi dom - maia tsuzhbina.	 Moskva:	
Proizvodstvenno-izdatelskoe	predpriiatie	“KOR-INF”.
The Transition of Administrative Culture Since 1991
Aarrevaara,	Timo	(1999),	Restructuring Civil Service in Russian Public Administration.	
Helsinki:Ministry	of	Finance,	Finland.
Abdurakhimov,	 J.	 (199),	Vzaimodeistvie	 organov	 samoupravlenia	na	 otetsestvennoi	
pohchve.	-	-	Polis: Politicheskie issledovania,	1/199.
Abramov,	Vitali	F.	(199),	Teoriia	mestnogo	samoupravleniia	na	otechestvennoi	pochve.	
-	-	Polis: politichseskie issledovaniia, 1/1998.
Aduhov,	 A.(1996),	 Reformirovanie	 ekonomiki	 i	 vzaimodeistvie	 tsentra	 i	 regionov	
Rossiiskoi	Federatsii.	-	-RAN.	Voprosy ekonomiki	1996:6,	Moskva.
Administratsiia	goroda-geroiia	Murmanska	(2000),	Material o rabote administratsii g. 
Murmanska c nojabriia 1996 goda po nastoiashee vremia.	Murmansk:	Poligrafist.






Bova,	Russell	 (1999),	Democratization	 and	 the	Crisis	 of	 the	Russian	 State.	 -	 -	State-
Building in Russia. The El’tsin Legacy and the Challenge of the Future.	Ed.Gordon	B.	
Smith.	Armonk,	New	York:	M.E.Sharpe.
Boycko,	 Maxim	 &	 Shleifer,	 Andrei	 &	 Vishny,	 Robert	 (1995),	 Privatizing Russia.	
Cambridge:	The	MIT	Press.	
Dimitrieva,	 J.	 A	 (red.)	 (2000),	 Munitsipal’noe pravo Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	 Moskva:	
Profobrazovanie.
Duka	 A.V	 (red.)	 (2001),	 Regional´nye elity severo-zapada Rossii: politicheskie i 
ekonomicheskie orientatsii.	RAN,	Sankt-Peterburg:	Izdatelstvo	Aleteiia.	
Easter,	Gerald	(2000),	Institutional	Legacy	of	the	Old	Regime	as	a	Constraint	to	Reform:	
the	Case	of	Fiscal	Policy.	-	-	Shaping the Economic Space in Russia: Decision Making 
Processes, Institutions and Adjustments to Change in the El´sin Era.	Ed.	Stefanie	Harter	
and	Gerald	Easter.	Aldershot:	Ashgate.	
Fabrichnyi,	 S.J.	 (1999),	 Pravovoe regulirovanie finansovo-ekonomicheskogo 
liTeraTure
363
vzaimodeistviia sub´ekta federatsii i mestnogo samoupravleniia.	 Biblioteka	
munitsipal´nogo	 sluzhashego,	 Moskva:	 Moskovskii	 obshchestvennii	 nauchnyi	
fond.
Federal´nyi	zakon	O	finansovykh	osnovakh	mestnogo	samoupravleniia	v	Rossiiskoi	
Federatsii,	priniat	Gosudarstvennoi	Dumoi	10.9.199.	-	-	Munitsipal´noe pravo v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii.	Moskva	2000:Izdatelstvo	Profobrazovanie.
Federal´nyi	zakon	ob	obshchikh	printsipakh	organizatsii	mestnogo	samoupravleniia	
v	Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii,	 12.	 avgusta	 1995/26.noiabraia	 1996	 i	 1.	marta	 199.	 -	 -	
Dimitrieva,	 J.	A	(red.)	 (2000),	Munitsipalnoe pravo Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	Moskva:	
Profobrozovanie.
Federal´nyi	zakon	Ob	osnovakh	gosudarstvennoi	sluzhby	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii,	prinjat	
Gosudarstvennoi	Dumoi	5..1995.	-	-	Sbornik zakonov Rossiiskoi Federatsii, fevra´l 
2001.	Moskva:	Itd	Pokrovskii	pri	uchastii	Meditsina
Federal´nyi	 zakon	 Ob	 osnovakh	 munitsipal´noe	 sluzhby	 v	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii,	
prinjat	Gosudarstvennoi	Dumoi	1.12.199.	-	-	Munitsipal´noe pravo v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii. Moskva	2000:	Izdatel´stvo	Profobrazovanie.
Federal´nyi	 zakon	Ob	 osnovakh	 sotsialnogo	 obsluzhivaniia	 naseleniia	 v	 Rossiiskoi	
Federatsii,	 priniat	 Gosudarstvennoi	 Dumoi	 15	 noiabria	 1995	 goda.	 -	 -	 Sbornik 
zakonov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	 fevral´ 2001.	 Moskva:	 Itd	 Pokrovskii	 pri	 uchastii	
Meditsina
Federal´nyi	zakon	O	gosudarstvennikh	pensiiakh	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii,	20.11.1990.	
-	 -Sbornik zakonov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	 fevral´ 2001.	Moskva:	 Itd	Pokrovskii	pri	
uchastii	Meditsina
Friedgut,	Theodore	H.	(193),	The	Soviet	Citizen´s	Perception	of	Local	Government.	
-	-	Soviet Local Politics and Government.	Ed.	Everett	M.	Jacobs,	Guildford:	George,	
Allen	&	Unwin.
Gelman,	 Vladimir	 (199),	 Regional´naia	 vlast´	 v	 sovremennoi	 Rossii:	 instituty,	
rezhimy	i	praktiki.	-	-	Polis: politicheskie issledovaniia 4/1998.
Gelman,	Vladimir	(2000),	The	Politics	of	Russia´s	Regions:	a	Comparative	Perspective.	
-	 -	Shaping the Economic Space in Russia: Decision Making Processes, Institutions 
and Adjustments to Change in the El´tsin Era.	Ed.	Stefanie	Harter	and	Gerald	Easter.	
Aldershot:	Ashgate.	
Giltsenko,	L,	V.	(1996)	Iz	istorii	stanovleniia	mestnogo	samoupravleniia	v	Rossii.	-	-.	
Gosudarstvo i pravo 1996:.	Rossiiskaia	Akademiia	Nauk.
Gosudartsvennyi	komitet	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	po	standardizatsii	i	metrologii:	Pravilo 
po provedeniiu sertifikatsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, utverzhdeno postonovleniem 
Gosstandardta Rossii ot 10.5.2000,	No	26.
Gosudarstvennii	komitet	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	po	statistike	(199), Naselenie Rossii za 
100 let (1897–1997).	Statisticheskii	sbornik.	Moskva.
Gribanova,	 Galina	 (2001),	Material of	 a lecture course “Russian regional and local 
government”.	University of Helsinki, 21.11–5.12.2001.
Grazhdanskii kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	 chast´ pervaia. 1994,	 No	 51-F3.	 Moskva	
2001:	Izdatelstvo	“Osb-9”.
Heusala-Pushnov,	 Anna-Liisa	 (2003),	 Venäjän lainsäädäntö ja oikeussuoja 
yritystoiminnan aloittamisessa.	Aleksanteri	Papers	2:2003,	Saarijärvi.
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
364
Jordan,	Pamela	(2000),	Russian	Courts:	Enforcing	the	Rule	of	Law?	-	-	Building the 
Russian State, Institutional crisis and the quest for democratic governance.	Ed.	Valerie	
Sperling,	Colorado.
Kirianov,	 V.	 &	 Moskovtsev,	 A.	 (1995),	 Novye	 tsentry	 ekonomicheskoi	 vlasti	 i	
parlamentarizm	 v	 Rossii.	 -	 -	Administrativnie reformy i parlamentskie protsessy v 
Rossii i SNG.	Sankt-Peterburg.
Kiselev,	Aleksei	&	Tulin,	Mihail	(19),	Kniga o Murmanske.	Murmansk	19.
Komitet	Gosudarstvennoi	Dumy	po	 voprosam	mestnogo	 samoupravleniia	 (1996),	O	
nekotorikh	voprosakh,	sviazannie	s	realizatsiei	Federalnogo	zakona	“Ob	obshchikh	
printsipakh	 organizatsii	 mestnogo	 samoupravleniia	 v	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii”.	 -	 -	
Rossiiskaia Federatsiia,	obshchestvenno-politicheskii	zhurnal,	9/1996.
Konstitutsiia	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii,	1993.-	-	Sbornik zakonov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	fevral´ 
2001.	Moskva:	Itd	Pokrovskii	pri	uchastii	Meditsina.	
Kordonskii,	Simon	(2000),	Rynki vlasti: Administrativnye rynki SSSR i Rossii.	Moskva:	
OGI.
Korzhikhina,	 Tat´iana	 Petrovna	 (1995),	 Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i ego utsrezhdeniia, 
noiabr´ 1917- dekabr´ 1991.	 Rossiiskii	 gosudarstvennyi	 gumanitarnyi	 universitet,	
Moskva.




Ledeneva,	Alena	V.	 (2000),	The	 Subversion	 of	Democracy	 in	Russia.	 -	 -	Shaping the 
Economic Space in Russia: Decision Making Processes, Institutions and Adjustments to 
Change in the El´tsin Era.	Ed.	Stefanie	Harter	and	Gerald	Easter.	Aldershot:	Ashgate.	








Mäenpää,	Olli,	 (2002)	Lecture given in a seminar on Administrative Court system in 
Finland,	organized	by	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	Helsinki.
Pankratov,	S.A	 (1995),	Razvitie	mestnogo	 samoupravleniia	v	usloviiakh	politicheskoi	
modernizatsii	rossiiskogo	obshchestva.	-	-	Administrativnye reformy i parlamentskie 





Polozhenie o postoiannykh komissiiakh Murmanskogo gorodskgvo soveta,	Prilozhenie	k	




Postanovlenie administratsii Murmanskoi oblasti,	2.11.1996,	N42
O poriadke vzaimodeistviia ispolnitel´nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti i 
obshchestvennikh ob´edineniiakh na territorii Murmanskoi oblasti. http://www.
transparentbudget.ru/rus/zakon.htm
Postanovlenie Ministerstva ekonomicheskogo razvitiia i torgovli Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 
6.4.2004,	 N1.	 http://www.government.gov.ru/data/news_print.html?he_id=103&	
news_id=1399
Postanovlenie o federal´noi programme gosudarstvennoi podderzhki mestnogo 
samoupravleniia	2.12.1995,	No	1251
Postanovlenie	 pravitel’stva	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii,	 ot	 2	 dekabria	 1995,	 No	 1251.	 -	 -	
Rossiiskaia Federatsiia 4/1996.









Shaping the Economic Space in Russia: Decision Making Processes, Institutions and 
Adjustments to Change in the El´tsin Era.	 Ed.	 Stefanie	 Harter	 and	 Gerald	 Easter.	
Aldershot:	Ashgate.	
Sharlet,	Robert	(1999),	Constitutional	Implementation	and	State-Building.	Progress	and	
Problems	of	Law	Reform	in	Russia.	-	-	State-Building in Russia. The YEl’tsin Legacy 
and the Challenge of the Future.	 Ed.Gordon	 B.	 Smith.	 Armonk,	 New	 York:	
M.E.Sharpe.
Shcherbakova,	 Nina	 (199),	 Granitsy	 mestnogo	 samoupravleniia	 v	 svete	 printsipa	
suvereniteta.	-	-	Polis: politichseskie issledovaniia 4/1998.
Sheremet,	 K.(1993),	 Decentralization,	 inter-governmental	 relations	 and	 urban	
administration	 in	 the	 Russian	 Federation.	 --	Local Government in Transition.	 Ed.	
Krister	Ståhlberg,	Helsinki:	Association	of	Finnish	Cities.
Shlemin	P.I	&	Fadeev,	V.	I.	(1993), Mestnoe samoupravlenie Rossiiskoi variant.	Rossiiskaia	
akademiia	 nauk,	 Institut	 nauchnoi	 informatsii	 po	 obshchestvennim	 naukam,	
Moskva.
Shugrina,	 Jekaterina	 (199),	 Voprosy	 funktsionirovaniia	 predstavitel´noi	 vlasti	 na	
mestakh.	-	-	Polis: politicheskie issledovaniia, 4/199.
Smith,	Gordon.	B	(190),	Bureaucratic	Politics	and	Public	Policy	in	the	Soviet	Union.	
-	 -	Public Policy and Administration in the Soviet Union.	Ed.	Gordon	B.	Smith,	New	
York:	Praeger	Publishers.
Smith,	Gordon	B.	(1996),	Reforming the Russian Legal System.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	
University	Press.	
Sokolov,	N.V	(1995),	Biurokratitseskaia	kommunikatsiia	v	totalitarnom	obshchestve.	-	-	
Administrativnye reformy i parlamentskie protsessy v Rossii i SNG.	Sankt-Peterburg.	
Sokolova	 L.P	 (red.)	 (2003),	Munitsipal´noe	 pravo	 v	Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii.	 Pravovye	 i	
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
366
finansogo-ekonomicheskie	 osnovy.	 Petrozavodskii	 gosudarstvennyi	 universitet.	
Izdatelstvo	Petrozavodskogo	gosudarstvennogo	universiteta.	
Solomon,	Peter	H.	Jr	(199),	Reforming Justice in Russia 1864–1996. Power, Culture and 




Stavtseva	A.	P	&	Nikitinski	V.I	(194),	Tietoja työntekijöiden ja virkamiesten työoikeuksien 
tuomioistuinsuojasta Neuvostoliitossa.	 Oikeusministeriön	 lainvalmisteluosaston	
julkaisu	/194,	Helsinki.
Sternheimer,	Stephen	(193),	Communications	and	Power	in	Soviet	Urban	Politics.	-	-	
Soviet Local Politics and Government.	Ed.	Everett	M.	Jacobs,	Guildford:	George,	Allen	
&	Unwin.
Sutela,	Pekka(199),“Miksi	Venäjän	talous	ei	nouse?”-	-	Helsingin Sanomat 4.9.1998.
Tekoniemi,	Marja	 (199),	Keskuksen	 ja	 alueiden	välisten	 suhteiden	kehitys	Venäjällä	
1992–199.-	-	Idäntalouksien katsauksia 3/1998. Suomen	Pankki,	Siirtymätalouksien	
tutkimuslaitos.	
The	Barents	 Euro-Artic	Council.	Working	Group	on	Economic	Cooperation	 (1995),	
Economic geography and structure of the Russian part of the Barents region.	Helsinki:	
Finnish	Barents	Group	Oy.
The Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation /Vyshii arbitrazhnii sud 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	Moskva	199.
Tolonen,	 Juha	 &	 Boris	 Topornin	 (2001), Legal Foundations of Russian Economy.	
Saarijärvi:	Kikimora	Publications.
Tsentral´naia	 Izbiratel´naia	 komissiia	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii	 (199),	 Mestnoe	
samoupravlenie	 v	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii,	 sostaianie,	 osobennosti	 formirovaniia,	
problemy.	-	-	Vestnik 4/1997.
Tshishliaev,	S.(1995),	Aktual´nye	problemy	gosudarstvennogo	stroitelstva	v	Rossii.	-	-	
Administrativnye reformy i parlamentskie protsessy v Rossii i SNG.	Sankt-Peterburg.
Ukaz prezidenta,	N	0649,	20.5.2004	“Voprosy stuktury federal´nykh organov ispolnitel´noi 
vlasti”.
Universitet	Laplandii	–	Kol’skii	Nauchnii	Tsentr	(2000),	Murmanskaia oblast´ v 90-kh 
godakh.	Universitet	Laplandii.	
Ustav goroda geroia Murmanska, 17. dekabria 1995.
 http://www.transparentbudget.ru/rus/zakon.htm
Ustav (osnovnoi zakon) Murmanskoi oblast´i,	 ot	 26.	 nojabria	 199.	 http://www.
transparentbudget.ru/rus/zakon.htm
Vasiljev,	Vsevolod	&	Peshin,	Nikolai	(199),	Medlennim	shagom,	robkim	zigzagom.	-	-	
Rossiiskaia Federatsiia, obshchestvenno-politichseskii zhurnal 7/1997.
Williams,	Christopher	(1996),	Economic	reform	and	political	change	in	Russia,	1991–







Bennett,	 Robert	 (199),European	 economy,	 society,	 politics	 and	 administration:	
symmetry	and	disjuncture.	 -	 -	Territory and Administration in Europe.	Ed.	Robert	
Bennett,	London:	Pinter	Publishers	Limited.
Bours,	 Adriaan,	 (199),	 Management	 by	 territory	 and	 the	 study	 of	 administrative	
geography.	-	-	Territory and Administration in Europe.	Ed.	Robert	Bennett,	Guildford	
and	King´s	Lynn.
Brower,	Daniel	R.(196),	Urban	Revolution	in	the	Late	Russian	Empire.	-	-	The city in 
the late imperial Russia.	Ed.	Michael	Hamm,	Bloomington,	Indiana.	
Cambpell,	Adrian	(1992),	Democracy	vs.	efficiency?	The	conflict	between	representative	
and	executive	rule	in	Russian	local	government	in	1991–1992.	–	Hallinnon tutkimus-	
Administrative Studies 4/1992, the special issue of intergovernmental relations.
Federal´nyi	zakon	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	ot	6	oktiabria	2003	g.,	N131-F3	Ob	obshchikh	
printsipakh	 organizatsii	 mestnogo	 samoupravleniia	 v	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii. - - 
Rossiiskaia gazeta,	.10.2003.
Hammer,	 Darrell	 P.(196), The USSR, The Politics of Oligarchy.	 Boulder,	 Colorado:	
Westview	Press.	
Heady,	Ferrel	(1996),	Public	Administration:	a	comparative	perspective.	USA.
Holmes,	 Stephen,	 (1996),	 Cultural	 Legacies	 or	 State	 Collapse?	 Probing	 the	 Post-
communist	Dilemma?	- - Post-communism: Four Perspectives.	Ed.	Michael	Mandelbaum,	
A	Council	of	Foreign	Relations	Book,	New	York:	Council	on	foreign	relations	book.
Koivisto,	Mauno	(2001), Venäjän idea (Russkaja ideja).	Jyväskylä:	Tammi
Kordonskii,	Simon	(2000), Rynki vlasti. Administrativnye rynki SSSR i Rossii.	Moskva:	
OGI.
Kositsin,	A.P.	&	Vlasova,	A.V.(red.)	(19),	Sovetskaia militsiia: istoriia i sovremennost 
1917/1987.	Moskva:	Iuridicheskaia	literatura.	
Ledeneva,	Alena	V.	 (2000),	The	 Subversion	 of	Democracy	 in	Russia.	 -	 -	Shaping the 
economic space in Russia: decision making processes, institutions and adjustments to 
change in the El´tsin era.	Ed.	Stefanie	Harter,	Gerald	Easter.	Aldershot.	Ashgate.
Mälkiä,	 Matti	 (1995),	 Hallintohistoria,	 hallintotiede,	 julkishallintotiede.	 -	 -	 Julkinen 
hallinto menneisyyden puristuksessa, näkökulmia hallintohistorialliseen tutkimukseen.	
Toim.	Jari	Stenvall	ja	Seppo	Tiihonen,	Tampere:	Tampereen	yliopisto,	A:4.
Peters,	B.	Guy	(194),	The Politics of Bureaucracy.	New	York.
Salminen	 Ari	 &	 Temmes,	 Markku	 (2000),	 Transitioteoriaa etsimässä.	 Kikimora	
Publications,	Series	B:10,	Saarijärvi.
Smith,	Gordon	B.(199),	The	Struggle	over	the	Procuracy.	-	-Reforming Justice in Russia 
1864–1996. Power, Culture and the Limits of Legal Order.	Ed.	Peter	H.	Solomon.	New	
York.
Solnick,	Steven	L.	(1999), Stealing the State, Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions.	
Harvard	University	Press.
Sungurov,	Aleksandr	(199),	Funktsii politicheskoi sistemy: ot chastoia k postperestroike.	
Sankt-Petersburskii	 gumanitarnii	 i	 politologicheskii	 tsentr	 “Strategiia”,	 Sankt-
Peterburg.
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
36
Whitefield,	 Stephen	 (1993),	 Industrialization and the Soviet state. New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press.
Yaney,	George	L.	(193),	The systematization of Russian Government, Social Evolution in 
the Domestic Administration of Imperial Russia, 1711–1905.	 Urbana,	 Illinois:	
University	of	Illinois	Press.	
Laws
Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1977.	http://
www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/cons04.html
Federal´nyi	zakon	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	ot	6	oktiabria	2003	g.,	N131-F3	Ob	obshchikh	
printsipakh	 organizatsii	 mestnogo	 samoupravleniia	 v	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii - - 
Rossiiskaia gazeta,	.10.2003.
Federal´nyi	zakon	ob	obshchikh	printsipakh	organizatsii	mestnogo	samoupravleniia	v	
Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii,	 12.	 avgusta	 1995/26.noiabraia	 1996	 i	 1.	 marta	 199.	 -	 -	
Dimitrieva,	 J.	A	 (red.)	 (2000),	Munitsipal´noe pravo Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	Moskva:	
Profobrozovanie.	
Federal´nyi	zakon	Ob	osnovakh	gosudarstvennoi	sluzhby	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii,	priniat	
Gosudarstvennoi	Dumoi	5..1995,	No	35-F3.	-	-	Sbornik zakonov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	
fevral´ 2001,	Moskva:	Itd	Pokrovskii	pri	uchastii	Meditsina.	
Federal´nyi	zakon	Ob	osnovakh	munitsipalnoe	sluzhby	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii,	priniat	
Gosudarstvennoi	Dumoi	1.12.199.	-	-	Munitsipal´noe pravo v Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	
Moskva	2000.
Federal´nyi zakon Ob osnovakh sotsialnogo obsluzhivaniia naseleniia v Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii,	priniat	Gosudarstvennoi	Dumoi	15	noiabria	1995	goda.
Federal´nyi	zakon	O	gosudarstvennikh	pensiiakh	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii,	20.11.1990.	-	-	
Sbornik zakonov Rossiiskoi Federatsii, fevral´ 2001.	Moskva:	Itd	Pokrovskii	pri	uchastii	
Meditsina.	
Federal´nyi	 zakon	 O	 finansovikh	 osnovakh	 mestnogo	 samoupravleniia	 v	 Rossiiskoi	
Federatsii,	 priniat	 Gosudarstvennoi	 Dumoi	 10.9.199.-	 -	 Munitsipal´noe pravo v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	Moskva	2000.
Federal´nyi	zakon	O	prokurature	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	1992(/1995	No	16-F3/1999,	
No	 31-F3,	 No	 202-F3/2000,	 No	 19-F3). - - Sbornik zakonov Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 
fevral´ 2001.	Moskva:	Itd	Pokrovskii	pri	uchastii	Meditsina.	
Federal´nyi	zakon	ob	obzhalovanii	v	 sud	deistvii	 i	 reshenii	narushaiushchikh	prava	 i	
svobody	 grazhdan,	 No	 466–1,	 2.aprelia,	 1995.	 -	 -	 Sbornik zakonov Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, fevral´ 2001.	Moskva:	Itd	Pokrovskii	pri	uchastii	Meditsina.	
Federal´nyi zakon o sertifikatsii produktsii i uslug,	10.6.1993,	N	5153–1
Grazhdanskii kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii, chast´ pervaia	1994,	No	51-F3,	Moskva	2001:	
Izdatelstvo	“Osb-9”.
Konstitutsiia	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	1993, - - Sbornik zakonov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,	fevral´ 
2001.	Moskva:	Itd	Pokrovskii	pri	uchastii	Meditsina.




Manifesto 17 October 1905.	File://R:\The	October	Manifesto	of	1905.htm
Polozhenie o postoiannikh komissijakh Murmanskogo gorodsgovo soveta,	Prilozhenie	k	
resheniiu	 Murmanskogo	 gorodskovo	 soveta	 ot	 4.2.199,	 N	 2–42.	 http://www.
transparentbudget.ru/rus/zakon.htm
Postanovlenie administratsiia Murmanskoi oblast´i,	2.11.1996,	N42
O poriadke vzaimodeistviia ispolnitelnikh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti i 
obshchestvennykh ob´edinenii na territorii Murmanskoi oblast´i. http://www.
transparentbudget.ru/rus/zakon.htm
Postanovlenie administratsiia Murmanskoi oblast´i,1..199,	N254	O strukture organov 
ispolnitel´noi vlasti Murmanskoi oblast´i (administratsii Murmanskoi oblast´i). http://
www.transparentbudget.ru/rus/zakon.htm
Postanovlenie	 XXVII	 S´ezda	 KPCC	 ob	 izmeneniiakh	 v	 ustave	 Kommunisticheskoi	
Partii	 Sovetskogo	 Soiuza	 1	 marta,	 196	 g.	 -	 -	 Materialy	 XXVII S´jezda 
Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (196),	Moskva:	Izdatelstvo	polititseskoi	
literatury.
Postanovlenie Ministerstva ekonomicheskoi razvitiia i torgovly Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, 6.4.2004,	 N1.	 http://www.government.gov.ru/data/news_print.html?he_
id=103&news_id=1399
Postanovlenie o federal’noi programme gosudarstvennoi podderzhki mestnogo 
samoupravleniia	2.12.1995,	No	1251
Russian Fundamental Law of April 1906.	 File://R:\The	 Russian	 Fundamental	 Law	 of	
1906.htm
The 1918 Constitution of the RSFSR.	 File://R:\1936	 Constitution	 of	 the	 USSR,	 part	
I.htm
The 1924 Constitution of RSFSR.	File://R:\The	Soviet	Constitution	of	1924	an	Invitation	
to	World	
The 1936 Constitution of the USSR.	File://R:\1936	Constitution	of	the	USSR,	TOC.htm















Accountability	 125,	 12,	 166,	 209,	 219,	
304
Acton	96,	9


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3	 Rosenholm,	 Arja	 (1999):	 Gendering	 Awakening	 :	 Femininity	 and	 the	 Russian	
Woman	Question	of	the	160s.	951-45-92-4
4	 Lonkila,	Markku	 (	 I	 999):	 Social	Networks	 in	Post-Soviet	Russia:	Continuity	 and	
Change	in	the	Everyday	Life	of	St.	Petersburg	Teachers.	951-45-91	I-4











10	Ylikangas,	Mikko	 (2004):	 Rivit	 suoriksi!	 Kaunokirjallisuuden	 poliittinen	 valvonta	
Neuvosto-Karjalassa	191-1940.	952-10-2059-.
11	Turunen,	 Maija	 (2005):	 Faith	 in	 the	 Heart	 of	 Russia:	 The	 Religiosity	 of	 Post-
SovietUniversity	Students	






2	 Granberg,	 Leo	 (ed.)	 (199):	 The	 Snowbelt:	 Studies	 on	 the	 European	 North	 in	
Transition.	951-45-253-5
3	 Sutela,	 Pekka	 (199):	The	Road	 to	 the	Russian	Market	 Economy:	 Selected	Essays	
1993-199.	951-45-409-0
4	 Törnroos,	 Jan-Åke	and	Nieminen,	 Jarmo	 (eds.)	 (1999):	Business	Entry	 in	Eastern	
Europe:	A	Network	and	Learning	Approach	with	Case	Studies.	951-45-60-6
5	 Miklossy,	 Katalin	 (toim.)	 (1999):	 Syitä	 ja	 seurauksia:	 Jugoslavian	 hajoaminen	 ja	
seuraajavaltioiden	nykytilanne.	951-45-61-4
6	 Vinnikov,	Aleksandr:	Tsena	svobody.	5-939-002-9.	




9	 Komulainen,	 Tuomas	 and	 Korhonen,	 Iikka	 (eds.)	 (2000):	 Russian	 Crisis	 and	 Its	
Effects.	951-45-9100-3
10	Salminen,	 Ari	 ja	 Temmes,	 Markku	 (2000):	 Transitioteoriaa	 etsimässä.	
951-45-923-






















24	Laine,	Antti	 and	Ylikangas,	Mikko	 (eds.	 )(2001):	Rise	 and	Fall	 of	 Soviet	Karelia	 :	
People	and	Power.	952-10-0099-6
25	Kivinen,	Markku	and	Pynnöniemi,	Katri	 (eds.)	 (2002):	Beyond	the	Garden	Ring	 :	
Dimensions	of	Russian	Regionalism.	ISBN	952-10-0544-0
26	Medijainen,	 Eero	 and	Made,	 Vahur	 (eds.)	 (2002):	 Estonian	 Foreign	 Policy	 at	 the	
Cross-Roads.	952-10-054-0
2	Paastela,	 Jukka	 (2003):	 Finnish	 Communism	 under	 Soviet	 Totalitarianism	 :	
Oppositions	within	the	Finnish	Communist	Party	in	Soviet	Russia	191-1935.	952-
10-055-9.
2	Nyyssönen,	Heino	 (toim.)	 (2003):	 Itäinen	Keski-Eurooppa	 vuonna	 2004.	 952-10-
1309-5.
29	Novikova,	 Irina	 and	 Kambourov,	 Dimitar	 (2003):	 Men	 in	 the	 Global	 World	 :	
Integrating	Post-Socialist	Perspectives.	952-10-130-.
30	Alapuro,	 Risto,	 Liikanen,	 Ilkka	 and	 Lonkila,	Markku	 (2003):	 Beyond	 Post-Soviet	





33	Smith,	Hanna	 (ed.)(2005):	Russia	and	 its	Foreign	Policy:	 Influences,	 Interests	and	
Issues.	952-10-230-5.
34	Melin,	Harri	(ed.)	(2005):	Social	Structure,	Public	Space	and	Civil	Society	in	Karelia.	
952-10-249-.
Orders: Aleksanteri	Institute	PO.Box	42	Fin-00014	University	of	Helsinki.	
Telephone	+35-9-191	2660	Telefax	+35-9-191	2616	E-mail:	kikimora-
publications@helsinki.fi	www.kikimora-publications.com
